CHAPTER 5 ~ ECONOMIC/ SOCIAL DEGRADATION IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD ~

Edition 4, November 2009 (Updated January 2010)

~ TABLE OF CONTENTS ~

[5-A] ~ Health-Care Benefits ~ [A1]~General, [A2]~Maternity Leave, ~
[5-B] ~
Unemployment Benefits and Rates, ~
[5-C] ~
Retirement Benefits, ~
[5-D] ~
Temporary Employment ~
[5-E] ~
Wages and Hours ~
[5-F] ~
Saving, Credit, Bankruptcies ~
[5-G] ~
Jobs and Labor-Force Size Data ~ [G1]~General, [G2]~Factory, ~
[5-H] ~
Social Costs, ~
[5- I] ~
Work Force Population Shifts ~
[5-J] ~
Labor/Management Relations and Work Rules, ~
[5-K] ~
Female Participation in the Work Force, ~
[5-L] ~
Trade Disadvantages, ~
[5-M] ~
Economic Polarization, ~
[5-N] ~
Sustainability Issues, ~
[5-O] ~
Currency Declines, ~
[5-P] ~
Globalization Case Studies ~[P1]~Viet Nam, [P2]~China, [P3]~Japan, [P4]~EU, ~
[5-Q] ~
Human Capital Issues, ~
[5-R] ~
Financial Capital Glut, High Risk Investments, Interest Rates, ~
[5-S] ~
Labor Force Participation, ~
[5-T] ~
Caste System, ~
[5-U] ~
Natural Resource Prices ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

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SECTION [5-A] ~ Health-Care Benefits ~ [A1]~General, [A2]~Maternity Leave, ~

The average employee contribution to company-provided health insurance has increased more than 143% since 2000. During the same time period employment-based health insurance premiums have increased 100%, compared to cumulative inflation of 24% and cumulative wage growth of 21% during the same period (09R2). NOTE: This is only marginally relevant to the globalization issue

The average employee contribution to company-provided health insurance has increased more than 143% since 2000. During the same time period employment-based health insurance premiums have increased 100%, compared to cumulative inflation of 24% and cumulative wage growth of 21% during the same period (09R2).

Part [A1] ~ General ~

About 64% of college graduates in the US received health coverage in entry-level jobs in 2005, vs. 71% in 2000. 33% of workers with high school diplomas received health coverage in entry-level jobs, vs. 67% in 1979 (06G3). (Rcgd)

Percentage of large companies (more than 500 employees) offering health coverage to retired employees (from a graph) (Data from Mercer). (Wall Street Journal (12/28/07))

Year

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2007

To pre-Medicare-
eligible retirees

46

40

35

29

29

30

To Medicare-eligible retirees

40

34

28

23

21

21

Percentage of US firms with more than 200 employees that offer retiree health benefits: (from a graph) (06W1) (Rcgd))

Year

1988

1991

1995

1998

2001

2003

2005

Percent

67

47

40

40

38

39

33

Sources: Kaiser/ HRET; KMPG; Health Insurance Association of America.

The percentage of the US on private medical insurance not job-related fell from 6.9 to 5.5% during 1997-2003 (04F2).

During 1997-2003 the percentage of the US population enrolled in public health insurance (Medicaid and SCHIP) increased from 7.6 to 11.9% while the percentage of uninsured fell from 15.4 to 15.0% (04F2).

The percentage of children enrolled in programs such as State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) increased from 37.9 to 49.3% during 2001-03 (This was a big reason why the number of US uninsured did not grow significantly during 2001-03 (04F2).

During the economic boom of the late 1990s, the percentage of Americans with health benefits tied to their jobs rose modestly, e.g. employer medical insurance covered 65.1% of the population in 1997 (04F2).

The number of Americans with job-related health benefits declined to 63 from 67% between 2001-03 (04F2). The cost of health insurance increased 28% over these two years (04F2).

Some 5.5 million people received long-term disability benefits in 2002, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, a 62% jump since 1992 (03P2).

As recently as 3-5 years ago, most companies paid health benefits for the long-term disabled until they were 65 (when federal Medicare benefits kick in). Today, 15% of companies do. 27% of companies now fire disabled workers as soon as they go on long-term disability (03P2).

In a survey of 435 large employers in 12/02, The Kaiser Family Foundation found that 5% considered themselves very or somewhat likely to terminate subsidized health care coverage for current retirees at some point in the future (03C2).

About 22% or American retirees (about 8.8 million people) get health insurance through a former employer, according to the Department of Labor (03C2).

The United Steelworkers of America says that nearly 200,000 retired steelworkers nationwide have lost health care benefits or will lose them in the coming months because of the bankruptcies of LTV and Bethlehem Steel (03C2).

Americans without Health Insurance, in millions (Wall Street Journal (9/12/03)) (from a graph)

Year

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Millions

31

33

33.5

35

35.5

38.5

39.8

39.8

41

.

Year

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Millions

41.5

43.6

44.2

39.5

39.9

41

On average, large employers pay 60% of retirees' health-care costs, while retirees contribute the remaining 40% (02K1). The companies surveyed have 5.4 million employees and their family members. Health care benefits cost them $12.5 billion in 2001 and an estimated $14.5 billion in 2002 (02K1).

About 85% of large employers said they would continue to pass on more health care costs to retirees. Over 2002 retiree contributions increased an average of 20% (02K1).

More than one third of the large employers that offer health care to retired workers have recently stopped such benefits for future retirees (13%), or expect to do so within the next three years (22%) (02K1) (Rcgd).

Only 38% of all new jobs in the US offered health benefits, vs. 43% in 1979 (93Z2).

In 2000 the number of Americans with no health-care insurance fell 600,000 to 38.7 million from 39.3 million in 1999 (Census Bureau data) (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (12/6/01)).

In 2001 the number of Americans with no health insurance increased to 41.2 million (14.6%) from 39.8 million (14.2%) in 2000 (Census Bureau data) (Wall Street Journal (9/30/02)).

One out of every 8 Americans have no private or public health insurance, and 65% of these 32.7 million people are working adults and their families. 178 million Americans have private health insurance, including 20 million American Medicare beneficiaries who have purchased private supplemental insurance. Medicaid covers 12 million Americans who are covered solely by Medicaid. Nationwide, America's private hospitals in 1984, handed out $6.9 billion in debts and charity. The study found a major portion of this uncompensated care - $6.7 billion- was cost-shifted onto the hospital bills of privately insured patients (Stephen G. Thompkins, Pittsburgh Press (8/4/86) reporting on an AHA study "Cost and Compassion").

Pre-Medicare-eligible Retired Employees receiving Medical Coverage from Employers (for employers with 500+ workers) (William M. Mercer Inc. data) (Wall Street Journal (3/13/01)):

Year

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Percent

 46

43

41

40

38

36

35

31

In 1998 (the latest year for which full statistics are available) 62.9% of US private sector workers had employer-provided health insurance (vs. 63.1% in 1989) (01U1).

The number of Americans without health insurance increased by 1.1 million during 1996, although the percentage without it, 15.6%, remained unchanged (Census Bureau data) (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (9/30/97)).

US Health Care Economics (Peter T. Kilborn, Pittsburgh Post Gazette (2/28/99))

Americans Without Health Insurance (Wall Street Journal (2/23/98) and (9/28/98) and (9/30/02)) (Census Bureau data) (from a graph) (Numbers are in millions)

Year

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Pct.

13.0

13.5

13.7

14.0

14.1

15.0

15.3

15.2

15.4

No.

31

32

33

35

36

40

40

40

40

Year

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Pct.

15.6

16.1

16.3

14.3

14.2

14.6

No.

42

??

.

.

.

.

Some 39% of the 503 small businesses surveyed said they offer health-care benefits in mid-1998 (46% in mid-1996). (Wall Street Journal (6/24/98)).

Some 57% of companies provided dental coverage in 1995, vs. 77% in 1984. Among those who retained coverage (in 1995), 54% helped pay for individual coverage, vs. 34% in 1988 (Wall Street Journal (11/10/98)) (Bureau of Labor Statistics data).

The number of new hourly jobs with health insurance dropped from 23% of the total in 1979 to 15% in 1988 (Clare Ansberry, Thomas F. O'Boyle, "Voice of a Generation Fear for Status of American Dream", Wall Street Journal (8/12/92)).

Number of people in the US without health insurance for all of 1992: 37.4 million (Wall Street Journal (10/05/93)) (22.2% under age 18; 42.2% aged 18-34; 27.3% aged 35-54, 8.3% over age 55).

In a study of 56 retiree health plans offered by companies with at least 5000 active employees, it was found that 17% have "virtually eliminated their liabilities for such benefits by requiring retirees to pay the full premium. 20% have eliminated such plans altogether for new hires (02G1).

The share of private-sector establishments offering health insurance to retirees under age 65 dropped to 12% in 2000 from 21.6% in 1997. Offerings to retirees who were 65 and older dropped to 10.7% from 19.5% during 1997-2000 (02G1).

Employers who continue to offer retiree health benefits to future retirees and new hires have reduced their share of the premiums, on average, from 80% for current retirees to less than 60% for future retirees. They are also requiring longer stints at the company to qualify, with only about 25% of the plans offering benefits as of last year to workers retiring with 5 or fewer years of service, compared with nearly 90% in 1984 (02G1).

Although 25% of companies have imposed caps on their contributions to each retiree's health care premiums, 39% have imposed them for current employees who qualify for future benefits, and 45% have caps in place for new hires. Also the caps are dropping. The median cap of $4450 for current retirees under age 65 drops to $3900 for future retirees (02G1).

In the 1980s, a 60-year-old employee with 10 years on the job could expect to contribute 39% of total lifetime retirement medical costs not paid by Medicare. By 2001, that share had shop up to 68%. By 2031, retirees shifted to medical accounts or plans with caps can expect to pay 92% of these costs (02G1).

Part [5A2] ~ Maternity Leave ~

A survey of 1002 US employers of 10/13/05 by the Families and Work Institute shows that 17% of US companies now offer full pay during maternity leave, vs. 27% in 1998. Another 2005 survey of 386 human resource managers by Society for human resource managers showed that 17% of those employers paid maternity leave, down from 19% in 2001 (05S2).

Go to top of this Section [5-A] ~ Health-Care benefits ~
Go to top of this Chapter 5 ~
Economic/ Social Degradation in the Developed World ~

SECTION [5-B] ~ UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND RATES ~

Jobless rates in developed countries. Source: OECD, Eurostat, U. K. Government (From a chart in Wall Street Journal (12/28/09) p. A10) Comments: Note that conditions are worsening. The Great Recession began in late 2007.)

Time

Oct. 2009

Aug. 2008

Norway

3.1

2.4

Netherlands

3.7

2.7

Austria

4.7

3.8

Japan

5.1

4.1

Germany

7.5

7.2

U.K.

7.9

5.8

Canada

*8.5

6.2

U.S.

*10.0

6.2

France

10.1

7.8

Ireland

12.8

6.3

Spain

19.3

11.8

* November 2009

Job seekers in July 2009 outnumber openings 6 to 1, the worst ratio since the government began tracking open positions in 2000. Some 2.4 million full-time permanent jobs were open, with 14.5 million people officially unemployed. At the beginning of 2009, job seekers outnumbered jobs 4 to 1. In the recession of 2001, the number of jobless reached little more than twice the number of full-time job openings. From the beginning of the recession in December 2007 through July of 2009, job openings declined 45% in the West, 36% in the Midwest, and 23% in the Northeast (09G3). 

Some 17.5% of workers were unemployed in October 2009. The previous high was 17.1% in December of 1982. This broader rate includes the officially unemployed, who have looked for work in the past four weeks. It also includes discouraged workers who have looked in the past year, as well as part-time workers who want to be working full time. The broader rate is highest in states that had big housing bubbles, e.g. CA and AZ, or have large manufacturing sectors, e.g. MI, OH, OR, RI, and SC. (09L2)

A recent book by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, two economists, found that over the last century the typical crisis had caused the jobless rate in the country where it occurred to rise for almost five years. By that standard, the US jobless rate will continue to rise for two more years, through the end of 2011. (09L2)

Nearly 16 million people are now unemployed, and more than 7 million jobs have been lost since late 2007. (09L2)

NOTE: This is only marginally relevant to the globalization issue.

In Spain, unemployment among people ages 16-24 is 42.9%, the highest in Europe, and more than double Spain's overall rate (19.3%). The overall unemployment rate in the EU is 9.8%. The unemployment rate among Spanish young people at the height of the boom just before the current recession was 17.5% (10S1).

In the last 12 months, the jobless rate in the US among workers ages16-24 has risen to 19.1 from 13.9%. Economists expect that rate to remain high, even as the overall jobless rate in the US (now 10%) begins to shrink (10S1).

Some current youth unemployment rates: Greece-25%; Ireland-28.4%; Italy-26.9%; Slovakia-27.9%; Poland 21.2% (vs. 35% a few years ago.) (10S1).

Job seekers in July 2009 outnumber openings 6 to 1, the worst ratio since the government began tracking open positions in 2000. Some 2.4 million full-time permanent jobs were open, with 14.5 million people officially unemployed. At the beginning of 2009, job seekers outnumbered jobs 4 to 1. In the recession of 2001, the number of jobless reached little more than twice the number of full-time job openings. From the beginning of the recession in December 2007 through July of 2009, job openings declined 45% in the West, 36% in the Midwest, and 23% in the Northeast (09G3). 

Legally mandated severance costs in weeks of pay (based on a set of assumptions including 20 years of full-time employment) Source: World Bank. (06W4) (NOTE: This might not be relevant to the globalization issue.)
US (0); Italy (1.7); Singapore (4.0); Japan (8.6); UK (22.1); France (31.8); India (55.9); Germany (69.3); China (91.0); Indonesia (108.3); Sri Lanka (177.7); Egypt (186.3); Sierra Leone (328.7); Zimbabwe (446.3).

About 3.6 million American workers ran out of unemployment insurance benefits in 2004, the most in at least 3 decades (John Leland, "For Unemployed, Wait for New Work Grows Longer", New York Times (1/9/05)). (Rcgd)

According to the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, the percentage of unemployed US workers who qualified for unemployment insurance (now known as "employment insurance") dropped from 87% in 1989 to 39% in 2001 (03M3) (Rgcd)

US unemployment rates: 8.1% in the 1980s, 4.8% in the 1960s (87T1).

Only 15% of workers displaced in the last recession expect to return to their former jobs, compared with an average of 44% in four previous recessions (93Z2). (Rcgd)

Nationwide, the maximum severance offered by 168 employers to rank-and-file employees averaged 24 weeks of pay (in 2001?), compared with 30 weeks in 1997, says a survey by Manchester Inc. a career-management firm. Because employees stay on jobs for shorter periods these days, tenure-based packages may not be as big (Wall Street Journal (6/5/01)).

Japanese Unemployment Rates (Datastream data) (Wall Street Journal (12/28/98)) (from a graph)

Year ~

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

1998

Percent

2.0

2.3

2.8

2.2

3.4

4.5

Comments: The mid-1990s increase probably resulted from a real estate valuation bubble bursting. The long-term trend probably reflects the need to compete with growing Chinese exports and Chinese wages far smaller than Japan's.

Value of US Food Stamps issued in fiscal years ending Sept.30 (in $billions) (Agriculture Department Data) (from a chart) {w60}

Year

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Value

10.5

10.5

11.0

12.0

14.0

17.0

21.0

22.0

23.0

Since the Canadian-US free trade agreement came into effect, the Canadian Unemployment Insurance Program has been repeatedly reformed so that less than 50% of unemployed workers now qualify for benefits, vs. over 90% in 1988. Welfare benefits have also been cut severely. Social spending has fallen sharply as a share of the Canadian economy (Wall Street Journal (12/23/97)). (Rcgd)

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SECTION [5-C] ~ RETIREMENT BENEFITS ~

Corporations are now shifting from "defined benefit" (guaranteed monthly payments based on salary and years of service paid by the corporation for the rest of your life) to "defined contribution" (an amount of your salary you can put into your retirement account). From 1978 to 2009, the number of "defined benefit" plans declined from 128,041 (covering 41% of private sector workers) to 26,000. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, only 21% of workers in the private sector have "defined benefit" plans (09R2). 

Corporations are now shifting from "defined benefit" (guaranteed monthly payments based on salary and years of service paid by the corporation for the rest of your life) to "defined contribution" (an amount of your salary you can put into your retirement account). From 1978 to 2009, the number of "defined benefit" plans declined from 128,041 (covering 41% of private sector workers) to 26,000. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, only 21% of workers in the private sector have "defined benefit" plans (09R2). 

Percentage of working-age households at risk of being unable to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement, by age and income (from a chart prepared by Retirement Research at Boston College) (06R1).

Birth Years

1946-1954

1955-1964

1965-1972

Income

Top
33%

Middle
33%

Bottom
33%

Top
33%

Middle
33%

Bottom
33%

Top
33%

Middle
33%

Bottom
33%

% at risk

33%

28%

44%

35%

43%

53%

42%

45%

60%

The tendency of younger workers to have more problems is attributed to (declining) rates of personal savings, changes (mainly reductions or eliminations) in employer pension plans, and changes in social security in recent decades (06R1).

In 2004, 11% of Fortune 1000 companies had frozen or terminated pension plans, up from 7% in 2003 according to Watson Wyatt Worldwide. Experts expect the trend to continue. Companies in the S&P 500 have $292 billion in non-funded health care and other retirement benefits, vs. a $150 billion pension-funding shortfall (S&P data of 2005) (Len Boselovic and Christopher Snowbeck, "Future of health, pension benefits cloudy", Pittsburgh Post Gazette (12/29/05), p. E1.).

