EDITION 3 ~ April, 2008

Bruce Sundquist

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Previous Editions: Ed. 1, June 2002 // Ed. 2, March 2003 //

~ Table of Contents 



(A- 1)


(A- 2)

The Future of Food/ Wood/ Water Production

(A- 3)

Human Migration Constraints

(A- 4)

Irrigation and Water Supplies - Threatened

(A- 5)

Wild Fisheries - Over-fished and Degrading

(A- 6)

Aquaculture- Worse than Nothing?

(A- 7)

Fuel-wood- Farther from Home - and Expensive

(A- 8)

Forests- Shrinking and Degrading

(A- 9)

Grasslands- Overgrazed


Shifting Cultivation - Far Beyond Sustainable


Cropland Reserves


Cropland Soils


Shrinking Cover-ups


Appendix A References

Table (A-1) -Populations in Options Available to Developing World Residents - Current and Projected
Table (A-2) -The Evolution of Large-Scale Food- and Wood Production over the Centuries 

Go to the home Page of this web site
Go to "The Controversy over US Support for International Family Planning: An Analysis

NOTE 1: This Appendix A focuses on facts, figures, arguments and analyses relevant to the questions of:

As discussed in Section (5-B) of "The Controversy over US Support for International Family Planning . . ." the sustainability of the global systems for producing food, wood and freshwater for human consumption is clearly highly dependent upon the availability of financial capital in the developing world. Population growth strongly affects financial capital generation because of the large amounts of capital required to finance the infrastructure expansion that population growth calls for. Hence the sustainability of the systems for producing food, wood and freshwater for human consumption in the developing world is strongly affected by rates of population growth.

NOTE 2: This Appendix A makes significant use of information from a larger set of documents (07S1) (07S2) (07S3) (07S4) (07S5) on this web site that reviews the global literature on the degradation of systems related to the production of food, wood and freshwater. These five reviews cover soils and croplands, forestlands, grasslands, irrigated lands and fisheries. They are organized more as easy-to-use set of reference documents. A recent document on the sustainability of the global systems for producing food, wood and freshwater for human consumption (08S1) is also found on this website. It too makes significant use of the five review documents. It covers many of the issues found in this document, but more in-depth, being a significantly larger document. So those who prefer a more detailed document on sustainability issues may prefer to examine Ref. (08S1) instead of this document.

NOTE 3: The developing world is undergoing numerous major changes as a result of "globalization." The economies (if not also the cultures) of the developed and developing worlds are in the process of converging into one global economy. This document deals with globalization issues only to the extent that the issues dealt with in this document are affected by globalization. A more detailed analysis of globalization-related issues can be found in a separate document (06S1) on this web site.


Developing nations have been experiencing numerous major changes over the past four decades. It seems reasonable to expect that situation to continue for the foreseeable future. So it is important to examine the issues of over-population and excessive population growth rates in the context of current conditions and in the context of conditions toward which these changes appear to be leading. One of the most important changes now underway in most developing nations is the mass migration from rural (mainly agricultural) environments to urban areas, most commonly to the slums surrounding most large urban areas of the developing world. There the migrants typically become part of the rapidly growing "informal" economy (08S2) where day-to-day survival is frequently a challenging ordeal. The primary causes of this rural-to-urban migration appear to be:

Constraints being imposed on migrants and their migration patterns are analyzed in Section (A-3) below. There it becomes apparent that available migration options cannot sustainably accommodate the population of the developing world and/or its high population growth rates by wide and growing margins. This is compelling evidence that the developing world is over-populated and/or is experiencing excessive rates of population growth).

In the global marketplace, per-capita food supplies increased 24%, and real food prices fell 40% since 1961, even as the global population increased from 3 to 6 billion (00W2). This is often cited as evidence against over-population in developing nations. Fundamental and somewhat sustainable improvements in global food/ wood/ freshwater-production systems have occurred over the past four decades. But virtually all "improvements" in recent decades fall into one or more of three categories:

These destabilizing resource transfers, non-sustainable expedients, and semi-sustainable improvements are probably largely responsible for the unjustifiable optimism about future food/ wood/ freshwater supplies. Thus increased per-capita food supplies and falling real food prices in global marketplaces in decades past probably have little or no bearing on the question of over-population or excessive population growth rates (or on the question of future per-capita food supplies and future food prices) in the developing world. In addition, the world's food supplies and food prices are heavily influenced by huge subsidies throughout the system. Most of these subsidies are proving to be non-sustainable, particularly in developing nations that are is under extreme and growing debts that are owed to external sources. (One purpose of the SAPs was to reduce or eliminate these subsidies.) In addition, the only part of the economy that is growing is the "informal" economy in most developing nations (08S2). For people in the informal economy, rudimentary survival represents an extreme and daily challenge. So even if real food prices were to remain constant, the average person's ability to pay for food is likely to decline in decades to come. If ever-increasing amounts of corn, sugarcane, palm oil and soybeans are used as energy sources, it seems more likely that food prices will be increasing from that fact alone. Also, glaciers throughout the world are in a state of rapid shrinkage (Chapter 4 of Ref. (08S1)). This threatens the continuity of water flows for about three billion people. Water translates into food via irrigation (60% of the global food supply in value terms). This, by itself, portends rather dramatic food-price increases in coming decades.

Below is a brief summary pertinent to Category (2) "improvements" (Sections (A-4) - (A-12)). Category (1) improvements are dealt with in Sections (A-2) and (A-3). Category (3) improvements are dealt with in Section (A-13).

The 24% increase in per-capita food supplies and the 40% drop in food prices since 1961 came about almost entirely from three Category (3) improvements (Section (A-13)):

  1. Increases in inorganic (chemical) fertilizer consumption;
  2. Genetic improvements to plants - the "green revolution",
  3. Increases in large-scale irrigation.

These three improvements have served to largely conceal the degradation (described above) of all the major components of the developing world's system for food/ wood/ freshwater production - croplands, forests, grasslands, irrigated lands, fisheries, and surface/ ground waters. These concealments cannot continue indefinitely because these three improvements have limitations.

The possibility of significantly higher doses of increasingly powerful pesticides providing a means of significantly increasing global food productivity is taken up in Section (A-13) below. Also considered is the possibility of the existence of a fourth strategy capable of achieving food productivity increases comparable to the three listed above is also considered in Section (A-13) below. The net result of all this is the conclusion that the developing world, under its current standard of living, is either over-populated relative to the sustainable capacities of food/ wood/ freshwater systems, or has population growth rates that preclude significant sustainable advances in human carrying capacity. So-called "Footprint" analyses (See Section (6-A) of Ref. (06S1)) support this conclusion. Net primary production analyses (that determine the global rate of photosynthesis) also support this conclusion (See Appendix A of Ref. (06S1)).

Return to Table of Contents of this Appendix A ~

Section (A-1) ~ INTRODUCTION ~

The median income in the developing world is less than $2/ person/ day (Refs.11, 25, 26 of Ref. (00S1)). So most of the developing world economy is subsistence level, meaning that a large fraction of personal income is spent on food, wood, and freshwater, with little left over for investments in infrastructure. The question of over-population must therefore be addressed in terms of the following constraints.

The constraint "non-subsidized" must be included because much of the developing world is burdened with high and rapidly increasing external debt, high-risk environments for financial capital, shrinking development/ humanitarian aid from developed nations, and capital formation that is heavily burdened with the needs of population growth, armed-conflict-related expenses, and interest payments on external debt. None of these factors are likely to diminish without reductions in fertility if not also population.

The constraint "sustainable" is more crucial, since none of the developing world's food/ wood/ freshwater production systems -irrigated and non-irrigated croplands, forests, grazing lands and fisheries -are managed sustainably (08S1). Sustainability and productivity could be increased, in theory, but only with large-scale infusions of financial capital. This capital is unlikely to become available without reductions in fertility, if not also population (Chapter 5 of the main document). These issues, other than financial capital availability, occupy this Appendix A.

Food/ wood/ freshwater production systems in developing nations have been experiencing rapid and major changes over the past four decades. Earlier in the 20th century, nearly all management of croplands, forests, grazing lands and fisheries was artisan, subsistence-level, and labor-intensive. Also it produced mainly for local markets. This management is now becoming increasingly capital-intensive. Also it produces increasingly for global markets. These changes are producing the following two key changes in the developing-world.