Degree to which U.S. single-employer pension plans are under-funded (Source: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation) (From a chart in Pittsburgh Post Gazette (8/15/05) p. A8) (in billions of US$). ((Rcgd)  

Year

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Amount

15

20

30

55

85

60

100

105

40

400

450+

Magnitude of US Pension Plan Deficits (05G1) (Rcgd)

Row 1: Number of corporations reporting deficits in their pension plans in excess of $50 million.
Row 2: Aggregate deficit in these pension plans (in billions of US$).

Year

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Number of Deficit Pension Plans

50

80

261

365

385

Aggregate Deficit of these Plans

18

20

111

306

270

About 0% of employees in the US currently has a traditional pension plan with their employers. Two decades ago the figure was 40% (05G1). (Rcgd)

Companies paid $1.5 billion in premiums in 2003 to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (The PBGC is not taxpayer-financed.) (04B1).

The number of retirees and workers entitled to pension benefits from PBGC topped one million in 2004 (04B1).

The PBGC paid out $3.0 billion in retirement benefits to US retirees during the fiscal year ending 9/30/04 (04B1).

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC), the federal agency that insures pension plans covering more than 44 million Americans, reported a record deficit of $23.5 billion on 11/15/04, vs. the previous record of $11.5 billion set in 2003 (04B1). Large corporate pension plans accounted for nearly the entire PBGC deficit, which measures the difference between the PBGC's $40.1 billion in assets and the $63.6 billion in benefits it is obligated to pay. In 2001 the PBGC had a surplus of $7.8 billion (04B1).

In 2003, 1119 company pension plans were terminated in the US. Since 2000, companies have shuttered nearly 7500 pension plans in the US (04O1). About 31,000 private sector pension plans still exist in the US (04O1). (Rcgd)

During the first 8 months of 2004, more than 1200 pension plans were terminated in the US, affecting tens of thousands of workers across the US, according to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC) (04O1). (Rcgd)

During fiscal year 2002, 144 failed companies with 187,000 retirees turned worker pension plans over to the federal government, vs. 89,000 retirees in FY 2001 (03C2).

Only 15% of all new jobs offered pension benefits, vs. 23% (in 1979?) (93Z2).

During 1950-1975, the percentage of private sector, full-time, year-round employees in jobs where they were earning credits toward a pension roughly doubled to 52%. The employee Benefit Research Institute reported that the share of all civilian non-farm workers who were earning credits toward a pension dropped from about 50% of the labor force in 1979 to 46.1% in 1983 and 44.2% in 1988. This means that 57 million workers weren't earning credits. Experts expect that for a while, the ratio of elderly retirees receiving pensions will grow beyond the current 30%, reflecting the upward surge in pension-covered jobs in 1950-75 and a recent law reducing, to 5 years, the time a person must usually work in a firm's plan to "vest"- earn a permanent right to some future pension. But the number of recipients will level off and perhaps even start dropping because of the decline in workers earning credits on the job (91U1).

In 1998 (the latest year for which full statistics are available) 49.2% had employer-provided pension plans (vs.44.3% in 1989 and 51.1% in 1978) (01U1).

An article by Ellen E. Schultz (Wall Street Journal (7/27/00)) discusses the trend of US employers devising all types of complex revisions to pension rules that result in reduced pensions without employees being aware of what is happening. A lawyer who runs a pension-consulting firm in Dallas was quoted as saying, "Never have so few plundered so much from so many." (Rcgd)

Roughly half of the workers on private payrolls do not have employer-sponsored retirement plans at all. About 74% of the best-paid fifth of American workers participate in some form of pension plan on the job, but only 17% of the lowest-paid fifth do (Economic Policy Institute analysis of Labor Department data) (Wall Street Journal (3/7/02)).

About 19% of the 503 small businesses surveyed said they offer retirement plans in mid-1998. The figure for mid-1996 was 28% (Wall Street Journal (6/24/98)). (Rcgd)

The number of new hourly jobs with pensions dropped to 30% of the total in 1988 from 43% in 1979 (Clare Ansberry, Thomas F. O'Boyle, "Voice of a Generation Fear for the Status of American Dream", Wall Street Journal (8/12/92)).

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SECTION [5-D] ~ TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT/ CONTRACT LABOR ~

The number of US workers working part-time for economic reasons in 2007 was 4.79 million vs. 4.13 million in 2006, the highest since 1993. In 2007, 1.8 million people in the US worked at two (or more?) part-time jobs for economic reasons, the highest number since the government began tracking such data in 1994 (08M1).

The average supermarket employee lost 3 hours per week since 2003, from 32.3 hours to 29.5 hours. Retain workers overall have lost 0.7 hours per week over the same period (08M1).

Overall the part-time share of the job market in the US has been fairly constant, accounting for about 17% of jobs (08M1).

Part-time jobs typically pay 10% to 20% less per hour than comparable full-time work. Often they receive no health or retirement benefits and little job security, even though some "part-timers" work 60 hours per week or more. Those working two part-time jobs are taxed twice for unemployment insurance (08M1).

Number of people in the US working part-time for economic reasons (in millions) (from a chart) (Source: US Labor Department) (08M1)
2001 - 3.2 || 2002 - 4.2 || 2003 - 4.4 || 2004 - 4.4 || 2005 - 4.3 || 2006 - 4.1 || 2007 - 4.3 ||

There are an estimated 117,600 day- laborers in the US on a typical day. An interview of 2600 day-laborers at 264 hiring sites found that they earn a median of $10/ hour and $700/ month. Incredibly high incidence of wage violations and injuries were found. 49% of those interviewed said that in the previous 2 months an employer had not paid them for one or more day's work. 44% said that some employers did not give them any breaks during the workday. 28% said employers had insulted them (06G1).

The Bush administration announced, on 11/14/03, plans to eliminate about half of the 1.7 million federal civilian workers by contracting out jobs. Advocates of this estimate savings of more than 30% (03H1) (Rcgd).

A K-Mart spokesman stated that one of the corporation's goals is to staff the company's 1800 stores mostly with part-time people (who will not be eligible for benefits) (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (9/4/02)).

A decade ago, BankAmerica had mostly full-time employees. Soon, only 19% will work full time; nearly 60% will work fewer than 20 hours per week and receive no benefits (93Z2). (Rcgd)

A series of articles (93Z2) argues that companies are turning to contingent labor - part-timers, temporaries, and contract-labor -- to avoid fringe benefits and increase profits.

Part-timers (no benefits) in Japan now make up 23% of Japan's work force, up from 17% in 1995, according to government data. Many of these "part-timers" work 48 hours per week. Both the US and Europe have been adding temporary- and part-time workers to their work forces (Yumiko Ono, Wall Street Journal (12/19/01)). (Rcgd)

"Contingent workers" under one US government definition, are people who've worked on a job for a year or less, and who expect to work there for another year or less. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated the number of such workers in 1997 as just over 3 million, vs. 3.4 million in 1995. Of those, only 9.4% had employer-sponsored health insurance, and 13% were offered pension coverage (Wall Street Journal (1/12/99)).

Average job tenure in the US: 7 years in 2001; 8 years in 2000; 9 years in 1999. (This is from a survey of about 2000 laid-off clients of outplacement concern Drake Beam Morin as reported in Wall Street Journal, early in 2002.)

About 31% of the 503 small businesses surveyed said they hired temporary workers in 1997. The figure for 1996 was 22% (
Wall Street Journal (6/24/98)). (Rcgd)

Europe's temporary-labor market is growing by more than 10%/ year.
US has 40% of the global temporary market.
France has 30% of the global temp market.
3.2% of workers in the Netherlands are temporary workers.
2.2% of workers in the US are temp workers.
1.9% of workers in Britain are temp workers.
(
Helene Cooper and Thomas Kamm, "Loosening Up", Wall Street Journal (early 1998).) (Rcgd)

In 1997, Spanish employers and unions agreed to new regulations that reduce severance pay to 33 days/ year worked from 45 days in return for lengthening the duration of labor contracts for first-time hires (Helene Cooper and Thomas Kamm, "Loosening Up", Wall Street Journal (early 1998)).

In France, 86% of new hires are on short-term contracts, usually for 6 months, renewable once, and they frequently have to work nights and weekends (Helene Cooper and Thomas Kamm, "Loosening Up", Wall Street Journal (early 1998)).

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SECTION [5-E] ~ WAGES AND HOURS ~

US wage increases are not keeping pace with inflation (Source: Economic Outlook Group) (08B1). Comments: My globalization document already has this information - even more detailed information.)

Annual Growth Rate of Wages in private industry, as measured by the employment cost index, (inflation corrected) (from a graph) Note the smaller growth rates after 1980. (09D2) (In gci3.doc Chapter 3, Section [3], Part [3A3])

Year

1976

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2009

%

7.3

9.2

4.2

4.2

3.0

4.0

2.7

1.2*

* For the year ending in September of 2009. This was the smallest change in wages since the US began measuring in 1975.

Those returning to work are taking an average 40% pay cut relative to their old jobs. (09D2)

The decline in wages affects people in all sectors of the economy (09D2).

US wage increases are not keeping pace with inflation (Source: Economic Outlook Group). (My globalization document already has this information - even more detailed information.) (08B1)

Entry-level wages for US college and high school graduates fell more than 4% from 2001 to 2005 in inflation-corrected terms. Entry-level wages for male college graduates fell by 7.3% to $19.72/ hour, while wages for female graduates fell 3.5% to $17.08. For men with high school diplomas, entry-level pay fell by 3.3% to $10.93/ hour from 2001 to 2005 (inflation corrected). For US female high school graduates, entry-level pay fell 4.9% to $9.08/ hour (06G3). ((Rcgd).

Americans put in 350 hours per year more on their jobs than the average European, even more than the Japanese (08R1).

Compensation costs (wages and benefits) for US civilian workers rose 3.1% for all of 2005, vs. 3.7% in 2004. The 2005 increase was the smallest annual increase since 1996. US Wages and salaries were up 2.6% for 2005, not enough to compensate for inflation (3.39%). The costs of benefits such as health insurance rose 4.5% in 2005, vs. 6.9% in 2004. (US Labor Department data) (06P1) ((Rcgd)).

Wage growth in service industries rose 2.7% in 2004 to 3.2% in 2005. In manufacturing (the sector most exposed to global competition) wage growth fell from 2.6% in 2004 to 2.3% in 2005 (06U1). (Rcgd

The US Labor Department's inflation report of mid-May, 2005, noted that 80% of the US work force has seen its pay fail to keep up with price increases over the past year. For non-managers in both white- and blue-collar jobs, hourly wage gains have failed to beat inflation every month for the past year. The workweek lengthened in April of 2005, but inflation ate up all the added income from the additional work - and more; over the past year, average weekly earnings have fallen by 0.3% after inflation ("Wages Lag Inflation, Again", New York Times (5/23/05)). ((Rcgd))

In the 1980s and 1990s, 2/3 of US workers who lost jobs in manufacturing industries hit by overseas competition earned less on their next job (study by Lori Kletzer). About 25% of US workers who lost their jobs and were re-employed saw income fall 30% or more (04H2).

Singapore's living standards are higher than Germany's (04H1).

Between 1999 and 2001 the number of US homeowners who spent more than half their income on housing rose 36%, vs. 24% among renters (02A1) (Rcgd).

More than 4 million US households are spending at least 50% of their salaries on rent or mortgages in 2002. This number is 67% greater than in 1998 (Source: Center for Housing Policy) (02A1). (Rcgd

In a study of how American industries were affected by increasing import competition in the 1980s and 1990s, it was found that, of the half-million American workers who lost jobs in the furniture sector between 1979-1999, 38% couldn't find new work. About 20% of those who did find new work had to take a pay cut of 30% or more (02H1).

Labor's share of the US GNP: 60.3% in 1979; 59.5% in 1985 (87T1).

Of the 10.7 million new earners added to the economy during 1979-85, 48.6% were paid less than $10,000 (in 1985 $), 30.5% were paid $10,000 to $25,000 (37.6% of the work force was in that range in 1979), and 20.9% were paid more than $25,000 (vs. 23.2% in 1979). Right across the earnings distribution, the new jobs were inferior to those the US economy had been generating before 1979 (87T1).

After correcting for inflation, the compensation to labor per hour of work rose 2.7%/ year during 1960-1969, but fell 0.4%/ year during 1979-1985 (87T1).

Rate of growth of US GNP during 1960-1969 (prior to a significant level of globalization) was 3.8%/ year. During 1979-1985 (as globalization was starting to have significant effects) US GDP growth was 2%/ year (87T1). (Rcgd

From 1976-85 the number of middle income male jobs (those paying from 75 to 125% of median male earnings ($13,334-$22,224) declined from 23.4% down to 20.3% of the male work force. The decline was larger (38% down to 32.6%) for male workers who worked full time all year (87T1).

According to a US Department of Labor report on 1998 wages, a 30-year-old American man with a high school diploma earned an average of $29,057 - 20% less, adjusted for reported inflation, than in 1974 (00M1).

Average hourly labor costs for 1990 (from a chart) (data from Institute of German Industries) (92R1) (Obsolete?)

Country

Wages
(DM)

Total
(DM)

Total
($)

W.Germany

20.~

38

23.6

Italy

14.~

30

18.6

Japan

20.~

26

16.1

France

13.5

25.5

15.8

Britain

17.~

25

15.5

US

17.~

24

14.9

Spain

13.~

22

13.6

Greece

6.~

10

6.2

Portugal

4.~

7

4.3

S. Korea

4.5

6.5

4.0

Taiwan

5.~

6

3.7

Singapore

3.5

6

3.7

Brazil

3.~

5

3.1

Turkey

1.5

3.5

2.2

Mexico

2.~

3

1.9

Wage erosion was also a characteristic of the 1980s, especially among poorer and less-educated workers. They had to replace lost income by working an average of two weeks longer each year and rely on a huge influx of working wives. Without these factors, the median household income would have fallen sharply; with them it still stagnated (93Z2).

Total employment rose by 8 million jobs from 1979-1984. But the number of jobs paying $14,000/ year or more in 1984 dollars declined by 1.8 million, and nearly 60% of the net job growth occurred in jobs paying less than $7000.

Between 1973-1984, average family income (in 1984 $) dropped $787 to $31,052 (not including food stamps, Medicare, Medicaid, employer-paid health- and pension benefits). Per-capita income rose, in real terms, to $12,149 (Wall Street Journal (9/8/86)). The family data uses the consumer-price index, while the per-capita series uses a price index based on the consumer-spending component of the GNP.

Income inequality is growing, not only between groups of different occupations and levels of education, but within them (e.g. the income gap between the highest-paid and the lowest-paid lawyers is also widening). This suggests that globalization cannot lie at the heart of the inequality dilemma (95W1).

Trade-related jobs in general, and export-related jobs in particular, pay better than the US overall average, and better even than the higher manufacturing average (95W1).

Some 15 years ago, the average male college graduate earned 49% more than his counterpart with a high school diploma; by 1993 he was earning 83% more (US Labor Department data).

Real family income growth, 1979-1993 (in 1993 dollars) (US Labor Department data): Top 20% - +18%; Fourth 20% - +5%; Middle 20% - minus 3%; Second 20% - minus 8%; Bottom 20% - minus 17%.

Robert Z. Lawrence of Harvard suggests that US wage and job problems stem mostly from items such as slow productivity growth in services, technology changes and housing's high cost (Robert Keatley, Wall Street Journal (10/08/93)).

Between 1989-1999, while the median hourly wage for all workers grew by 2.4%, the median income for all CEOs nearly doubled to an average of 3.5%. CEOs of the 350 biggest corporations earned an average of $12.4 million/ year in salary, bonuses and stock options, a figure that grew more than 500% in the 1990s (01U1).

An average middle-class husband and wife worked 3885 hours in 1998, up 247 hours since 1990. Most of this increase reflects more working women and longer hours for women (01U1).

Year-to-Year percentage change in US employment cost indexes for all civilian workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics data) (Apparently not inflation-adjusted) (from a graph) {w50}

Year

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Wages

3.2

2.8

2.8

2.9

3.2

~

Benefits

5.5

5.3

3.9

2.7

1.9

~

Total

3.8

3.6

3.2

2.8

2.9

3.0

American household income during 1996 was $1083 below the 1989 peak of $36,575 after inflation is taken into account (Census Bureau data) (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (9/30/97)).

The growth in US wage rates during 1979-1993 was virtually flat, after adjusting for inflation and including all benefits. In this period, output per worker-hour (i.e. productivity) increased 10%. The ratio of wages earned by college graduates to high-school graduates rose by 15% during the 1980s (Gene Epstein, Barron's (11/8/93)).

Average annual hours worked by US workers (Sue Shellenbarger, Wall Street Journal (5/16/02))

Year

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Hours

1920

1946

1945

1954

1952

1966

1960

1977

1980

Since 1972 the median income of men aged 25-34 has fallen 26% after adjustment for inflation. For black men who did not finish high school, earnings fell by 50% between 1973-89 (report by Annie E. Casey Foundation (4/24/95)).

Hourly compensation costs, including wages and benefits, for factory workers (Wall Street Journal (1/26/98)) (Bureau of Labor Statistics data) {w30}

Country

~1996

1997

Germany

$31.85

$27.81

Japan

23.66

19.01

France

19.34

16.91

US

17.19

18.17

S. Korea

7.40

4.29

Malaysia

2.43

1.81

Thailand

0.68

0.39

China

0.27

0.33

Inflation-adjusted Weekly Earnings for the Bottom 10% of the US Pay Scale (Wall Street Journal (3/28/98)) (from a graph)

Year

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

Pay

294

282

281

278

277

271

272

267

258

260

Minimum Wages:
Indonesia $2.46/ day (
Wall Street Journal (6/4/97))

Real wages for the majority of workers are declining in all three NAFTA countries. Real US median wages: $10.78/ hour in 1993, $10.35/ hour in 1996. (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (7/30/97)).

Average weekly earnings in the private sector (1982 dollars) (Labor Department data) (from a chart):

Year

1959

1964

1969

1974

1979

1984

1989

1991

Earnings

260

282

300

300

290

273

264

256

Median household income for the US remains $1083 below its 1989 peak of $36,575 (inflation-adjusted) (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (9/30/97)).

For a US family headed by a high school graduate or worker with some college, the hours at work per week since the 1960s increased by 17.4%, but real earnings increased during that period by less than 4% (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (8/17/98)).

The proportion of mothers working full time, year-around climbed to 39% of households with kids in 1996 from 17% in 1969. The median income for married couples with children expanded 25% between 1969-96 (inflation-corrected), but without the increased participation by mothers in the labor force, median income would have expanded by only 2% during the same period (Wall Street Journal (9/1/98)).

Number of US multiple-job holders: 4.9% of labor force in 1979, 6.3% in 1997. (Economic Policy Institute data) (Pittsburgh Press (9/15/98)).

Percentage of US Married Couples in which both Husband and Wife Work (US Bureau of Labor Statistics data) (From a chart)

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

Pct.

35.5

39.5

42.5

45.0

50.0

Number of US Work Stoppages Involving 1000 Workers or More (from a plot) (Wall Street Journal (12/16/99))

Year

'50-54

'55-59

'60-64

'65-69

'70-74

'75-79

'80-84

Number

370

290

220

320

320

290

130

Year

'85-89

'90-94

'95-99

Number

60

40

30

A program entitled "Time Frenzy" on PBS, aired on the San Francisco affiliate on 8/30/00. It had to do with how Americans are experiencing terrible time pressure. Jack Kurzweil, Professor of Electrical Engineering at San Jose State University was one of those interviewed. Although population issues were not addressed, he did say that there are thousands of engineers recently laid off or unemployed a while, in their 40's and 50's, with enormous backgrounds of skills, who could learn the particular specialized skills required by a Silicon Valley company in three or four months of training.

Go to List of References // Go to Table of Contents of this 11-chapter document // Go to Globalization: The Convergence Issue //
Go  to Home Page of this website //

SECTION (5-F) ~ SAVINGS, CREDIT AND BANKRUPTCIES ~

About 9% of American (home?) mortgages were past due (or in foreclosure) at the end of March 2008. That ratio is rising rapidly as home prices fall and as job markets weaken. The first 3 months of 2008 marked the worst quarter for American homeowners in nearly 3 decades (Source: a report issued by Mortgage Bankers Association) (08B1).

About 8.8% of US home loans were past due or in foreclosure (about 4.8 million loans) on 3/31/08, up from 7.9% at the end of December 2007. At first, past-due mortgages represented mostly high-risk loans made by borrowers with blemished, or "sub-prime" credit. But now, as the economy weakens and as home prices fall in many parts of the US, homeowners with better loans are also falling behind. About 9.7% of loans in 5 Midwestern states were past due (or in foreclosure) in the first quarter of 2008, vs. 10.5% in the 4th quarter of 2007 (08B1). (In Midwestern states (like Michigan and Ohio) home prices did not soar as much as elsewhere in the US.)

About a third of American homeowners do not have mortgages (08B1).

So far, home prices in the US have fallen by 16% from their peak in the summer of 2006 - the point at which the real estate bubble began its disastrous collapse (Source: Standard & Poor's/ Case-Shiller index). Economists at Lehman Brothers expect the decline in US home prices to bottom out at 25% (relative to peak bubble prices?) (08B1). Comments: Later estimates in the fall of 2008 gave a prediction of a 40% reduction in home prices - apparently relative to peak bubble prices.

A $1 billion ad campaign run by Citicorp from 2001-2006 urged Citicorp customers to take out "home equity loans" (previously called "second mortgages.") Such loans were once considered to be the borrowing of last resort, to be avoided by all but people in dire financial straits. Since the early 1980s, the total value of home equity loans outstanding increased from $1 billion in 1982 to $100 billion in 1988 to more than $1 trillion in 2008. Nearly 25% of Americans with first mortgages have them. Part of the reason for this was that portions of home equity loans were tax-deductible (08S2).

In mid 2008, the portion of people who have home equity loans more than 30 days past due is 55% above its average since the American Bankers Association began tracking it around 1990; delinquencies on home equity loans are 45% higher (2008) (08S2).

For the first time since WWII, the portion of home value that Americans own (in 2008) has fallen to less than 50%. In the 1980s, that portion was 70% (08S2).

The cause of this huge transformation in indebtedness began in the 1970s and early 1980s when federal laws were changed to allow mainstream banks to offer second mortgages as well as loans with interest only, adjustable rates and so-called piggyback features combining first and second mortgages. Prior to that time, such products were marketed primarily to lower-income customers by savings and loan companies and financing companies such as Beneficial and Household Finance (08S2).

U.S. Household debt as a percentage of disposable income (09G1).

Year

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2008

%

67

70

83

89

95

127

129

Real estate is the biggest household asset at 36% of net worth - and real estate prices have not yet stopped falling (09G1).

US Household financial debt as a percentage of disposable income (from a graph). (09D1)

Year

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2009

%

37

50

64

66

81

92

128

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve. (NOTE: Same data as above!)

Experts predict a steady stream of defaults over much of the next decade as interest-only loans mature. Auctioned off at low prices, those foreclosed houses could help break any revival in home prices (09S1).

There are currently 2.8 million active interest-only home loans worth a combined total of $908 billion. In the next 12 months, $71 billion of interest-only loans will reset. In the year after that, another $100 billion in interest-only loans will reset. After mid 2011, another $400 billion will reset. A decade ago, interest-only loans were rare. In 2004, nearly 50% of all homebuyers in California had an interest-only loan. Nationally, about 18% of prime interest-only loans are at least 60 days delinquent (09S1).

The savings rate in the US has been below zero during 2006-2008 (the lowest it has been since the Great Depression) (09R2).

In 2006, spending on advertising was estimated at $155 billion in the US, and $385 billion worldwide (09R2). The worldwide advertising figure is expected to exceed $500 billion by 2010 (09R2).

Credit card debt of the average US consumer is over $3000, and the average household credit card debt is over $8000. These figures do not count the over $5000 of mortgage- and auto debt that the average American carries (09R2).

More Americans now declare bankruptcy than graduate from college (09R2). 

The poorest 80% of the people in the US have seen very little rise in income since the 1970s (09R2). Today the average CEO in the US makes more in a day than the average worker makes in a year (09R2).

The average debt nationally among graduating seniors with loans reached $23,200 in 2008, a sum that has been growing by about 6% / year since 2004. The unemployment rate in the third quarter of 2009 was 10.6% for graduates 20-24 years of age. This is the highest national rate for that group in the 10 years that data have been available. (Bill Schackner, "College grads' average debt exceeds $23K," Pittsburgh Post Gazette, p. A1 (12/02/09).) (NOTE: This is only marginally relevant to the development of a caste system in the U.S.)

About 9% of American (home?) mortgages were past due (or in foreclosure) at the end of March 2008. That ratio is rising rapidly as home prices fall and as job markets weaken. The first 3 months of 2008 marked the worst quarter for American homeowners in nearly 3 decades (Source: a report issued by Mortgage Bankers Association) (08B1).

About 8.8% of US home loans were past due or in foreclosure (about 4.8 million loans) on 3/31/08, up from 7.9% at the end of December 2007. At first, past-due mortgages represented mostly high-risk loans made by borrowers with blemished, or "sub-prime" credit. But now, as the economy weakens and as home prices fall in many parts of the US, homeowners with better loans are also falling behind. About 9.7% of loans in 5 Midwestern states were past due (or in foreclosure) in the first quarter of 2008, vs. 10.5% in the 4th quarter of 2007 (08B1). (In Midwestern states (like Michigan and Ohio) home prices did not soar as much as elsewhere in the US.)

So far, home prices in the US have fallen by 16% from their peak in the summer of 2006 - the point at which the real estate bubble began its disastrous collapse (Source: Standard & Poor's/ Case-Shiller index). Economists at Lehman Brothers expect the decline in US home prices to bottom out at 25% (relative to peak bubble prices?) (08B1). Comments: Later estimates in the fall of 2008 gave a prediction of a 40% reduction in home prices - apparently relative to peak bubble prices.

A $1 billion ad campaign run by Citicorp from 2001-2006 urged Citicorp customers to take out "home equity loans" (previously called "second mortgages.") Such loans were once considered to be the borrowing of last resort, to be avoided by all but people in dire financial straits. Since the early 1980s, the total value of home equity loans outstanding increased from $1 billion in 1982 to $100 billion in 1988 to more than $1 trillion in 2008. Nearly 25% of Americans with first mortgages have them. Part of the reason for this was that portions of home equity loans were tax-deductible (08S2).

In mid 2008, the portion of people who have home equity loans more than 30 days past due is 55% above its average since the American Bankers Association began tracking it around 1990; delinquencies on home equity loans are 45% higher (2008) (08S2).

For the first time since WWII, the portion of home value that Americans own (in 2008) has fallen to less than 50%. In the 1980s, that portion was 70% (08S2).

The cause of this huge transformation in indebtedness began in the 1970s and early 1980s when federal laws were changed to allow mainstream banks to offer second mortgages as well as loans with interest only, adjustable rates and so-called piggyback features combining first and second mortgages. Prior to that time, such products were marketed primarily to lower-income customers by savings and loan companies and financing companies such as Beneficial and Household Finance (08S2).

U.S. Household debt as a percentage of disposable income (09G1). 

Year

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2008

%

67

70

83

89

95

127

129

Real estate is the biggest household asset at 36% of net worth - and real estate prices have not yet stopped falling (09G1).

US Household financial debt as a percentage of disposable income (from a graph). (09D1)

Year

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2009

%

37

50

64

66

81

92

128

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve. (NOTE: Same data as above!)

Experts predict a steady stream of defaults over much of the next decade as interest-only loans mature. Auctioned off at low prices, those foreclosed houses could help brake any revival in home prices (09S1).

There are currently 2.8 million active interest-only home loans worth a combined total of $908 billion. In the next 12 months, $71 billion of interest-only loans will reset. In the year after that, another $100 billion in interest-only loans will reset. After mid 2011, another $400 billion will reset. A decade ago, interest-only loans were rare. In 2004, nearly 50% of all home-buyers in California had an interest-only loan. Nationally, about 18% of prime interest-only loans are at least 60 days delinquent (09S1).

The savings rate in the US has been below zero during 2006-2008 (the lowest it has been since the Great Depression) (09R2).

In 2006, spending on advertising was estimated at $155 billion in the US, and $385 billion worldwide (09R2). The worldwide advertising figure is expected to exceed $500 billion by 2010 (09R2). 

Credit card debt of the average US consumer is over $3000, and the average household credit card debt is over $8000. These figures do not count the over $5000 of mortgage and auto debt that the average American carries (09R2).

More Americans now declare bankruptcy than graduate from college (09R2). 

The poorest 80% of the people in the US have seen very little rise in income since the 1970s (09R2). Today the average CEO in the US makes more in a day than the average worker makes in a year (09R2).

During the 10-year period from 1994 through 2003, personal bankruptcy filings in Japan increased from 40,000/ year to 240,000 (Source: The Financial Services Agency) (Yuka Hayashi, Wall Street Journal (4/27/06) p. C1) Comments: This may simply reflect Japan's economic downturn in the stock market during this period, which may have more to do with the real estate bubble than with globalization. When did the real estate bubble collapse?)

For American households with at least one person under age 35, the savings rate is minus 16% (06G3). (Americans have not spent less than they earned since the Great Depression of the 1930s (06G3).)

Since 1987, US home mortgages increased from $1.8 trillion to $8.2 trillion. ((Rcgd) - (07H1))

Since 1987, US consumer debt increased from $2.7 trillion to $11.0 trillion. ((Rcgd) - (07H1)).

Between 1987 and 2006, US household debt quadrupled. ((Rcgd) - (07H1))

The US government debt is now approaching $9.0 trillion (07H1). Comments: In around September of 2008 it exceeded $10 trillion.

The number of US families headed by people aged 55 or older with housing debt has increased steadily from 24% in 1992 to 36% in 2004, according to Employee Benefit Research Institute in Washington DC (Tim Grant, "Retiring with Debt," Pittsburgh Post Gazette (9/28/07)). ((rcgd) Section [3A9] on debt)

In the 4th quarter of 2007, the number of American homes entering foreclosure rose to the highest level on record. More than 2% of all US mortgage loans were in the foreclosure process and 0.83% of loans entered the foreclosure process in the 4th quarter of 2007. Both figures are the highest since records started being kept in 1972. (Mortgage Bankers Association data). The delinquency rate for home loans hit 5.82%, up nearly a 0.25% percentage point during the 4th quarter of 2007 and the highest since 1985 when delinquency rates were over 6% (08R2).

In the 4th quarter of 2007, homeowners' share of equity in their homes fell to a post-World-War-II low. In 2007, for the first time, American homeowners, in the aggregate, owed less than half the value of their houses. Their share of home equity dropped to 47.9% in the 4th quarter of 2007 (Source: Federal Reserve in a quarterly report) Home equity as a percentage of home value has been falling from a high of more than 80% since 1945, when such data first started being recorded (08R2).

The total wealth of American households fell about $533 billion to $57,700 billion in the fourth quarter of 2007. (Another estimate computed a drop of $1.4 trillion during the 4th quarter of 2007.) A major portion of the decline was in housing-related assets (including those that are mortgaged) fell by $170 billion to $20,200 billion. The value of other financial assets (e.g. stocks) fell by $254 billion to $45,300 billion (08R2). (Data for just one quarter may not have much significance.)

For most of the past decade British consumers went on a debt-financed spending spree that made them the most indebted rich nation in the world, accumulating a record US$2.8 trillion in debt (more that Britain's GDP). Personal debt in the US is $13.8 trillion, including mortgage debt, compared to the US GDP of $14 trillion. The average British adult has 2.8 credit cards, more than any other country in Europe. Britons have a household debt-to-income ratio of 1.62 vs. 1.42 for the US and 1.09 for Germany. In 2007, British housing foreclosures reached their highest level since 1999. Foreclosures are expected to increase in 2008 because more than one million homeowners have adjustable-rate mortgages that are expected to reset in the next 12 months to significantly higher rates. Less than 50% of Britons save regularly (08W1)

Of the 80 million homes in the US, about 55 million have mortgages. Of those, 4 million are behind in payments. Foreclosure proceedings were begun on about 1.5 million homes in 2007, up more than 50% from 2006. Foreclosures in 2008 are expected to be worse. Home prices could drop another 10-15% (08W2).

Moody's Economy.com estimates that roughly one in 12 American families (4 million in all) already owe more than their house is worth. By early 2009, nearly 25% (12 million homeowners) will owe more than their house is worth (08W2).

Average debt for graduating Medical students (Source: Association of American Medical Colleges)

1995 - $70,000 // 2007 $140,000  (08W3). (This might reflect factors other than globalization.)

The net worth of the typical (median) American family rose only 1.5% after inflation between 2001 and 2004, according to a Federal Reserve survey done every 3 years (06C1). ($93,100 in 2004) It rose 10.3% between 1998 and 2001, and 17.4% during the 3 years prior to that (06C1). A stagnant stock market and rising debt offset many of the gains resulting from the booming housing market. Less affluent (bottom 25%) households lost ground to $13,300 during 2001-04, while the richest 10% of households increased their net worth by 6.5% to $831,600 during 2001-04 (06C1).

The median price of a primary residence in the US rose 22.1% after inflation to $160,000 in 2004. The typical (median) home-owning family had $95,000 in mortgage debt on its house (06C1).

The value of the median portfolio fell to $24,300 in 2004 from $36,700 in 2001 adjusted for inflation (06C1).

Mortgage and other debt as a percent of total family assets in the US rose to 15% in 2004 from 12.1% in 2001 (06C1).

Median net worth of US households headed by 25-34-year-olds, in 1998 dollars (Source: Economic Report of the President) (Greg Ip, "Report Plays Down Economic Woes", Wall Street Journal (2/14/06) p. A2.) ((Rcgd) Ch. 3)

Year

1962

1983

1998

Net Worth

$6,072

$19,504

$15,500

A record 4.81% of US credit card accounts were at least a month behind in the second quarter of 2005 (USA Today (9/28/05)). This number surpasses the prior high, set in the first quarter of 2005. About 1.24 million Americans declared personal bankruptcy this year through 9/17/05. The US Federal Reserve has been increasing short-term lending rates since June 2004. Since banks must base their prime lending rates upon the Federal Reserve rate, this has led to higher loan rates. On average, these loans were at 6.75% in September of 2005, higher than at any time during the last four years. These rates are used for many short-term loans, including home equity lines of credit (Startribune.com (9/29/05)). (Note that consumer spending accounts for 2/3 of US economic activity (05U1)).

The US personal savings rate was negative for the first time since the Great Depression (excluding the month following 9/11/01). Now, the personal savings rate has been negative for three months in a row. Following a revised minus 0.3% rate in June, and a revised minus 1.1% rate in July, in August, the personal savings rate was minus 0.7%. Personal income during August also fell by 0.1%, as did consumer spending - by 1% (Washington Post (10/1/05)). What makes these statistics worrisome is that even though consumer spending decreased proportionately more than personal income, people still spent more than they earned. This indicates that Americans had to dip into savings, sell assets, or take on more debt to maintain their standard of living (05U1).