Population growth and degradation/ abandonment of agricultural land, forests and fisheries are butting up against limited supplies of arable land and related resources (Section D of Chapter 1 of Ref. (08S1)). These problems are being magnified by reductions in labor requirements per unit area of land resource, per ton of freshwater consumed, or per ton of fish caught. Reductions of 90-95% are typical values for the developed world. As a result, hundreds of millions of rural residents of developing nations are finding it necessary to migrate to urban environments -- typically to wretched slums surrounding most of the large urban centers of the developing world. There they find themselves in the "informal" economy, a wretched environment totally unfamiliar to them (08S2).

Real food prices in the global marketplace may well be 40% lower than in 1961 in response to per-capita food supplies increasing 24% (00W2). But for developing world folk being forced to migrate from rural subsistence-agriculture settings to urban slums, the resultant, effective changes in food/ wood/ freshwater prices are large and positive.

To assess whether the developing world is over-populated, the long-term effects of these two changes must be evaluated. This is done in this Appendix A. Evaluating the over-population question without evaluating the effects of, and potential of, human migration would make any conclusions meaningless. Similarly, assuming continued decreases of real food/ wood prices and increasing per-capita food/ wood supplies without understanding these changes, and without evaluating the sustainability of the relevant production systems and the potential for restoring any deficiencies in sustainability would also make any conclusions meaningless.

Return to Table of Contents of this Appendix A ~


In the global marketplace, per-capita food supplies increased 24%, and real food prices fell 40% since 1961, as global population increased from 3 to 6 billion (00W2). This is usually the basis for claims that the developing world is not over-populated. But consider some context.

The perplexing disparity among the above facts can be reconciled in various ways.

High Fertility Side Effects: The poorest nations typically have the highest fertilities. Fifty or so nations have fertilities of five or more per woman, so population growth there significantly exceeds global rates of growth of food/ wood/ freshwater production. Financial capital shortages resulting from high fertilities make irrigation systems difficult or impossible. Fertilizing typically poor tropical soils, typical of poorer, developing nations, is also difficult - and far more costly than even in the developed world (02S1) (02F1). This gives genetically improved crops these same attributes. (See top half of Section (A) of Chapter 1 of Ref. (08S1))

Globalization Side Effects: Globalization of the world's economies helps many developing nations to import food and wood from developed nations. But poorer developing nations cannot afford to import much food/ wood from the global marketplace. But developed nations find it profitable to invest their financial capital in food/ wood production on croplands and fisheries of these poor nations. Then they cart off the food and wood, and leave behind subsistence wages and local food/ wood marketplaces with even less to sell while providing little enhanced ability for poorer nations to purchase food/ wood in global marketplaces. To add insult to injury, the developed world's investments invariably involve transforming agriculture from high-labor-input-low-capital-input to the opposite. This adds to population-driven pressures for people to migrate to marginal croplands (where production is non-sustainable) to slums ringing urban areas (Section (A-3)). Examples of food/ wood transfers from poor to developing nations are described below.

Fishery Transfers: Fisheries off of developing nations have long supported local, artisan fishermen and supplied local markets. But many of these are now being purchased by heavily subsidized fishing companies from developed nations. Examples include Pakistan (98M1), various African governments (98M5), various South Pacific island nations (98M5), and Russia (98M5). Some contracts often call for huge increases in allowed catches in fisheries already being fished at, or beyond, their sustainable limits (98M5). In most cases the price is a small fraction (e.g. 5-10%) of the value of the catch - and probably far less since contract enforcement is weak at best. Heavy external debts probably motivate many of these sales.

Grassland Transfers: Huge areas in Latin America are being converted from producing food/ wood for local, high-labor-input-low-capital-input markets to cattle ranching for export to the global marketplace (even though the land becomes unproductive in 7-8 years and must be fallowed for perhaps 20 years to regain fertility). About 2/3 of Central America's arable land is now devoted to cattle production (91J1). Results have been negative for local residents, as evidenced by decreases even in local meat consumption (83N1).

Forest Transfers: Illegal timber harvesting of timber on developing world forests for export to the developed world constitutes 50 to 80% of timber harvesting in most developing nation forests. (See Chapter 2 of Ref. (08S1).)