US Credit Card Delinquencies as a percent of total loans (smoothed data are from American Bankers Association, and appeared in the Pittsburgh Post Gazette (9/29/05)) (Rcgd)

Year

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Delinquencies

2.6

2.8

3.0

3.2

3.4

3.6

4.0

4.5

Personal bankruptcy filings in the US have almost doubled in the past decade, reaching 1.58 million in 2004 vs. about 800,000 in 1995 (data of Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). The Bankruptcy Coalition says these bankruptcies cost them $40 billion/ year and is lobbying Congress to tighten bankruptcy laws and make them more in favor of the lender (Laura Litvan, "Banks want changes in personal bankruptcy law", Pittsburgh Post Gazette (1/10/05), p. C18.). (Rcgd)

Estimated number of bankruptcy filers in the US, by age, in thousands (04H3)

Age Range

1999

2001

% Change

Under 25

99.0

102.0

3.0

25-34

417.5

500.3

19.8

35-44

348.1

648.4

86.3

45-54

179.7

446.4

148.4

55-64

69.4

138.5

99.6

65+

23.9

88.5

270.3

Source: Consumer Bankruptcy Project

Age Range

Under 25

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

In 1999

99.0

417.5

348.1

179.7

69.4

23.9

In 2001

102.0

500.3

648.4

446.4

138.5

88.5

Source: Consumer Bankruptcy Project
Comments: Part of the increase shown in this table could be a result of the recession in 2001.

College loans were taken out by 45% of full-time students in 2000, compared with 30% in 1990 (Wall Street Journal (6/2/04) p. A1).

The ratio of net worth to disposable personal income sank to a 7-year low of 4.9 in the third quarter of 2002 (vs. 6.3 at the end of 1999) (02I2). Comments: Some of this may be due to the slump in the stock market and thus be temporary.

US household wealth has fallen to its lowest level since 1995 - to $38 trillion according to the Federal Reserve (02I2).

Eliminating consumer credit would go a long way toward raising the personal savings rate in the US, but what politician wants to advocate that (87T1)?

Interest rates have fallen since 1980, making installment purchases of things such as cars easier (00M1).

The Federal Reserve reports that Americans' household wealth was 6.3 times income in 1999, vs. 5 times income in the early 1990s. This was due in part to the Dow earning a total compound return of over 18%/year between 1983-99 (00M1).

Losses by US Credit-Card Issuers in percent and Bankruptcy Filings in millions (from plots) (Eileen Alt Powell, Wall Street Journal (6/20/01))

Year

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

LCCI

2.8

4.5

3.6

5.2

6.0

5.6

B.F.

0.8

0.96

0.86

1.20

1.43

1.30

US Consumer Debt ($trillions) and Household Debt-service Payments in percent of disposable personal income (from plots) (Federal Reserve data) (Eileen Alt Powell, Wall Street Journal (6/20/01))

Year

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

Debt

0.78

0.76

0.90

1.16

1.26

1.50

Pmts

13.4

12.4

12.0

13.1

13.4

14.0

Estimated Claims handled by Collection Agencies (billions of $US) (American Collectors Association) (from a graph) {w70}

Year~

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1988

1989

1990

Claims

14

25

28

22

22

27

51

72

67

Note: 1986-1987 data are not available.

In 1984, half of all retirees had a net worth (aside from their homes) of under $20,268 (91U1). (Needs data prior to start of globalization to be significant.)

Total Consumer Credit Outstanding, in billions of dollars (Wall Street Journal (3/29/01)) (from a graph)

Year

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Credit

1100

1200

1300

1350

1500

Comments: The above data has apparently not been corrected for inflation or for population growth.

Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income in the US (Commerce Department data) (from a plot) (Wall Street Journal (8/29/00)) (Rcgd

Year

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2000

Savings

10.0

11.0

9.0

11.0

9.0

7.5

6.0

4.0

0.0

Total outstanding debt in the US is about $15 trillion, broken down roughly into one-third government debt, one-third business debt, and one-third consumer debt. Debt growth in the US economy is about 5%/ year - about the same rate as economic growth, unadjusted for inflation (Federal Reserve data) (Bernard Wysocki Jr., Wall Street Journal (7/28/97)).

Outstanding Debt of US non-financial Corporations ($trillions) (Federal Reserve data) (Wall Street Journal (12/31/99)) (from a chart)

Year

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

Debt

2.6

2.6

2.7

3.1

3.9

(Corporate debt now represents 43% of US GDP, up from 38% in the early 1990s, and near the highest level since 1960.)

Corporate Short-term Debt-load (Commercial paper outstanding issued by US non-financial corporations ($billions) (from a chart) (Wall Street Journal (12/21/00))

Year

1997

1998

1999

2000

Debt

170

200

220

280

At the end of the third quarter of 2001, US corporate debt was $4.92 trillion and consumer debt was $7.53 trillion. At the end of 1989 the corresponding figures were $2.38 trillion and $3.36 trillion (Federal Reserve data as reported in Wall Street Journal, 1/2/02).

Personal Bankruptcies in the US in millions (from a chart) (ABI World data) (02S1) (More than 90% of people who file for bankruptcy do so because of job-loss, illness or divorce (02S1).)

Year

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2001

Number

0.3

0.32

0.3

0.44

0.55

0.72

0.86

0.78

1.12

1.40

1.21

1.45

Total average debt of households headed by someone aged 65+: $8000 in 1992, $23,000 in 2000 (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (7/8/02)).

A third of Americans spend so much of their incomes on housing that they cannot afford other necessities (Economic Policy Institute of August 1990). (Needs data prior to 1980 to be useful in the globalization issue.)

Banks closed due to financial difficulties (FDIC data) (Deposit data are in $billion)

Year

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Number

42

48

79

120

138

184

200

206

169

127

Deposits

9.9

5.4

2.9

8.1

6.5

6.3

24.9

24.1

14.3

53.8

Estimated Claims Handled by Collection Agencies (American Collectors Association data) (from a chart)

Year

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1988

1989

1990

$Billions

13

25

27

22

25

27

51

72

67

Bankruptcy Data (data from the Administrative Office of the US Courts) (from a plot) Numbers are in thousands)

Year

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Personal

54

54

56

62

64

70

75

84

85

Business

380

480

600

810

830

470

490

610

600

Personal bankruptcies as a percent of total US households (Wall Street Journal (8/18/99)) (Administrative Office of the US Courts)

Year

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Pct.

0.8

1.0

1.3

1.4

1.36

Personal Bankruptcy Filings (thousands) (ABI World, (1997)) (from a graph in Wall Street Journal of unknown date)

Year

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

Number

300

300

300

400

550

700

900

800

1100

Personal Bankruptcies (Administrative Office of the US Courts data) (from a plot)

Year

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

Millions

30

10

20

50

100

170

190

Year

1975

1980

1985

1990

1991

Millions

220

290

340

720

870

US Personal Savings Rate as a percent of Disposable Income (Wall Street Journal (12/21/98)) (from a graph)

Year

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

Percent

8.0

9.0

7.0

6.0

5.5

5.0

5.5

4.0

3.0

0.0

Consumer Installment Debt (US) (Wall Street Journal (10/8/98)) $1.271 Trillion on 8/31/98 (up 4.1% in past year).

US Credit-Card Delinquency Rates (as a pct. of the total number of accounts) (Wall Street Journal (6/18/97)) (from a graph)

Year

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1997

Pct.

2.5

2.3

3.2

2.5

3.4

3.5

The National Foundation for Consumer Credit reports its average client owed $18,300 in 1990,vs. $9750 in 1986 (Wall Street Journal (8/12/92)).

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SECTION [5-G] ~ JOBS AND LABOR-FORCE SIZE DATA ~ [G1] General, [G2] Factory, ~

Part [G1] ~ General ~

Since the 1960s, the number of women in the US work force has been increasing. Since around 2000 that number has been declining (Bureau of Labor Statistics data) (08U1). It was found that this is not a matter of choice (e.g. to raise children) but a matter of economics. Women are being afflicted on a large scale by the same problems as men: downturns, layoffs, outsourcing, stagnant wages or outright pay cuts (08U1). Women have tended to bring home about a third of family income, and only those families with a working wife have seen real improvement in their living standards. The proportion of women holding jobs in their prime working years (25-54) peaked at 74.9% in early 2000. (72.7% in June 2008) (08U1). The pattern is roughly similar among the well-educated and the less-well-educated, among the married- and never-married, among mothers with teenaged children and those with children under age 6, and among white women and black women. Some 96% of men held jobs in 1953, their peak year (86.4% in 2008) (08U1). The biggest retreat has been in manufacturing, where more than one million women have disappeared from payrolls since the year 2001. Median pay for women aged 25-54 was $15.04/ hour in 2004 and $14.84/ hour in 2007 (inflation-adjusted) (Economic Policy Institute data). The corresponding wages for men today are about $2/ hour more (08U1). 

For the first time since the Great Depression, the American economy has added virtually no jobs in the private sector over a 10-year period July 1999 - July 2009. Total number of jobs has grown slightly, but only because of government hiring (09N1).

For the decade, there was a net gain of 121,000 private sector jobs. In an economy with 109 million such jobs, this indicates an annual growth rate for the 10 years of 0.01% (09N1). (NOTE: These figures might be warped by including much of the recession that began in December of 2007.)

Overall Rate of job growth for various occupations During July 1999- July 2009 (in %/ year) (09N1)

Home health care

5.0

Health care

2.4

Lawyers

0.7

Accountants

0.9

Computer systems designers

2.4

Management and technical consulting

5.0

Making computer and electronic equipment in the US

-4.4

Manufacturing

-3.7

Consumer economy

-0.2

Architecture and engineering firms

1.2

Bars and restaurants

1.8

The August 2009 jobs data estimates that non-farm payrolls shrank for the 20th consecutive month. Some 233,000 jobs were eliminated, in addition to the 247,000 eliminated in July of 2009. The unemployment rate increased back up to 9.5% from 9.4% in July of 2009. In the 3 months of winter of 2008-2009 more than 2 million workers lost their jobs (09G2).

The service sector of the US economy accounts for nearly 86% of all non-farm jobs in the US (09G2). (Comment: The manufacturing sector comprises most or all of the remaining 14%. That sector has been shrinking in recent decades because the bulk of the outsourced jobs in the US are in manufacturing.)

Since the 1960s, the number of women in the US work force has been increasing. Since around 2000 that number has been declining (Bureau of Labor Statistics data) (08U1). It was found that this is not a matter of choice (e.g. to raise children) but a matter of economics. Women are being afflicted on a large scale by the same problems as men: downturns, layoffs, outsourcing, stagnant wages or outright pay cuts (08U1). Women have tended to bring home about a third of family income, and only those families with a working wife have seen real improvement in their living standards. The proportion of women holding jobs in their prime working years (25-54) peaked at 74.9% in early 2000. (72.7% in June 2008) (08U1). The pattern is roughly similar among the well-educated and the less-well-educated, among the married- and never-married, among mothers with teenaged children and those with children under age 6, and among white women and black women. Some 96% of men held jobs in 1953, their peak year (86.4% in 2008) (08U1). The biggest retreat has been in manufacturing, where more than one million women have disappeared from payrolls since the year 2001. Median pay for women aged 25-54 was $15.04/ hour in 2004 and $14.84/ hour in 2007 (inflation-adjusted) (Economic Policy Institute data). The corresponding wages for men today are about $2/ hour more (08U1). (in gci-analysis3.doc [3A-18] (10/23/08))

For the first time since the Great Depression, the American economy has added virtually no jobs in the private sector over a 10-year period July 1999 - July 2009. Total number of jobs has grown slightly, but only because of government hiring (09N1).

For the decade, there was a net gain of 121,000 private sector jobs. In an economy with 109 million such jobs, this indicates an annual growth rate for the 10 years of 0.01% (09N1). (NOTE: These figures might be warped by including much of the recession that began in December of 2007.)

Overall Rate of job growth for various occupations During July 1999- July 2009 (in %/ year) (09N1)

Home health care

5.0

Health care

2.4

Lawyers

0.7

Accountants

0.9

Computer systems designers

2.4

Management and technical consulting

5.0

Making computer/ electronic equipment in the US

-4.4

Manufacturing

-3.7

Consumer economy

-0.2

Architecture and engineering firms

1.2

Bars and restaurants

1.8

The August 2009 jobs data estimates that non-farm payrolls shrank for the 20th consecutive month. Some 233,000 jobs were eliminated, in addition to the 247,000 eliminated in July of 2009. The unemployment rate increased back up to 9.5% from 9.4% in July of 2009. In the 3 months of winter of 2008-2009 more than 2 million workers lost their jobs (09G2).

The service sector of the US economy accounts for nearly 86% of all non-farm jobs in the US (09G2). (Comment: The manufacturing sector comprises most or all of the remaining 14%. That sector has been shrinking in recent decades because the bulk of the outsourced jobs in the US are in manufacturing.)

An average of 15 million jobs were eliminated annually in the US over the past decade. But those jobs typically are offset by the creation of new jobs (04H2). Comments: The US population grows by about 1%/ year, i.e. by about 2.75 million people/ year. This suggests that the US job-creation rate needed just to accommodate population growth must be around 1.5 million per year.

A commonly used formula that purports to measure the size of the job loss says that every $1 billion increase in the US trade deficit equals a loss of 17,000 US jobs (95W1). Comments: There is another correlation for manufacturing labor elsewhere in this document (Section (5-I)).

Comments: Somewhere else in this review document is a statement saying that the US labor force is about 136 million. Whether this figure includes part time labor is not known.

Part [G2] ~ Factory ~

Nearly two million factory jobs have disappeared since the recession began in December of 2007 (09U1).

The U.S. ranks behind every industrial nation except France in the percentage of overall economic activity devoted to manufacturing - 13.9% (World Bank data), down 4 percentage points in a decade (09U1).

Industrial production in the U.S. has fallen 17.3%, the sharpest drop during a recession since the 1930s (09U1).

Nearly two million factory jobs have disappeared since the recession began in December of 2007 (09U1).

The U.S. ranks behind every industrial nation except France in the percentage of overall economic activity devoted to manufacturing - 13.9% (World Bank data), down 4 percentage points in a decade (09U1).

Industrial production in the U.S. has fallen 17.3%, the sharpest drop during a recession since the 1930s (09U1).

South Carolina has lost roughly 30,000 jobs in textiles and 68,000 jobs in manufacturing since 1997, according to the South Carolina Employment Security Commission (Kelly K. Spors, Wall Street Journal (9/27/04) p. R6.)

Number of Factory Jobs in the US (millions) (Bureau of Labor Statistics) (from a plot) (Wall Street Journal in 1999)

Year

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

Number

19.5

19.0

19.1

19.3

19.2

18.3

18.2

18.5

18.8

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SECTION [5-H] ~ SOCIAL COSTS ~

The USDA's 2004 national assessment of food security estimates that 1.4 million Pennsylvanians were living at risk of hunger. That includes 336,000 people living in households where someone experienced hunger. Nationally, the USDA estimates that 38.2 million people were food insecure in 2004, including 13.9 million children. This latter figure includes 545,000 children living in households classified as "food insecure with hunger among children." (Steve Levin, "More families relying on food pantries for help, survey finds", Pittsburgh Post Gazette (4/29/06) p. B5.) (To be relevant to the globalization issue, there must be data from pre 1980.)

South Koreans are also feeling the financial stresses created by globalization. Among the major reasons mentioned for South Korea's low birth rate are instability of employment, and difficulty in meeting expenses involved in child-rearing ("South Korea: one in 3 Married Women Rejects Motherhood," Korea Herald (3/23/06)). (Rcgd)

Britain is suffering a baby "shortage" with potentially disastrous consequences as work pressures force young women to shelve plans for a family, according to dramatic new research urging an £11bn campaign to boost parenthood (06H1).

Women have not turned against becoming mothers and, if they could have the number of children they actually wanted, more than 90,000 extra babies a year would be born, according to calculations by the respected think-tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research. But the report says the professional and financial penalties of childbearing - a mid-skilled 24-year-old who gives birth will earn £564,000 less over her lifetime than a childless counterpart, as motherhood narrows her career options - mean many are delaying pregnancy until it may be too late to conceive. The findings of a government commission on working women, to be published in early 2006, has been struck by evidence of mothers being trapped in dead-end, low-paid, part-time work. Britain has 'too many women remaining involuntarily childless', the report concludes, while high fertility and early childbirth is 'systematically associated with severely reduced prospects'. If women had had, by the age of 36-38, the number of children they wanted when they were aged between 21-23, the birth rate would be 13% higher, it calculates. Only 5% said they did not originally want children, yet four times as many were childless by their late thirties (06H1). (Rcgd)

A fertility behavior project funded by the European Commission shows that more than half the people questioned would on average like at least two children. However, a great number of couples actually have fewer, due to worries about the future and the cost of raising children. The DIALOG project collected data from 30,000 people in 14 European countries on their attitudes and opinions concerning family numbers, fertility behavior and demographic change. The study shows that average desired fertility in Europe is still in line with the two-child family. More than half of all those questioned, male or female, wanted two or more children. There is a difference though, between the real and the desired number of children in countries like Cyprus, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and the Netherlands. There is also a drop of the desired number of children to below two in Germany, Italy, Austria and Belgium and the Czech Republic (06E1).

The declining importance attached to the institution of marriage and the rise in divorce rates do not necessarily translate into fewer births. In fact, births have remained steady over the last decade in the range of 1.2-1.4 children, with the percent of children born to unmarried mothers rising to 30-40%. However having children within marriage remains the preferred choice, especially in Southern and Eastern European countries, with approval rates of 80% in Italy, Lithuania and Poland. On the other hand, living together without having children is also becoming more acceptable, e.g. 26-31% of couples approve in countries like the Czech Republic, Germany and the Netherlands (06E1). For more information on the DIALOG project visit http://www.bib-demographie.de/ppa/Main.htm (Rcgd).