A Closer Look at Food Price- and Production Data Over a Recent Four-Decade Span
Interpret food price data carefully before using the data to draw conclusions about sustainability trends. Demand for food is inelastic. Small surpluses produce large reductions in price; small shortages produce severe price increases. For example, in 1972 minor global weather problems doubled grain prices over the following few years (98D1). Also, much of the 40% drop in food/ wood prices since 1961 reflect technological advances in planting, harvesting, and distributing food and wood. So the price drop says little about the intrinsic capacity of land and fisheries to produce food and wood. Also, food/ wood/ freshwater production is heavily subsidized, globally. Some examples: The EU and its heavily protectionist "Common Agricultural Policy" (CAP) sold grain at heavily subsidized prices starting around 1980, causing a 40% drop in grain prices by 1990 (98D1). This caused a large portion of the 40% drop in food prices over the past four decades that is often cited in cornucopian literature. The world's taxpayers pay the fishing industry $1.77 for each dollar's worth of wild fish caught (98M3). Subsidies, virtually worldwide, cover 80-90% of the total cost of irrigation freshwater production and distribution (Ref. 54 of Ref. (90P1)) (01S1). These subsidies result in massive waste of water (even in water-scarce environments), reduced apparent food prices, falling freshwater tables, and hence reduced sustainability -completely contrary to how the data would have been interpreted without close inspection.

A Closer Look at Future Production Systems Improvements
Recent "improvements" in global systems for food/ wood/ freshwater production tend to fall increasingly into one or more of the following three categories.

These improvement categories are probably responsible for much of the unjustifiable optimism about future food/ wood/ freshwater supplies. They show however that the future of such supplies and prices can hardly be extrapolated from the past, as they too often are (98D1) (01M1).

Return to Table of Contents of this Appendix A ~


Growing population pressures upon the land, degradation/ abandonment of land and fisheries, and conversions of food/ wood/ freshwater production systems from high-labor-input-low-capital-input to the reverse is forcing hundreds of millions, if not billions, of developing world people to migrate from subsistence agricultural and fishery-oriented environments to urban environments. Their primary options are the following:

  1. Staying in rural subsistence-level, labor-intensive agriculture or fisheries;
  2. Staying in rural areas but working as labor in high-capital-input agriculture or fisheries.
  3. Migrating to central cities of developing nations, to jobs producing for the global economy.
  4. Migrating to central cities of developing nations, to jobs producing for the local economy.
  5. Emigrating to developed nations.
  6. Migrating to increasingly environmentally marginal croplands, grazing lands and fisheries where capital-intensive management is not feasible.
  7. Migrating to slums that ring most cities in the developing world and working in the "informal" economy.

Option (6) (marginal agricultural lands) and Option (7) (urban slums) simply reflect a lack of capacity of, or access to, Options (1)-(5). Option (6) typically involves marginal fisheries or land with steep, rocky hillsides, high erosion rates, low precipitation rates, low productivity, non-sustainable production, high abandonment rates, and high labor inputs per unit of output. Despite what some claim (80S1) (94B1) (96S1), migration to undeveloped land or fisheries of good inherent quality is rarely feasible due to the lack of such resources (see Sections below and/or Chapter 1, Section D of Ref. (08S1)). Option (6) tends to foment social, economic, political, and military instability (90B1) (00N1). Using the rate of agricultural land abandonment (100,000 km2/ year (92P1) (94K1)), and assuming a family of five occupies 2 ha. of land before abandoning it, suggests that 25 million people in Option (6) leave it every year - probably migrating to Option (7). If each marginal farm lasts 20 years before it must be abandoned, then the population of Option (6) would be about 500 million people.

Option (7) (rings of urban slums) also tends to foment social, economic, political and military instability (00N1) and high risks for capital of all types. It seems likely that the bulk of the 826 million chronically under-nourished people in developing countries (1994-96 data) (98U2) are to be found in Options (6) and (7). The fraction of developing-nation residents living in urban settings nearly doubled during 1960-1990 [under 22% to over 40%] and the trend shows no sign of let-up (00W1), (99U1). In the 1980s, almost 75% of households established in urban areas of developing countries were in slums (94L1). One billion people now live in unplanned shantytowns (99R1). This appears to be a reasonable estimate of the population of Option (7), i.e. of the "informal" economy. In most nations of the developing world, the "formal" economy is not growing at all. Virtually all economic growth is in the "informal" economy. This reality can be used to project that the "informal" economy (with all its wretchedness, poverty and hope-deprivation) is destined to become about two thirds of the economy of the developing world (08S1). There is much discrimination (and worse) against those working in the "informal" economy throughout the developing world. There are all sorts of public policies aimed at making it extremely difficult (if not downright impossible) for someone in the "informal" economy to become part of the stagnant "formal" economy (08S1). What is likely to happen when those working in the "informal" economy outnumber those in the formal economy by 2:1 is anyone's guess. It should be noted however that virtually all the world's armed conflicts over the past century or so have originated from situations of extreme duress (08S3).

Option (1) (labor-intensive agriculture and fisheries) is primarily just a holding pattern until the transformation to capital/ energy-intensive agriculture, forestry and fishing comes along. For the developing world as a whole, the fraction of the labor force directly engaged in agriculture is 60.5% (vs. 2.4% in North America where agriculture, forestry and fisheries operate in a capital-intensive mode) (00F1). This would suggest that their transformation to capital/ energy-intensive agriculture is about 40% complete. The proportion of the urbanized population in the developing world was 40% in 2000. That proportion is growing by 2.3%/ year (UN Population Division statement, 2000). In the developed world, 75% of the population lives in urban areas (UN data, Christian Science Monitor (5/3/01)). This would suggest that the transformation to capital/ energy-intensive agriculture in the developing world is somewhat over 50% complete, with a completion date in roughly three decades. The population of Option (1) is 2.9 billion (60.5% of the developing world population) less 0.06 billion in Option (2) (see below) less 0.5 billion in Option (6) (see above) or 2.34 billion. Essentially all of these people (plus any fertility-driven population growth) will need to migrate to other options over something on the order of 3-4 decades.

Option (2) (labor in capital-intensive agriculture and fisheries) will likely be viable for no more than roughly 2-3% of the original rural population of developing nations by the time transformations to capital-intensive agriculture/ forestry/ fishing are complete. This is based on the experiences of developed nations, which went through the same transformation early in the 20th century or before. The fraction of the labor force directly engaged in agriculture is 2.4% in North America (00F1). Given the estimate above that the transformation to capital-intensive agriculture is 40-50% complete, gives a rough estimate of the population in Option (2) of 40-50% of 2.4% of the developing world's population, or about 0.06 billion people. This should roughly double as the transformation to capital-intensive agriculture runs its course.

Option (3) (jobs producing for the global economy) plus Option (4) hold a 2002 population of roughly 1.1 of the developing world's 5.0 billion people (02U1) (See data above for Options (1), (2), (6) and (7)). But even Option (3)'s share of this 1.1 billion has produced huge trade deficits in US, major problems for labor in other nations of the developed world (06S1), developed-nation tariffs on developing-world goods, and rapidly growing political opposition to "free-trade" agreements. This opposition seems motivated mainly by the large differences between wages in developing and developed nations, and suspicions that trends to lower real wages and benefits for labor of developed nations are attributable to imports from developing nations. The huge and rapidly growing trade deficit of the US (over $700 billion/ year in 2005 and 2006) could cause foreign governments that lent the money to finance this deficit to start pulling their money out, causing the dollar to sink, stock markets to plunge, interest rates to rise, and the US economy to grind to a halt (02P1).

The effects of Option (3) on those who chose it have been mixed. In most developing nations, people have left subsistence agriculture, forestry and fishing to move to slums surrounding manufacturing facilities producing for global markets where they receive wages, but must purchase their necessities on the global market, making them only slightly better off. This is largely because they must seek employment in an environment where population-growth and the transition to capital-intensive agriculture have created huge labor surpluses that have kept wages at or near subsistence levels. The "Asian Tiger" economies have combined the transformation to manufacturing for the global economy with fertility reduction programs that have been able to reduce fertilities to replacement level or below. This has enabled them to grow their own capital rather than importing it, and to transform themselves, economically, nearly or totally into developed nations (98B1).