The Reagan administration's social-welfare cutbacks added only a few hundred thousand to the poverty rolls out of the 4 million people added to the poverty rolls since 1979. Far more fundamental economic forces were responsible for the overwhelming bulk of these additions (87T1). (Women and children account for 77% of those in poverty.)

Air rage, road rage, desk rage, surf rage, pedestrian rage etc. appear to be growing in the US according to the book "Road Rage and Aggressive Driving" by Leon James, Prometheus Books (2000). Air rage incidents, globally, increased from 1132 in 1994 to 5416 in 1997. Road rage killed 218 people during 1992-97 and left 12,610 people injured. Workplace violence - virtually unheard of until the 1970s -now costs businesses more that $36 billion/ year according to a 1995 report by the Workplace Violence Research Institute. About 14% of Americans are on the verge of exploding in acts of violence, according to the Anger Institute of Chicago (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (9/5/00)). Comments: One can also sense increasing rage from the clergy (fundamental churches) and in the attack ads seen on TV during election time.

Nationwide research led by University of California Los Angeles and University of Southern California physicians and published in New England Journal of Medicine, and another study at the University of Pennsylvania found that pervasive economic insecurity was an important contributor to assaults on women. Primary risk factors for male abusers include intermittent employment and unemployment (Julie Marquis, Los Angeles Times, published in Pittsburgh Post Gazette (12/16/99)).

The six-fold difference in black and white rates of domestic homicide disappears when "household crowding" is used as a measure of socioeconomic status (study in Journal of the American Medical Association during week of 6/25/95).

According to a Harris survey, the proportion of American feeling under great stress, either almost every day or several days per week, rose in the past decade from 28% to 33% (Gregory N. Racz, Wall Street Journal (3/12/93)).

Yankelovich Partners reports that half of the 1000 workers it surveyed have much more to do at work than 2-3 years ago. Some 42% of those surveyed reported spending less time with their spouses in the same period. Managing Work and Family, a consulting firm, says that among 150 couples seen in workshops and focus groups, those troubled by one partner's long work hours have doubled in 5 years. A University of North Carolina study of the impacts on the family of workaholism found that the number of spouses complaining about overworked mates have doubled in the past 10 years (Wall Street Journal (2/26/97)).

The number of adults living with their parents (in the US?) has doubled to 12% of the 25-34 age group, from 6% in 1960 (93Z2).

Since 1979 the number of poor people in the US South has risen from 9.4 million (15.6% of the population) to 12 million (18% of the population) according to the Southern Regional Council's report "Patterns of Poverty". The US Census Bureau reports that the number of poor across the US increased from 26 million in 1979 to 35 million in 1983 (Los Angeles Times (12/18/84)) (US Census Bureau data).

More than 25% of all black and Hispanic families live in poverty. More than 36% of all black children and 34% of all Hispanic children live in poverty (01U1).

The income of the poorest fifth of the US remained 12% below what it was 20 years ago, in 1979. In the same time period, the income of the top 20% of Americans rose 34% and the top 1% rose 85% (01U1).

Japanese homeless: about 1000 in the 1980s, 25,000 in 2002 (vs. more than 2 million in the US) (Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 7/?/02). Comments: Japanese are finding it hard to compete with a near-infinite supply of unskilled Chinese labor willing to work for 60 cents/ hour.

The proportion of Americans who report sleeping 7-8 hours/ night fell from 64% in 1983 to 58% in 1992 (a Harris survey reported by Gregory N. Racz, Wall Street Journal (3/12/93)).

The US Conference of Mayors found that, despite a booming economy, the number of Americans seeking emergency food or shelter rose significantly in 1999 and the trend will likely continue for years to come. In 1999, demand for emergency food aid grew 18%, and for shelter by 12%. A little over 20% of homeless people have jobs and more than 2/3 of those seeking emergency food aid are employed (Reuters (12/16/99)).

Percentage of Americans below the Poverty Line
(
Paulette Thomas, Wall Street Journal (10/05/93)) (from a plot) (Census Bureau Data)

Year

1972

1975

1980

1985

1990

1992

Pct.

12.0

11.8

14.0

13.6

13.5

14.5

One in ten Americans sought emergency food in 1993 (data from Second Harvest) (Wall Street Journal (3/8/94)).

Some 27.12 million Americans received food stamps during 10/1994 (Source: US food and Nutrition Service data). (Needs data prior to 1980 to be useful for the globalization issue.)

H-1B Visas

A program entitled "Time Frenzy" on PBS, aired on the San Francisco affiliate on 8/30/00. It had to do with how Americans are experiencing time pressure. Jack Kurzweil, Professor of Electrical Engineering at San Jose State University was one of those interviewed. He did say that there are thousands of engineers recently laid off or unemployed a while, in their 40's and 50's, with enormous backgrounds of skills, who could learn the particular specialized skills required by a Silicon Valley company in 3-4 months of training.

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SECTION [5-I] ~ WORK FORCE POPULATION SHIFTS ~

New jobs created in various pay ranges (expressed as a percentage of total job-creation) (Low wage level is under $7400/ year; medium wage level is $7400-$29,600/ year; high wage level is more than $29,600.)
(All figures are in constant 1986 dollars.)

Year Range

1963-1973

1973-1979

1979-1985

Low-Wage

20

20

43

Medium Wage

33

64

46

High Wage

47

16

11

It takes one million full-time, year-around employees in US manufacturing to produce $42 billion worth of goods. Hence the trade deficit of some four times that amount has squeezed more than 4 million workers out of manufacturing and forced them to take other work (87T1). Comments: This correlation needs to be corrected for inflation - and for productivity increases. Comments: The 1997 trade deficit in goods and services was about $105 billion.

In a period when total male employment was growing by 7.4 million jobs, 400,000 middle-income male jobs were disappearing (87T1).

As recently as 1950 there were 3 unskilled jobs for every skilled position. In 2000, jobs requiring skills are 4 times more prevalent than those for which manual labor suffices (00M1).

Since mid-1989, the American Electronics Association says, the domestic industry has lost 300,000 jobs (Kyle Pope, Wall Street Journal (3/30/93)).

The US high-tech work force shrunk by 100,000 in 1992 (Kyle Pope, Wall Street Journal (3/30/93)).

The 500 largest manufacturers have slashed nearly four million jobs since 1982 (93Z2). Defense workers and military personnel stand to lose 2.5 million jobs in the 1990s (93Z2). Aerospace industry workers, among the highest-paid blue-collar workers in the US have lost 1/3 of their jobs, and huge additional cuts are in the offing (93Z2).

A series of articles (93Z2) argues that major industries such as banking, construction, aerospace and defense are shrinking, perhaps permanently.

The US labor Department projects that the economy will produce about 26 million new non-farm jobs from 1990-2005, assuming a moderate 2.3% annual growth in GNP. More than 21 million of these jobs will come in the service sector and other low-wage occupations such as retail clerks, janitors and nurses aides. Two World Bank economists conclude in an internal study, unregulated trade will push wages "downward due to the vast number and rapid growth rate of underemployed populations in the Third World (Jonathan Tasini, Wall Street Journal (1/21/93)).

During 1979-1993 the proportion of white-color non-production employees to all employees in manufacturing rose from 28 to 32%. During 1979-93, the US manufacturing sector shed more than 3 million blue-collar workers (Gene Epstein, Barron's (11/8/93)).

SECTION (5-J) ~ LABOR/ MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND WORK RULES ~

An estimated 250,000 students took to the streets of Paris and major cities across France on 3/16/06 escalating a political rebellion by France's younger generation against a government that is floundering in its attempts to restructure a moribund economy. The protests began as a few campus demonstrations and expanded over the course of a week to turnouts in 80 cities and towns on 3/16/06. The students were protesting a newly passed law that would take effect in April of 2006 and make it easier to hire and fire young people at a time when youth unemployment in France averages 23%. The anger focused on a provision that will allow employers to fire employees under age 26 at any time during their first two years of work without cause (Molly Moore, Washington Post, "Students rebel in France," Pittsburgh Post Gazette (3/17/06) p. A5.).

A survey of 5000 people found that 51% were satisfied with their jobs in March of 2002, as compared to 59% in 1995. About 20% of workers were satisfied with their company's promotion policy and bonus plans, while 40% were content with their wages. Among the higher-earning households, job satisfaction was 67% in 1995, and 55% in 2000 and 2002. Less than 48% of people aged 35-44 were satisfied with their work in 2002, vs. 61% in 1995 (Robert O'Neil, AP, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (8/22/02)).

The number of unionized workers fell sharply during 1985-95 in most of the 90 countries surveyed by the International Labor Organization, a UN affiliate. The decline was attributed to reduced public-sector employment, heightened global competition, a worldwide boom in non-unionized service jobs, and to local politics. US union membership fell 21% (Wall Street Journal (11/04/97)). Comments: The economic size of employers increased considerably during this same period, so the disparity in economic size between buyers and sellers or labor became even more exaggerated.

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SECTION [5-K] ~ FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN THE WORK FORCE ~

In 1980, 53 million households had more than one paycheck. In 2000, 68 million households had more than one paycheck (00M1).

In 1960, only 18% of women with children under age six were in the workforce. By 1995, 65% were. In constant dollars, after-tax earnings of Americans in retail trade (in 1995) were equal to those during the Great Depression (Pat Buchanan, "The Great Betrayal" (1998)).

SECTION [5-L] ~ TRADE DISADVANTAGES ~

Protectionist barriers are still a key defense for South Korea, and have helped in its transformation from one of the world's poorest countries in the 1960s to one of the richest. South Korea was mired in poverty for years after the Korean War in the 1950s. A military dictator built a modern economy in the 1960s and 1970s by assigning large companies to build different parts of the economy and protecting them with large import duties. In 2006, South Korea was the world's 10th largest economy. The South Korean economy grew by 8-9%/ year for much of the 1990s, but its growth has recently slowed to 5%/ year. A key reason is that China is taking away South Korea's lead in low-cost manufacturing, and it now threatens South Korea's higher-value industries (07R1). ((Rcgd))

Environmental protection costs in Germany are 60% higher than the EU average (92R1).

By 1995 the average German workweek is contractually set to drift down to 35 hours/ week from 37.5 hours in 1992 (92R1).

Germany's corporate tax rate is half again as high as those in the US, Japan and France (92R1).

SECTION [5-M] ~ ECONOMIC POLARIZATION ~

Homi Kharas (researcher at Brookings Institution) estimates that, by 2020, the world's middle class will grow to 52% of the global population, vs. 30% in 2008 (08N2). Comments: Much of this depends on the willingness (or ability) of the US to run huge trade deficits indefinitely, frequently along with huge federal budget deficits and huge current accounts deficits. This tends to decrease the value of the dollar.

During 2008-2009, the rich, as a group, have become poorer. During the prior 30 years, the super-rich became both wealthier and more numerous (09L1).

In 2008 the number of Americans with a net worth of at least $30 million dropped 24%. Monthly income from stock dividends have fallen more than 20% since 2008 - the biggest such decline since the government began keeping records in 1959 (09L1).

During the period from 1929-1979, income distribution tended to flatten. Since the early 1980s, incomes have tended to get less equal. For much of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, both the middle class and wealthy received raises that outpaced inflation (09L1).

In the late 1970s, the cutoff to qualify for the highest-earning household per 10,000 households was $2 million in inflation-adjusted, pre-tax terms. By 2007, this cutoff had jumped to $11.5 million. The cutoff to be in the top 1% of households doubled since the late 1970s, to $400,000. Median income ($50,000 in 2007) increased by less than 20% between the late 1970s and 2007 (09L1).

Since 1980, tax rates on the affluent have fallen more than the tax rates on any other group. The top marginal tax rate is 35%.

In 2007, the top household in 10,000 households took home 6% of the nation's income vs. 0.9% in 1977. This was the highest such level since at least 1913, the first year for which the IRS has data. In 2007, the top 1% of earners took home 23.5% of the nation's income, vs. 9% in 1977 (09L1).

Homi Kharas (researcher at Brookings Institution) estimates that, by 2020, the world's middle class will grow to 52% of the global population, vs. 30% in 2008 (08N2). Comments: Much of this depends on the willingness (or ability) of the US to run huge trade deficits indefinitely, frequently along with huge federal budget deficits and huge current accounts deficits.

During 2008-2009, the rich, as a group, have become poorer. During the prior 30 years, the super-rich became both wealthier and more numerous (09L1).

In 2008 the number of Americans with a net worth of at least $30 million dropped 24%. Monthly income from stock dividends have fallen more than 20% since 2008 - the biggest such decline since the government began keeping records in 1959 (09L1).

During the period from 1929-1979, income distribution tended to flatten. Since the early 1980s, incomes have tended to get less equal. For much of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, both the middle class and wealthy received raises that outpaced inflation (09L1).

In the late 1970s, the cutoff to qualify for the highest-earning household per 10,000 households was $2 million in inflation-adjusted, pre-tax terms. By 2007, this cutoff had jumped to $11.5 million. The cutoff to be in the top 1% of households doubled since the late 1970s, to $400,000. Median income ($50,000 in 2007) increased by less than 20% between the late 1970s and 2007 (09L1).

Since 1980, tax rates on the affluent have fallen more than the tax rates on any other group. The top marginal tax rate is 35%.

In 2007, the top household in 10,000 households took home 6% of the nation's income vs. 0.9% in 1977. This was the highest such level since at least 1913, the first year for which the IRS has data. In 2007, the top 1% of earners took home 23.5% of the nation's income, vs. 9% in 1977 (09L1).

In 2004 the US economy grew 4.2%, yet the Census Bureau reported that real median family income fell, and poverty increased. (Rcgd) 

In 2004, even if capital gains are excluded from a rising stock market, the real income of the richest 1% of Americans surged by almost 12.5%. The average real income of the bottom 99% rose 1.5%. People in the 95th percentile of income distribution (people richer than 19 out of 20 Americans) gained only modestly. The real earnings of the typical college graduate fell in 2004. (Rcgd) 

US minimum wages, in real terms, are at their lowest level in 50 years. (Rcgd) 

The US unemployment rate (counting only people actively seeking work) for people ages 20-24 is 8.2%, vs. 4.4 for those aged 25-34 (06G3).

The median US real wage has not risen in real terms over the past 25 years, but real wages of the top 1% have more than doubled (06M2).

The richest 1% of Americans today controls almost 20% of total US income, a proportion higher than at any time since the Roaring Twenties (06M2).

Effect of Educational attainment on US wages and wage growth (Wage changes are inflation-corrected.) ("Some college" includes associate degrees.) (06W3) ((06W4) (Rcgd) 

Education
Achievement

% of Total
Employment

Ave. Wages
in 2005 ($)

% Change
(2000-2005)

Non-High School Graduate

9.9%

22,374

- 4.6%

High School Graduate

29.8%

31,665

- 0.2%

Some College

27.9%

38,009

- 2.5%

College graduate

21.1%

56,740

- 3.1%

Master's degree

7.9%

68,302

- 1.8%

Ph. D.

1.5%

93,593

+ 2.9%

M.B.A., J.D., M.D.

1.9%

119,343

+10.6%

Note: The data above include only cash wages, not health benefits, pensions, stock options, etc.
The top 1% of wage earners in the US got 16% of all wages in 2004, vs. 9% in 1984 (
06W3). (Rcgd) 
The best-paid 20% of workers on private payrolls are three times more likely to have (employer-financed?) health insurance as the worst-paid 20% (
06W3). (Rcgd) 
It is in the middle - where many 4-year college graduates work - that imports, overseas outsourcing and technology seem to be reducing US employer demand for labor most significantly (06W3). (Rcgd) 

A UN report released in mid-December of 2006 found that:
2% of the world's adults command more than 50% of the world's wealth.
50% of the world's adult population own 1% of the world's wealth.
More than 50% of the world's richest people live in the US and Japan.
North America, Europe, and the high-income Asia-Pacific countries collectively hold 90% of the world's wealth.
In countries such as the Congo and Ethiopia, average family households had acquired lifetime wealth and assets of $253 (US).
According to Anthony Shorrocks, director of the World Institute for Development Economics Research (who were commissioned to carry out the work for the UN) "the super-rich are even more grotesquely rich than 50 years ago."

The percentage of poor Americans who are living in deep or severe poverty is now 43% of the nation's 37 million poor people - the highest rate since 1975. (A family of 4 with 2 children and an annual income of less than $9,903 [half of the federal poverty line] was considered severely poor in 2005. So were individuals who made less than $5080/ year.) The analysis was based on the 2005 federal census. The number of severely poor Americans grew by 26% between 2000 and 2005. That number has been growing over the past 3 decades. This was 56% faster than the overall poverty population growth rate (Tony Pugh, "Millions in U.S. falling into "severe" poverty," Pittsburgh Post Gazette (2/26/07) p. A14.). ((Rcgd) 

Income inequality in the US grew significantly in 2005, with the top 1% of Americans (those with 2005 incomes of more than $348,000) receiving their largest share of national income since 1928 (07J1).

The top 10% of Americans (those earning more than $100,000) also reached a level of income-share not seen since before the Great Depression (07J1).

While total reported income in the US increased almost 9% in 2005, average incomes for those in the bottom 90% dropped $172, or 0.6% compared with 2004 (07J1).

The top 1% whose incomes rose to an average of $1.1 million each, enjoyed an average gain of more than $139,000, or about 14% (07J1).

The top 300,000 Americans collectively enjoyed almost as much income as the bottom 150 million Americans. Per person, the top group received 440 times as much as the average person in the bottom half earned, nearly doubling the gap from 1980 (07J1).

The IRS estimates that it is able to accurately tax 99% of wage income, but that it captures only about 70% of business and investment income, most of which flows to upper income individuals, because not everyone accurately reports such figures (07J1).

According to the US Census Bureau, nearly 37 million Americans (12.6% of the population) were living in poverty in 2005. The poverty rate in 2001 (at the bottom of the last recession) was 11.7%. This means that the 4 most recent years of economic expansion have increased, not decreased, the US poverty rate ("Counting the Poor," New York Times Editorial (4/17/07).). (Rcgd) 

The median US worker's earnings, adjusted for inflation, haven't gone up at all since the current economic expansion began in 2005 (07K1). (Rcgd) 

Since President Bush took office, the combination of rising productivity and stagnant wages has led to a veritable profit gusher, with corporate profits more than doubling since 2000. In 2006, profits as a share of national income were at the highest level ever recorded (07K1). (Rcgd) 

Non-residential investment (investment other than housing construction) in the US has grown very slowly by historical standards. As a share of GDP, US non-residential investment remains far below its levels of the late 1990s, and has been declining in recent quarters (07K1). ((Rcgd) 

Instead of investing in physical capital, many companies are using profits to buy back their own stock. Cynics suggest that the purpose of these buy-backs is to produce a temporary rise in stock prices that increases the value of executive stock options, even if it's against the long-term interests of investors. Researchers at the Federal Reserve have found evidence that company decisions about buy-backs are strongly influenced by "agency conflicts," a genteel term for self-dealing by corporate insiders (07K1).

Low investment may be one reason why US productivity growth slowed dramatically during 2004-2006 (07K1) .(Rcgd).

The poverty rate in Germany (expressed an the percent of people living on less than 60% of the median income) has climbed from 12% in 2000 to 16% in 2005 (07W1).

Germany's welfare law (HartzIV passed in 2005) slashed benefits for Germans who have been out of work for over a year. As in many other European countries, Germany's welfare state is in retreat. Germany's poor were formerly unskilled workers with casual jobs. Today, Germany's blue-collar workers are falling out of Germany's once-broad middle class (07W1).

The number of volunteer-run food centers that distribute surplus food to Germany's needy increased from 200 in 1999 to 700 in 2007 (07W1)   (Rcgd)  

The income of an American man in his 30s is now 12% below that of a man of his age 3 decades ago (08R1). 

Widening gaps in higher education between rich and poor, whites and minorities, could lead to a downturn in opportunities for the poorest American families. Hispanics and black Americans were falling behind whites and Asians in earning college degrees, making it harder for them to enter the middle class or higher (08E1),

Someone born into a family in the lowest fifth of earners who graduates from college has a 19% chance of joining the highest fifth of earners in adulthood and a 62% chance of joining the middle class or better (08E1).

In recent years, 11% of children from the poorest families have earned college degrees, vs. 53% of children from the top 20% (08E1).

A majority of black children born to middle-class parents grew up to have the lower incomes (08E1).

Nearly half of middle-class black children fell into the bottom fifth in adulthood, vs. 16% of middle-class white children (08E1). (I don't see any sort of well-defined analysis here for any conceivable use that I might have.)

Under the Bush tax cuts, the 400 taxpayers with the highest incomes - a minimum of $87 million in 2000, the last year for which the government will release such data - now pay income, Medicare and Social Security taxes amounting to virtually the same percentage of their incomes as people making $50-$75,000. Those earning more than $10 million a year now pay a lesser share of their income in these taxes than those making $100,000 to $200,000 (05H1).

Economic mobility in the US - the extent to which individuals and families move from one social class to another - is no higher than in Britain or France, and lower than in some Scandinavian countries (05H1).

For every additional dollar earned by the bottom 90% of the population between 1950 and 1970, those in the top 0.01% earned an additional $162. For every additional dollar earned by the bottom 90% between 1990 and 2002 each taxpayer in that top bracket brought in an extra $18,000 (05H1).

The chief executives at California's largest 100 companies took home a collective $1.1 billion in 2004, an increase of nearly 20% over 2003. This contrasts with the 2.9% raise that the average California worker saw in 2004 (05H1).

In the US, four meat-packing firms have traditionally controlled two-thirds of the beef supply. By the mid-1990s they controlled over 80% of the beef supply (01O3) (OECD, 2001d). In Australia, over 75% of retail food distribution is controlled by three firms (01O3) (OECD, 2001d).

It is estimated that only three firms control over 80% of US maize exports and 65% of US soybean exports; only four firms control 60% of domestic grain handling, and 25% of compound feed production (02H4) (Hendrickson and Heffernan).

The Premium employers pay for US workers with 4-year college degrees over those with high-school diplomas (in percent) (from a graph) Source: Economic Policy Institute (04W1) (Rcgd)

Year

1973

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2003

Women

36

33

26

33

42

46

47

46

Men

25

26

21

30

35

37

42

41

In 1983, the median wage in US exporting industries was $18,637/ year. In industries that compete with imports, it was $19,583/ year. For the entire economy the median was $16,168/ year (87T1). These export- and import-competing industries generate a more equal distribution of earnings. Thus when exports fall and imports rise to create a trade deficit, the distribution of earnings moves toward inequality (87T1).

Economist Lester Thurow attributes the rising inequality in the distribution of earnings in the US to two major forces:

    1. Intense international competitive pressures coupled with high unemployment, and
    2. A rising proportion of female workers (87T1).

Neglecting homes and real estate, the top 2% of all families own 54% of all net financial assets (stocks, bonds, pension funds etc.); the top 10% own 86%, and the bottom 55% have zero or negative financial assets (87T1).

Four-year college graduates in the US now earn about twice as much as those with high school diplomas. That's double the 50% premium of 20 years ago (00M1). (About 75% of Americans lack a bachelor's degree (00M1).)

In 1980, a new employee with a master's or doctoral degree earned just a little more than twice as much as someone who didn't complete high school. Today that spread is more than 4 to 1 (00M1).

According to the US Bureau of the Census, the share of total income that went to the top 20% of all families was 43.5% in 1985, the highest level recorded since the data were first collected in 1947 (87T1). The income share of the bottom 60% of the population in 1985 was 32.4%, the lowest level ever recorded (This group's share was slightly less than 36% in the late 1960s (87T1).) Data of the Federal Reserve board on income distribution suggests that the move toward inequality is even more pronounced, because it includes capital gains and retained earnings, not counted by the Census Bureau. Federal Reserve board data give (87T1):

Federal Reserve board figures also show that wealth is much more unequally distributed than income (87T1):

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SECTION [5-N] ~ SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES ~

A report "Infrastructure 2007: A Global Perspective," released on 5/9/07 by the Urban Land Institute and Ernst & Young LLP concluded that US airports, roads, rail lines, bridges and other transit infrastructure are deteriorating across the US because of insufficient investment. The report says that the failure to address this "emerging crisis in mobility" will undermine the ability of the US to compete internationally. In 2005 the American Society of Civil Engineers graded as "poor" the condition on the US transit infrastructure as well as US power grids, dams and systems for drinking water and waste water. The US faces a $1.6 trillion deficit in needed infrastructure spending though 2010 for repairs and maintenance according to the ULI/ Ernst & Young report. China spends 9% of its GDP on infrastructure; India spends 3.5%. The US spends 0.93% of its GDP ($112.9 billion/ year) on infrastructure according to the ULI/ Ernst&Young study (Thaddeus Herrick, "U.S. Infrastructure Found to Be in Disrepair," Wall Street Journal (5/9/07) p. B4.). (Rcgd) 

Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, said, "The very low US savings rate and related huge balance of payments deficit to attract funds from overseas are not sustainable things." The adjustment is likely to be long and painful. Roach estimates US net national savings at 1.4% of national income, and household debt at 133% of (one year of) personal disposable income (08C1). (Rcgd) 

In the latest study by the World Economic Forum (Geneva), four Nordic nations ranked among the six most competitive economies, despite having some of the world's highest tax rates (04W2). (The US was #2.) Scores are based on criteria critical to sustained economic growth, e.g. the quality of economic policies, the fairness and transparency of public institutions such as courts, and technological prowess. Business people in these high-tax-rate Nordic countries benefit from huge state investments in education, training and infrastructure that these taxes fund. These investments make the Nordic countries competitiveness more sustainable than countries with lower taxes and higher debt (04W2). ((04W2), when copied to gci-refs.doc becomes (04W3)). (Rcgd) 

None of the three basic trends - high stock market yields, falling interest rates, and increasing numbers of paychecks per household are sustainable (00M1). Nor are decaying infrastructure, ever-increasing credit-card debts, or selling the equity in one's home to finance current consumption. One might point out that US fertility rates have dropped significantly since around 1970, reducing living expenses for wage earners. However this trend, also, is non-sustainable, and net immigration is producing one of the highest population growth rates in the developed world. (Rcgd)

SECTION [5-O] ~ CURRENCY DECLINES ~

The Euro's 8% advance against the US dollar so far in 2006 risks removing a prop from the Euro's $10 trillion economy by making exports more expensive. About 40% of the euro region's GDP stems from shipments abroad (International Herald Tribune, "Greenspan sounds alarm on oil supply," Reuters (6/7/06).) (Rcgd) 

Since 2003, American mutual funds have increased their allocation of overseas equity from 15% to 22.5%. America's other large institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies might be doing the same thing. Downbeat expectations for the dollar have been common among fund managers for the past five years. One probable source of concern: America's huge and growing foreign indebtedness. In the absence of policies to boost domestic savings (thereby slowing the build up of debt) a steady decline of the dollar implies a steady decline in American living standards ("Dollars for Sale," Editorial, New York Times (8/25/07).)

In 2000, Iraq demanded payment in Euros for the oil the US allowed on the international market. Iran and Venezuela are now following Iraq's example (03D1).

US currency declined 12% during the past 12 months (2/1/02 -1/31/03?) (03U1).

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SECTION [5-P] ~ GLOBALIZATION CASE STUDIES ~ [P1]~Viet Nam, [P2]~China, [P3]~Japan, [P4]~EU, ~

Technology and foreign investment are making income inequality worse around the world according to the IMF's most recent semiannual economic review "World Economic Outlook." This confirms the work of other economists who have been trying to understand why income inequality has widened in both rich and poor countries during the past two decades (07D2).

Since at least the 1980s, the IMF has pressed countries to open their borders to foreign investment, technology and trade as a path to economic growth - and has channeled loans to countries that took its advice. An anti-IMF and anti-globalization backlash developed in many parts of the world, especially Latin America and Africa, where the economies that followed the IMF's advice did not grow as rapidly as anticipated. Now, that anti-globalization movement, which has spread to the US, Europe and parts of Asia, has become a political barrier to further liberalization of trade, investment, and the migration of workers (07D2). Comments: The economies of many developing nations are largely in agriculture. Forcing these economies to compete with highly mechanized, heavily subsidized exports of the US and the EU has resulted in huge trade deficits and economic hardships.

Part [P1] ~ Viet Nam

Unlike Viet Nam (Pop. growth during 1980-1999: 2.1%/ year) and China (Population growth during 1980-1999 was 1.3%/ year), sub-Saharan Africa (Pop. growth during 1980-1999 was 2.9%/ year) largely failed to take advantage of growing trade opportunities in global markets (03S5). Comments: Could geography have been a factor? Or could it be the poor soils? Its share in global exports dropped from 3.1% in the mid-1950s to 1.2% in 1990.

Some of today's most successful agricultural exporters (e.g. China and Viet Nam) established their international competitiveness under protection and import substitution regimes and embarked subsequently on "policy reforms" (03S5). Viet Nam's rapid economic and agricultural development over the 1990s is regarded as one of the most successful development stories of the 1990s. GDP growth in the 1990s averaged 7.6%/ year. In the 1990s, agricultural output grew almost 5%/ year (01V1) (Government of Viet Nam). Poverty has declined and the number of under-nourished has dropped by 3 million people (01F1) (FAO, 2001a). Over the 1990s, the value of agricultural exports increased by a factor of 3.5 (03S5). The foundations for Viet Nam's rapid integration into the global market were laid in 1986 with the introduction of Doi Moi, Viet Nam's economic renovation program. It involved a de-collectivization process, through which farming families received most of the land. Also, farmers were allowed to increase sales to the market and agricultural taxes were reduced. Agriculture also benefited from other fiscal reforms, the creation of a Treasury system, and the reformation of the banking system. This created a secure deposit base, and allowed fiscal operations deep into Viet Nam's rural areas. These measures had profound effects on society, encouraging entrepreneurship and willingness to take risk. Finally, Doi Moi offered "return" options to workers in the new factories, thereby reducing risk for internal migrants and further accelerating the fast development of rural areas (03S5). Viet Nam's agricultural import tariffs were raised repeatedly over the 1990s and subsidies were created to subsidize agricultural production and exports. Viet Nam, starting in December 1999, converted many non-tariff barriers into tariffs, with rates of 30-100% (03S5). Policies also played an important role in managing the 2000/02 coffee crisis that severely affected large parts of Viet Nam's agriculture. A sizeable support program helped coffee growers regain international competitiveness. The program includes subsidies to upgrade coffee quality and to reduce production costs. It promotes smaller, less centralized processing factories and warehouses suitable for the many different coffee-producing regions (01U3) (USDA, 2001b) and supports the creation of overall and agricultural infrastructure and the shift towards improved coffee varieties (03S5).

Part [P2] ~ China

A similar set of reforms in China in the late 1970s set the stage for impressive economic performance. Per-capita GDP (at current prices) increased by a factor of nine, and the value of exports by a factor of ten. Agricultural output tripled, as did agricultural exports, while the number of under-nourished declined by 76 million people (from 1990/1992 to 1997/1999). In fact, China was the single largest contributor to the reduction of under-nourishment during the 1990s, accounting for two-thirds of the progress made in fighting hunger (01F1) (FAO, 2001a). Comments: This was likely due to advances in fertilizer use, irrigation and crop genetics that produced like effects globally, regardless of economic openness. China's rapid development started with loosening the communal farming system and introducing the so-called household responsibility system, allowing farmers to sell their crops on the free market once they had fulfilled their quota obligations to the state. Production expanded rapidly under administrative pressure to fulfill production quotas, and under production incentives through input subsidies (water, fertilizer). Policies promoted adaptation of new imported technologies to domestic production (particularly high-yielding varieties of the green revolution). Domestic policies also encouraged the exit from agriculture of unproductive farmers by creating village enterprises to absorb excess rural labor. China also made massive investments in rural infrastructure (03S5).

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Part [P3] ~ Japan

Japan's Health Ministry estimates that the birth rate will drop this year from 1.28 to 1.26 per couple or lower. Japan's workforce may become too small to support its graying population, the tax base will shrink and the pensions system will come under increasing strain. Some of the blame lies with loyalty, measured in hours spent behind a desk. Japanese workers take only half the 18 days of paid holiday they are entitled to. Men find themselves at their desks when they should be at home. Overwork is the most commonly cited reason why young Japanese shy away from having children. In December 2005, Japan's population shrunk by 19,000 - the first decline since 1945. The Minister charged with boosting the birthrate, insists that companies must allow men to spend more time at home and help women return to work after giving birth. Japan's Health and Welfare Ministry said it was considering a law compelling firms to tell workers to take all their paid holiday. Some Japanese white-collar employees say taking a vacation has become harder because of tight schedules after companies cut down on staff. The workaholic trend has been getting worse in recent years. The Japanese work longer than their counterparts in Britain, the US and Germany (06G2). (Rcgd) 

An estimated 640,000 unmarried Japanese aged 15-34 had dropped out of the work force or failed to enter it in all of 2004 - up from 400,000 in 1993, the first year for which Japan's Labor Ministry has figures (05W1). These people are termed "NEETs" - not in education, employment or training - primarily young people who have given up looking for a job and who often get financial support from their parents. The term comes from the UK in the late 1990s when young people started finding difficulty in finding jobs (05W1). In 2004 the NEET population made up about 2% of Japan's 33 million 15-to-34-year-olds. (There are 63 million people in Japan's work force. Japan's total population is about 128 million.) The US does not track NEETs, but in the closest equivalent, nearly 9% of people in the US ages 16-24 were not in school, not working and not looking for a job (05W1). The number of Japanese NEETs is expected to reach 1.2 million by 2020 (05W1). Part of the cause of Japan's growing NEET population is the increasing trend for Japanese companies to reduce full-time hiring and rely increasingly on part-timers. Japanese hiring practices make it difficult for people who have hopped from one low-paying job to another to get hired for full time, long-term company work (05W1). Adding to the problem, many Japanese in their 40s and 50s who sacrificed their lives for stable, but grueling, corporate jobs don't want their children to follow in their footsteps and encourage their children to pursue "dream jobs" and are willing to support them in the process (05W1). Young people with full-time jobs are also getting weary of corporate jobs -even full-time jobs with high pay. A recent study by Japan's Nomura Research Institute of 1000 full-time company employees in their 20s and 30s found that 75% of them said they felt unmotivated at work. 50% said they would quit if given the chance (05W1). [ Note: To better understand this, See Henny Sender, "Where Salary Buys the Soul", Wall Street Journal, 1/3/06, p.D8 (a review of a book "Notes from Toyota-Land" by Darius Mehri)]

Some 32,155 Japanese committed suicide in 2006. Japan's suicide rate ranks 9th highest in the world. (Lithuania, Belarus and Russia ranked 1, 2, and 3 out of roughly 190 nations.) Health problems were believed to factor in almost 50% of Japanese suicides in 2006, followed by money problems and household difficulties. 48% of the Japanese who killed themselves in 2006 were unemployed. Suicides in Japan first exceeded 30,000/ year in 1998 during a national economic downturn that resulted in many Japanese finding themselves bankrupt, jobless and desperate (Carl Freire, "Japan's Suicide Rate Remains High," Associated Press (1/09/07)).

Japan has been in a 'slump' for the past decade or more. Which goes to show that the cozy mercantilist version of capitalism practiced there produces worse results than the American-led free market model. It seems neither of these is true - rather the reverse. In an article for the British magazine Prospect, Tokyo-based writer Eamonn Fingleton questions both of them. He suggests that the Japanese have encouraged these myths, and the Western establishment and financial press have generally swallowed them. His work is supported by that of Doug Stuck of the Washington Post Foreign Service. (Continued below)

The Japanese economy is the most income-equal of the developed countries. This is important. It has in fact thrived over the past 10 years. Japanese consumers are probably the richest in the world. About 2.2 million more households now own a car than a decade ago. Domestic sales of sophisticated electronic equipment rose by 17.6% in 2002. Household ownership of video cameras grew 136% during 1990-2001. Japanese mobile phone subscribers increased from nearly zero in 1993 to 67 million in 2000. Every household has a color television, 90% has a microwave oven, 40% a computer and 39% a set of golf clubs (03K1) (Continued below).

Unemployment has ranged from 4.5-4.9% - roughly similar to that in the US. The number of Japanese holidaying abroad rose from just over 8 million in 1989 to 14.6 million in 2000 - a rise of 79.9%. In terms of life expectancy, Japan surpassed Sweden and Switzerland in the 1990s to lead the world (03K1) (Continued below).

The Japanese work less hard than the Americans to achieve higher incomes, more savings and better health than the Americans. The average working week is five hours shorter than Americans'. They also pay less tax - less than 20% compared to 26%. Yet health care is virtually free; and nearly every ward in the cities has a public swimming pool and playgrounds. Japan's rate of heart attacks is a third of that in the US, Japan's divorce rate is half of that in the US, the crime rate one-third and murder rates are one sixth of those in the US. Homelessness is rare in Japan; where they also read twice as many books per capita than do Americans (03K1) (Continued below).

Why is this? Why is an economy that is supposed to be in a recession producing the goods for its people? Doug Stuck thinks that 'Japan's public and corporate officials have largely resisted the route so often urged by the US to cut their losses, cut their workforces, and let companies go bankrupt. Japan balks at the US model wherein highly paid CEOs rescue a struggling company by throwing thousands of its employees out of work. Instead, workers keep their jobs while the companies limp along. It may be inefficient capitalism, they say, but workers have jobs.' (Continued below)

The result is that the financial sector of the economy - the owners of capital - do less well in Japan than under the US model; and it is strains in that sector that are of interest to the conventional economic establishment and the financial media. But Japanese financiers take a longer, and less speculative, view of their investment. They have continued to invest heavily in capital-intensive industry and in infrastructure. A record 2.2 million square meters of new office space will be completed in 2003 in Tokyo - more than was contained in the Twin Towers. Tokyo's sewerage system has been transformed in the past decade (03K1) (Continued below)

Why has Japan managed to defy the conventional wisdom that an economy must put the financial sector's interest above all others? Essentially it is because Japan manages her economy - both trade and investment - to suit her own long-term interests. Japan defies the rules about opening trade in sectors where she is not competitive. She does not rely on foreign investment; for decades Japan fiercely resisted American attempts to open Japan's financial markets to foreigners. The result is a benign circle of expansion in which Japan has become an exporter of capital. Japan's net foreign assets have nearly quadrupled in the past 12 years (03K1) (Continued below).

Japan's current account trade surplus totaled $987 billion in the 1990s -- 2.4 times the total for the 1980s, when Japan was regarded as the 'unstoppable juggernaut' of trade. The yen has risen by 19% since the Tokyo financial crash. The savings rate was 14.9% of GDP in 2001, which means Japan accounts for nearly 30% of all new savings in the OSDC group of rich countries. Government debt, fell from 6.0 to 1.6% of GDP between 1993-98. Only 6% of government debt is owed to foreigners; while the US borrows abroad $4 billion a day to finance its debt (03K1). (Rcgd)
Go to top of this Chapter 5 ~ Economic/ Social Degradation in the Developed World ~

Part [P4] ~ European Union ~

Some 58% of the Spanish construction sector's work force is on short-term contracts, vs. an EU average of 16% (05J1).

Productivity in Spain grew an average of 0.9%/ year between 1995 and 2004, vs. 1.7%/ year in Germany, 2% in France and 2.5% in the US (05J1).

Spanish workers on short-term contracts are typically young (between 18 and 30), creating a generational divide in the work force. College degrees don't help much (05J1).

Studies have found that short-term work contracts have done little to boost Spain's productivity because companies don't invest as much in training temporary employees (05J1).

The German government, earlier in 2005, cut benefits to those unemployed for more than a year (05J1).

Denmark has liberalized its hiring and firing policies. Its unemployment rate has fallen 50% over the past decade (05J1).

The French Prime Minister issued a decree in August of 2005 allowing companies with fewer than 20 workers to lay off employees within 2 years of their hiring without any justification (05J1).

Economic growth rates in 2005: US 3.5%/ year: Spain 3.2%/ year: Germany 0.8%/ year: France 1.5%/ year. (Source: International Monetary Fund) (05J1),

Other EU countries have tried to avoid short-term employment contracts, and have higher unemployment rates and lower economic growth rates. E.g. Germany's unemployment rate is 11.4%, up from 9.2% in 2001. In France, unemployment increased from 8.3% to 9.9% in the same period (05J1).

Spanish workers on short-term contacts now account for 32.5% of the Spanish labor force, double the EU's average. (In La Mancha, the short-term work rate was 38.3% in 2004.) Short-term workers often subsist on salaries barely above Spain's gross minimum wage (about $725/ month) and don't get severance payments to ease their (frequent) transitions between jobs. The plight of Spain's short-term workers has created a new political buzzword: "precariousness" (05J1).

Four million Spaniards - a third of Spain's work force - work at low-paid jobs (minimum wage: about $725/ month) on short-term employment contracts that last from one day to 6 months. Short-term workers get slim or no benefits. The proliferation of such jobs has helped to cut the unemployment rate from 20% to 9.4% over the past decade (05J1).

Germany and Japan both manage to keep advanced manufacturing sectors anchored at home, and to defend domestic wage levels and social guarantees. When they do disperse production and jobs overseas, as they must, they do so strategically. By contrast, Washington defines "national interest" primarily in terms of advancing the global reach of our multinational enterprises (05G2). (All 4 of these statements are in Sect. (3-B) of gci.html.)

Go to top of this Section [5-P] ~ Globalization Case Studies ~
Go to top of this Chapter 5 ~
Economic/ Social Degradation in the Developed World ~

SECTION [5-Q] ~ Human Capital Issues ~

Percent of African health care workers Intending to migrate: Cameroon - 49.3%; Ghana - 61.6%; Senegal - 37.9%; South Africa - 58.3%; Uganda - 26.1%; Zimbabwe - 68.0% (Source: WHO Migration Report, 2005) ("Return of the Population Growth Factor: Its impact on the millennium development goals," Report of the Hearings by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development and Reproductive Health (January, 2007) p. 30) 

Engineering degrees awarded in the U.S. (in thousands) (from a chart) (DMB = PhD+ Masters+ Bachelor's: B= Bachelor's only) Source: American Society for Engineering Education (05B3)

Year

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

DMB

96

100

102

104

112

119

B

62

64

65

67

71

73

During the period 1970 to 1996 the U.S. federal government investment in physical sciences declined from 0.1% of the GDP to 0.05% of the GDP and remained at about 0.5% until at least 2003 (Sources: National Science Foundation and the American Association for the Advancement of Science).

Federally backed student loans granted annually nearly doubled between 1995 and 2003, from $26 billion to nearly $50 billion. (Source: College Board. See Wall Street Journal (1/6/05))

Go to top of this Chapter 5 ~ Economic/ Social Degradation in the Developed World ~

SECTION [5-R] ~ Financial Capital Glut ~

Peter Bernstein (age 89) has observed or dealt with the Great Depression, the recession of 1958, the bear market of the 1970s, the 1987 crash, the Savings-and-Loan crisis of the late 1980s, and the 2000-2002 bear market following the tech stock bubble. Bernstein argues that the current situation is worse than he has seen since the Depression, and believes that it will roil the markets into 2009 and beyond. He sees two main problems today: (1) Abuse of "securitization" - the trend for banks to hold fewer loans on their books and, instead, turn them into securities that are then sold to other investors, and (2) years of over-borrowing by financial institutions and consumers alike. He contends that today's problems were sparked primarily by hedge funds that are both unregulated by the federal government and, in many ways, unregulated by their owners who gave their hedge fund managers a very broad set of marching orders (08B2).

The $1.7 trillion hedge fund industry lost $180 billion during the three months August, September, and October 2008. Money managers fear hundreds or even thousands of hedge funds could be driven out of business. This creates problems for public pension funds, foundations and endowments that have poured billions of dollars into these private partnerships since they pulled their money out of Internet (bubble) stocks in 2001. Worldwide, the hedge fund industry (which started in 1990) is shrinking for the first time. The number of hedge funds dropped by 217 during August, September, and October 2008 to 10,016 according to Hedge Fund Research. (Total liquidations for the first half of 2008 were 350.) The Massachusetts state pension oversight committee will soon vote on whether to allow some towns with pension funds smaller that $250 million to invest in hedge funds. However the US House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will meet in November 2008 to consider increased regulation of the hedge fund industry. (Louise Story, "Investors Flee as Hedge Funds Woes Deepen," The New York Times (10/23/08) 

From the early 1950s to the early 1980s (before significant influences of globalization), US Federal Reserve interest rates have trended upward (amid assorted dips and peaks) apparently driven by the need to keep dynamic economic growth under control. From the early 1980s to the end of 2008 (a period in which the effects of globalization on economic activity are significant), US Federal Reserve interest rates have trended downward (amid assorted dips and peaks) apparently driven by the need to counter the increasingly anemic levels of economic growth. In late 2008, Federal Reserve interest rates had gotten so low that this tool for propping up anemic economic activity no longer has any ability to serve this purpose (08H2).

CDs and government bonds are often costing money once inflation, fees and taxes are considered. A rate of 2% on a CD is rare. Most CD rates are well under 1%.

William H. Gross, co-chief investment officer of PIMCO, says "What the average citizen does not understand is that a significant part of the government's plan to repair the financial system and the economy is to pay savers nothing and allow financial institutions to earn a nice, guaranteed spread." Many think that the Federal Reserve is fueling a stock market bubble by keeping rates so low that investors decide to bet on stocks instead. Some blue chips have a dividend yield of at least 3%. (Stephanie Strom, "At Tiny Rates, Saving Money Costs Investors," The New York Times (12/26/09))

Peter Bernstein (age 89) has observed or dealt with the Great Depression, the recession of 1958, the bear market of the 1970s, the 1987 crash, the Savings-and-Loan crisis of the late 1980s, and the 2000-2002 bear market following the tech stock bubble. Bernstein argues that the current situation is worse than he has seen since the Depression, and believes that it will roil the markets into 2009 and beyond. He sees two main problems today: (1) Abuse of "securitization" - the trend for banks to hold fewer loans on their books and, instead, turn them into securities that are then sold to other investors, and (2) years of over-borrowing by financial institutions and consumers alike. He contends that today's problems were sparked primarily by hedge funds that are both unregulated by the federal government and, in many ways, unregulated by their owners who gave their hedge fund managers a very broad set of marching orders (08B2). 

The $1.7 trillion hedge fund industry lost $180 billion during the three months August, September, and October 2008. Money managers fear hundreds or even thousands of hedge funds could be driven out of business. This creates problems for public pension funds, foundations and endowments that have poured billions of dollars into these private partnerships since they pulled their money out of Internet (bubble) stocks in 2001. Worldwide, the hedge fund industry (which started in 1990) is shrinking for the first time. The number of hedge funds dropped by 217 during August, September, and October 2008 to 10,016 according to Hedge Fund Research. (Total liquidations for the first half of 2008 were 350.) The Massachusetts state pension oversight committee will soon vote on whether to allow some towns with pension funds smaller that $250 million to invest in hedge funds. However the US House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will meet in November 2008 to consider increased regulation of the hedge fund industry. (Louise Story, "Investors Flee as Hedge Funds Woes Deepen," The New York Times (10/23/08)) (This is in \global\gci-analysis3.doc Chapter 3 Section [A] Part A18 10/24/08)

From the early 1950s to the early 1980s (before significant influences of globalization), US Federal Reserve interest rates have trended upward (amid assorted dips and peaks) apparently driven by the need to keep dynamic economic growth under control. From the early 1980s to the end of 2008 (a period in which the effects of globalization on economic activity are significant), US Federal Reserve interest rates have trended downward (amid assorted dips and peaks) apparently driven by the need to counter the increasingly anemic levels of economic growth. In late 2008, Federal Reserve interest rates had gotten so low that this tool for propping up anemic economic activity no longer has any ability to serve this purpose (08H2).

Assets under management by Hedge Funds in the U.S., (in billions of dollars) (from a chart) (06M1).

Year

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2005

Amount

30

90

170

260

380

460

620

970

1100

The net amount of money flowing into hedge funds that focus on emerging-market investments rose 13% to $5.3 billion in 2005 from $4.7 billion in 2004, bringing total assets to $44.5 billion. Pension funds, *endowments and other institutional investors are pouring money into these funds - funds that they have been avoiding for years (06P3).

There are nearly 600 Asia-dedicated hedge funds with nearly $100 billion under management, up from 100 funds with $15 billion under management in 2000 (06P3).

In 2005 and 2006, US lenders wrote an estimated $3.2 trillion in new home mortgages (a record). To do this they lowered their credit standards considerably. In 2005, 20% of mortgages taken out were "subprime" -made to borrowers with poor credit. Many more mortgages had risky features like interest-only payments. As interest rates rose in 2006, mortgage delinquency rates soared and are expected to peak in 2008 at over 3%, well above the level of the last recession. Many of these risky mortgages were sold to investment bankers who sold them to investors worldwide. More than 20% of global private debt securities is now tied to housing in the US -- $7.5 trillion - far larger than the market for US Treasuries (4.3 trillion) (Editors, "Mortgage Insecurities," New Your Times Editorial (2/22/07) [based on an analysis by Mark Zandi and Juan Manuel Licari, two economists for Moody's Economy.com].)

Lewis Ranieri (who helped to create the vast business of selling bonds backed by Americans' home-loan payments) is worried about the proliferation of risky mortgages and the convoluted ways of financing them. As of 12/31/06 there were about $7 trillion of US mortgage securities outstanding, easily exceeding the $4.3 trillion of US Treasury securities. Many sub-prime borrowers (people with weak credit records) bought homes with no down-payment. In 2006, more than 40% of sub-prime borrowers weren't required to produce pay stubs or other proof of their income and assets (Credit Suisse Group data). Many mortgage loans made in 2005 and 2006 were made without the lenders being sure of what the house was worth (James R. Hagerty, "Mortgage-Bond Pioneer Dislikes What He Sees," Wall Street Journal (2/24/07) p. B1.) 

The hedge fund Sailfish Capital Partners that previously held $2 billion in assets collapsed (08A1).

The number of hedge funds is 10,000 and they manage almost $1.9 trillion in assets (08A1).

Growing numbers of pension funds are investing billions into "hedge funds" which are secretive, lightly regulated investment partnerships with risks that are hard to measure and returns that are hard to predict and that charge some of the highest fees on Wall Street. They normally manage money only for wealthy investors. Hedge fund managers do not need to give investors specifics about trading activity, and there are no daily updates on the value of investors' holdings as there are with mutual funds. Hedge funds often invest in derivatives (05A2).
Pension funds and other large institutions are expected to invest as much as $300 billion in hedge funds by 2008, vs. $5 billion in 1995. Pension funds account for roughly 40% of all institutional money
(05A2).
Some pension funds have more than 20% of their assets invested in hedge funds
(05A2).
In Congress there has been a push for amendments that would make it easier for hedge funds to manage even more pension money without having to comply with the federal law that governs company pensions
(05A2).
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a federal agency, covers corporate pension failures. Taxpayers cover pension failures by state and local governments
(05A2).
Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, nearly collapsed in 1998. Bayou Group, a $450 million hedge fund shut down after most of its money disappeared. Its two officers have pleaded guilty to fraud charges (
05A2).
Go to top of this Chapter 5 ~
Economic/ Social Degradation in the Developed World ~

SECTION [5-S] ~ Labor Force Participation ~

Labor force participation is declining among adolescents of both sexes (age 15-19). This is due to staying in school longer. See the chart comparing 1990 to 2005 for the more developed countries and for the less-developed countries (06P2). (Note: this data is available as a pdf file on the Internet.) (NOTE: The connection with globalization is far from clear.)

Go to List of References // Go to Table of Contents of this 11-chapter document // Go to Globalization: The Convergence Issue //
Go  to Home Page of this website //

SECTION [5-T] ~ Caste System ~

(This is a very weak support for Caste system analyses)

Some of the biggest banks in the US are refusing to grant student loans at community colleges, for-profit universities and other less competitive institutions. They continue to extend federally backed loans to students at the top universities in the US. Some of the most needy students in the US will be hurt most by such policies. More than 6.2 million of the nation's 14.8 million undergraduates attend community colleges. About a third of the graduates of community colleges took out loans. Most of these loans were federally guaranteed. Students attending elite, expensive, public and private four-year universities can expect loans to remain plentiful. Banks contend that these loans are larger, more profitable and less risky. This is probably because the banks expect the universities' graduates to earn more. Sallie Mae and Nelnet have reaffirmed their commitment to federal loans regardless of the institution that a student attends. The US government guarantees 95% of the value of student loans. The banks that are pulling out say that this is because of analyses of which colleges have the highest default rates, lowest numbers of borrowers, and small loan amounts. Such factors make a bank's student-loan business less profitable (Jonathan D. Glater (The New York Times) "Banks refuse loans to students at lesser colleges," Pittsburgh Post Gazette (6/2/08) p. A4.).

College tuition and fees in the US increased 439% from 1982 to 2007 (adjusted for inflation) while the median family income rose 147% (08L2).

Student borrowing in the US has more than doubled in the last decade, and students from lower-income families, on average, get smaller grants from the colleges they attend than students from more affluent families (08L2).

The US is one of the few countries where 25- to 34-year-olds are less well educated than older workers (08L2).

In 2007, the net cost at a four-year public university in the US cost 76% of the median family income (08L2).

Among the poorest families (those with incomes in the lowest 20%) the net cost of a year at a public university was 55% of median income, up from 39% in 1999-2000. At community colleges, long seen as a safety net, that cost was 49% of the poorest families' median income in 2007, up from 40% in 1999-2000 (08L2).

In community colleges in the US, tuition and fees averaged about $3,200. In private U.S. universities they cost more than $33,000 (08L2).

The tuition has risen at public universities in the US largely to make up for declining state appropriations (08L2).

In order to persuade Ford Motor Co. to produce Ford Fiestas in the Ford plant outside Mexico City (involving 4,500 jobs), union leaders offered a two-tier hiring scheme. Wages for new hires would be reduced to about half of the current wage of $4.50/ hour (Unknown) "Unions agree to wage cuts," Pittsburgh Post Gazette (6/5/08) p. A4. Comments: Two-tiered wage scales are becoming common even in the developed world. (in gci-append-b.doc (10/22/08))

A class of outcasts known as "buraku," dating back to Japan's feudal times, still endures discrimination. According to Buddhist beliefs, burakus perform tasks considered unclean, e.g. slaughterers, undertakers, executioners and town guards. They are forced to wear telltale clothing, and they are segregated into their own neighborhoods. This same category of people are also found in Tibet and Nepal, with the same Buddhist background. In South Korea, burakus have largely vanished, having melted into society as a whole. Japan's burakus were officially liberated in 1871, a few years after the 13th Amendment abolished slavery in the US. However buraku living standards and education levels still remain far below national Japanese averages. Also, welfare recipient rates remain higher than that of the average Japanese (09O1).

Federal student-loan disbursements - the total amount borrowed by students and received by schools - in the 2008-2009 academic year grew 25% over the previous year, to $75.1 billion. The rate of growth was 1.7% in the 1998-1999 school, and 17% in 1994-95 (09C2).

Today, two-thirds of college students borrow to pay for college, and their average debt load is $23,186 by the time they graduate. In 1987, 58% of students borrowed to pay for college, and the average amount borrowed was $13,172 by the time they graduate (09C2).

Tough student loan repayments affect major life decisions by recent graduates, forcing them to put off traditional milestones - such as buying a first home, getting married, and having children (09C2).

The rising costs of borrowing may ironically be contributing to the accelerating cost of college. Loans can give colleges an artificial sense of a family's ability to pay tuition. To some extent, that false sense of security gets built into the assumption schools make when setting prices. The idea is that, as prices rise, families borrow more and more, spurring prices to rise further, which, in turn, require more borrowing. This phenomenon is playing a role in why tuitions grow at about twice the rate of inflation. It's easier to raise prices because this additional loan amount is made available (09C2).

The total borrowing limit for dependent undergraduates who take out federal Stafford loans - the most popular federal aid program - grew to $31,000 in the 2008-2009 school-year (09C2).

Some 39% of US college graduates say it will take them more than 10 years to pay off their household's education-related debt (09C2).

In August 2009, the percentage of teenagers who wanted a job but could not find one was 25.5% - the highest level since the government began tracking such data in 1948 (09R1).

Jobs for youth never recovered after the last recession in 2001 (09R1).

Before August of 2009, 25.4% of the teenagers in the job market were unable to find work - an unemployment rate nearly three times that of the non-teenage population (9%) and nearly four times that of workers over 55 (6.8%, also a record high for that age group). An estimated 1.64 million people ages 16-19 were unemployed (09R1).

More than 34% of young workers (younger than 35) are living with their parents (09B1).

Some 24% of all employed young workers say they are not making enough money to cover their bills (09B1).

Some 31% of employed young workers do not have health insurance. In 1999 the figure was 24% (09B1).

Of the young workers who do not have health insurance, 31% said their employer did not offer insurance, and 48% said the cost of health insurance was keeping them uninsured (09B1).

While 74% of full-time employees have a pension or retirement plan, 47% of younger workers have retirement benefits (09B1).

Some 88% of full-time workers over age 35 had health care coverage. Only 68% of workers under age 35 had health care coverage (09B1).

Some 33% of younger workers have jobs that do not provide paid vacation time, and 40% of younger workers have jobs that do not provide sick days (09B1).

(This is a very weak support for Caste system analyses)

Some of the biggest banks in the US are refusing to grant student loans at community colleges, for-profit universities and other less competitive institutions. They continue to extend federally backed loans to students at the top universities in the US. Some of the most needy students in the US will be hurt most by such policies. More than 6.2 million of the nation's 14.8 million undergraduates attend community colleges. About a third of the graduates of community colleges took out loans. Most of these loans were federally guaranteed. Students attending elite, expensive, public and private four-year universities can expect loans to remain plentiful. Banks contend that these loans are larger, more profitable and less risky. This is probably because the banks expect the universities' graduates to earn more. Sallie Mae and Nelnet have reaffirmed their commitment to federal loans regardless of the institution that a student attends. The US government guarantees 95% of the value of student loans. The banks that are pulling out say that this is because of analyses of which colleges have the highest default rates, lowest numbers of borrowers, and small loan amounts. Such factors make a bank's student-loan business less profitable (Jonathan D. Glater (The New York Times) "Banks refuse loans to students at lesser colleges," Pittsburgh Post Gazette (6/2/08) p. A4.).

College tuition and fees in the US increased 439% from 1982 to 2007 (adjusted for inflation) while the median family income rose 147% (08L2).

Student borrowing in the US has more than doubled in the last decade, and students from lower-income families, on average, get smaller grants from the colleges they attend than students from more affluent families (08L2).

The US is one of the few countries where 25- to 34-year-olds are less well educated than older workers (08L2).

In 2007, the net cost at a four-year public university in the US cost 76% of the median family income (08L2).

Among the poorest families (those with incomes in the lowest 20%) the net cost of a year at a public university was 55% of median income, up from 39% in 1999-2000. At community colleges, long seen as a safety net, that cost was 49% of the poorest families' median income in 2007, up from 40% in 1999-2000 (08L2).

In community colleges in the US, tuition and fees averaged about $3,200. In private universities they cost more than $33,000 (08L2).

Tuition has risen at public universities in the US largely to make up for declining state appropriations (08L2).

In order to persuade Ford Motor Co. to produce Ford Fiestas in the Ford plant outside Mexico City (involving 4,500 jobs), union leaders offered a two-tier hiring scheme. Wages for new hires would be reduced to about half of the current wage of $4.50/ hour (Unknown) "Unions agree to wage cuts," Pittsburgh Post Gazette (6/5/08) p. A4. Comments: Two-tiered wage scales are becoming common even in the developed world. 

A class of outcasts known as "buraku," dating back to Japan's feudal times, still endures discrimination. According to Buddhist beliefs, burakus perform tasks considered unclean, e.g. slaughterers, undertakers, executioners and town guards. They are forced to wear telltale clothing, and they are segregated into their own neighborhoods. This same category of people are also found in Tibet and Nepal, with the same Buddhist background. In South Korea, burakus have largely vanished, having melted into society as a whole. Japan's burakus were officially liberated in 1871, a few years after the 13th Amendment abolished slavery in the US. However buraku living standards and education levels still remain far below national Japanese averages. Also, welfare recipient rates remain higher than that of the average Japanese (09O1).

Federal student-loan disbursements - the total amount borrowed by students and received by schools - in the 2008-09 academic year grew 25% over the previous year, to $75.1 billion. The rate of growth was 1.7% in the 1998-99 school, and 17% in 1994-95 (09C2).

Today, two-thirds of college students borrow to pay for college, and their average debt load is $23,186 by the time they graduate. In 1987, 58% of students borrowed to pay for college, and the average amount borrowed was $13,172 by the time they graduate (09C2).

Tough student loan repayments affect major life decisions by recent graduates, forcing them to put off traditional milestones - such as buying a first home, getting married, and having children (09C2).

The rising costs of borrowing may ironically be contributing to the accelerating cost of college. Loans can give colleges an artificial sense of a family's ability to pay tuition. To some extent, that false sense of security gets built into the assumption schools make when setting prices. The idea is that, as prices rise, families borrow more and more, spurring prices to rise further, which, in turn, require more borrowing. This phenomenon is playing a role in why tuitions grow at about twice the rate of inflation. It's easier to raise prices because this additional loan amount is made available (09C2).

The total borrowing limit for dependent undergraduates who take out federal Stafford loans - the most popular federal aid program - grew to $31,000 in the 2008-2009 school-year (09C2).

Some 39% of US college graduates say it will take them more than 10 years to pay off their household's education-related debt (09C2).

In August 2009, the percentage of teenagers who wanted a job but could not find one was 25.5% - the highest level since the government began tracking such data in 1948 (09R1).

Jobs for youth never recovered after the last recession in 2001 (09R1).

Before August of 2009, 25.4% of the teenagers in the job market were unable to find work - an unemployment rate nearly three times that of the non-teenage population (9%) and nearly 4 times that of workers over 55 (6.8%, also a record high for that age group). An estimated 1.64 million people ages 16-19 were unemployed (09R1).

More than 34% of young workers (younger than 35) are living with their parents (09B1).

Some 24% of all employed young workers say they are not making enough money to cover their bills (09B1).

Some 31% of employed young workers do not have health insurance. In 1999 the figure was 24% (09B1).

Of the young workers who do not have health insurance, 31% said their employer did not offer insurance, and 48% said the cost of health insurance was keeping them uninsured (09B1).

While 74% of full-time employees have a pension or retirement plan, 47% of younger workers have retirement benefits (09B1).

Some 88% of full-time workers over age 35 had health care coverage. Only 68% of workers under age 35 had health care coverage (09B1).

Some 33% of younger workers have jobs that do not provide paid vacation time, and 40% of younger workers have jobs that do not provide sick days (09B1).

Some 32,155 Japanese committed suicide in 2006. Japan's suicide rate ranks 9th highest in the world. (Lithuania, Belarus and Russia ranked 1, 2, and 3 out of roughly 190 nations.) Health problems were believed to factor in almost 50% of Japanese suicides in 2006, followed by money problems and household difficulties. (These could have their basis in money problems.) 48% of the Japanese who committed suicide in 2006 were unemployed. Suicides in Japan first exceeded 30,000/ year in 1998 during a national economic downturn that resulted in many Japanese finding themselves bankrupt, jobless and desperate (Carl Freire, "Japan's Suicide Rate Remains High," Associated Press (1/09/07).)

In 2004, 50% of graduating seniors in the US borrowed some money for college (an average of $19,000). Compare this to 1993 when 35% of seniors borrowed for college, and their debt averaged $12,400 in 2006 dollars (06G3).

The difficult economic times faced by high-wage Japan in dealing with an increasingly globalized marketplace are reverberating throughout Japanese society. Not only is the normally classless Japanese society becoming more socially stratified, but also organized crime is expanding (84,700 known members of organized Japanese criminal groups in 2007 vs. 1000 Mafia members in the US). Tougher economic times are forcing organized criminals to victimize regular Japanese more frequently. (Martin Fackler, "Mayor's Death Forces Japanese Crime Rings into the Light," The New York Times (4/21/07).)

American men in their 30s today are worse off than their fathers' generation, a reversal from a decade ago, when sons generally were better off than their fathers (Study "The Economic Mobility Project," done by Pew Charitable Trusts, Brookings Institute, Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, and the Urban Institute) (07I1).

In 2004, the median income for a man in his 30s, which is a good predictor of his lifetime earnings, was $35,010 - 12% less than for men in their 30s in 1974 - their fathers' generation - adjusted for inflation. A decade ago, median income for men in their 30s was 32,901, 5% higher than 30 years earlier (07I1).

In Japan, the world's No. 2 economy, companies are increasing their use of temporary workers ("temps") in factory jobs that start at $10/ hour and receive few benefits. They earn 2/3 of what full-timers make, and can often be hired and fired with a few day's notice. More than 33% of Japan's labor force is categorized as "non-permanent" (part timers, temps on fixed-term contracts, and people sent to companies by temporary staffing agencies) vs. 23% in 1997 and 18% in 1987 (08H1).

During 1997-2007 average wages in Japan fell every year except two because of increased use of temps and stagnant wages for full-timers. Consumption by Japanese working families declined on a year-on-year basis in 6 of the past 8 quarters. This even though the Japanese are also saving less: A Bank of Japan survey showed that 23% of households had no savings in 2007, vs. 10% in 1996 (08H1).

In the July-September quarter of 2007, when Japans economy grew at 1.5%/ year, exports were rising at an annualized 11% rate, and domestic demand was shrinking slightly. Personal consumption is so weak in Japan that it accounts for a little over 50% of the economy, vs. 70% in the US. Sharp cuts in regional public works spending, part of Japan's effort to reduce its huge fiscal deficit, have hurt local economies and consumption. Personal consumption growth is also weak in Europe, and US consumers are stressed. European countries have also been relying more heavily on temps. In Germany, temps make up 14% of the work force, according to the OECD. In the US, "contingent" workers - those lacking permanent job arrangements -totaled about 4% of the work force in 2005. By any definition, Japan's reliance on temps is among the highest in developed nations (08H1).

The number of Japanese families receiving public financial support for children is soaring. There's even a new kind of homeless people - young folks who sleep at Internet cafes (08H1).

In the 1990s Japanese companies shifted large chunks of their manufacturing capacity overseas (08H1).

In the late 1990s, worker-friendly laws in Japan forbade temporary labor contracts except for a few specialized areas such as computer programming. A 1999 changed allowed temp agencies to dispatch workers to many more types of jobs. In 2004, Japanese manufacturers were allowed to use worker sent by temporary help agencies (08H1)

Once Japanese workers accept temporary help status they tend to be discriminated thereafter. For example, when the Japanese economy began recovering in 2003 and companies needed more full-time workers, they got them by hiring fresh graduates rather than by promoting "temps" (08H1).

Among Japanese workers aged 25-34, about 26% were "temps" in 2006, vs. 14% in 1997 (08H1).

Changes in Household spending in Japan (year-over-year percentage change) (08H1). {w55}

Year

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

Change

1.0%

-0.8%

-1.1%

-1.1%

+0.8%

-2.0%

Household Savings Rates in %, after taxes (08H1)

Year

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

Japan

12.0%

10.8

10.3

5.2

3.8

3.0

Great Britain

10.4%

9.5

5.5

6.2

3.7

5.3

US

4.6%

3.6

2.6

2.0

2.2

0.0

The proportion of US 18- to 34-year-olds living with their parents has risen by an estimated 5 percentage points since 1980, to roughly 34%. (From "The Price of Independence," published by Russell Sage Foundation) (08S1)

In southern Europe, as many as 60% of young adults live at home. (08S1)

Rising housing and commuting costs play a role. But rising real housing costs explain only about 15% of the drop in independent living among young adults, which started years before the sharpest run-up in housing. (08S1)

The biggest increase in young adults living with parents came in the 1980s.

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SECTION [5-U] ~ Natural Resource Prices ~

The global food-price index (compiled by "The Economist" since 1845) is at an all-time high (2008); it increased 30% in 2007. Milk prices rose 29% in 2007, wheat prices increased 80% and soybeans increased by 90% in 2007 (08N2).

Per-capita consumption of meat in China more than doubled since the mid-1980s (08N2). Comments: A secret World Bank report found that 75% of food price increases in the past few years is attributable to the US bio-fuels program, and only part of the remaining 25% was due to consumption growth in nations like China and India, droughts in Australia, etc.

The global food-price index (compiled by "The Economist" since 1845) is at an all-time high (2008); it increased 30% in 2007. Milk prices rose 29% in 2007, wheat prices increased 80% and soybeans increased by 90% in 2007 (08N2).

During 2006-2007 the world price of tin, nickel and zinc roughly doubled; the price of aluminum increased 39%; plywood prices increased by more than 27% (08N2). China alone accounts for 33% of the growth in global oil consumption in recent years (08N2). Comments: These non-food commodity price increases reflect mainly increases in consumption by nations like China, India and Brazil. Therefore, much of this depends on the willingness of the US to run huge trade deficits indefinitely. - something that is non-sustainable. It is causing the dollar to decline.

Since the start of 2003 through mid-2006, the bid-price for 3-month nickel futures contracts on the London Metal Exchange roughly tripled, from about $8000/ metric tonne to $25,000/ metric tonne (06B2). Some of the world's biggest nickel-producing countries include Russia (270), Canada (198), Australia (194) Indonesia (150) and New Caledonia (113). (Figures in parentheses are thousands of metric tonnes of production during 2005.) (06B2). The world's supplies of easy-to-extract nickel ore are nearly gone, forcing miners to use more expensive procedures (06B2).

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