"Footprints": Might the remainder of the developing world achieve near-developed-world status merely through the combination of manufacturing for the global economy and fertility reductions to replacement level or below? The answer is No. The ecological "footprint" - the average amount of productive land and shallow sea appropriated by each person from around the world for food, freshwater, housing, energy, transportation, commerce and waste absorption - is about one hectare (2.47 acres) in developing nations, and 9.6 hectares (24 acres) in the US (02W1). For every person in the world to reach present US levels of consumption with existing technology would require five planet Earths (02W1). Some lessons learned: (1) Over-population must be evaluated relative to some assumed standard of living; (2) Developing world folk would need to decrease their "footprint" to zero for the Earth to be within its "footprint" limit if the developed world kept its "footprint" unchanged, and (3) If everyone on Earth had the same standard of living, and the Earth's "footprint" limit were obeyed, that living standard would be roughly 20% of the current US standard of living or 1.9 times the current standard of living of the developing world.

Net Primary Production: An analysis of human co-option of global photosynthesis (net primary production) (the bottom of the world's food chain) produces essentially the same conclusion as "Footprint" analyses. Humans co-opt 90-96% of the Earth's accessible products of photosynthesis (See Appendix A of Ref. (06S1)). The population anticipated in mid-21st century (9 billion) would take the 1.9 figure given in the previous paragraph down to 1.27. Lack of sustainability in the developing world's food/ wood/ freshwater supply systems would cause 1.27 to fall indefinitely.

The "China" Problem: China has been moving into Options (3) and (4) in a big way - perhaps 250 million of its total population of about 1.25 billion. India is proceeding along the same path. Because of its essentially inexhaustible supply of unskilled people willing to work for $0.40-$0.60/ hour, China and India have been pulling foreign investments (and the jobs that go with such inveestments) away from "Asian Tigers" (where unskilled labor costs $2/ hour in Malaysia, $5 in Singapore and $25 in Japan) (02W2). China appears to be advancing economically along the same path as did Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. If it does this to the point of achieving the same level of fish consumption as these nations, the entire sustainable wild fish production of all the world's oceans will be required just to supply China's fish needs (Ref. 40 of (98B2)). Even today, economic growth in parts of China and India is causing significant price increases in numerous natural resources (including fossil fuels) and food in the global marketplace.

Option (4) (urban jobs producing for local economies) was the option used by subsistence-level economies early in the 20th century, or before, to achieve developed-nation status. For modern-day developing nations, Option (4) has not been available to anywhere close to a sufficient degree due to a lack of financial capital to work through the huge surplus of subsistence level labor (Chapter 5). Problems alluded to in Option (3) are likely to greatly reduce whatever capacity Option (4) may have.

Option (5): Emigration from the developing world to the developed world appears to be no more than about two million/ year - 3% of the developing world's 2002 population growth rate of 71 million/ year (02U1). But even this number is causing backlashes, resulting in all kinds of doors to the developed world being closed. For example, a decade ago, 40% of the 500,000 asylum-seekers seeking refuge in Europe annually were admitted. Today less than 10% are granted asylum (Dana Milbank, Wall Street Journal (11/7/94)). Political parties have been formed throughout Europe dedicated to opposing immigration. The tide of public opinion is turning against immigrants throughout the developed world. For example, 79% of West Germans felt that too many foreigners live in the Federal Republic (George Melloan, Wall Street Journal (11/5/90)). Up to 75% of Americans support cuts in both legal and illegal immigration (Pittsburgh Post Gazette (4/26/96)). Although the human tide seeking permanent entry into the developed world is multiplying, resistance is also expanding rapidly. So significant increases in emigration from developing nations seem unlikely and 97% or so of the developing world's population growth is going to have to remain in the developing world.

Summary: Table A-1 summarizes the populations in Options (1) through (7) as estimated above, currently and at the completion of the conversion to capital-intensive agriculture.

Table A-1 - Populations in Options Available to Developing World Residents - Current and Projected.



Population in
3.5 decades #
























7100 ##


# At completion of conversion to capital-intensive agriculture and fisheries
## 7.2 billion (02U1) less 70 million migrated to developed nations (Option (5))

Table A1 makes the central issue clear. Can the developing world really cram 7 billion people into Options (3) and (4)? Extreme shortages of financial capital in the developing world (caused primarily by population growth that requires huge amounts of financial capital to fund the needed infrastructure growth) make significant additions to Option (4) impossible (Chapter 5). As shown above, economic problems that would develop in developed nations, and risks to global food/ wood markets make significant growth in the population of Option (3) impossible. Yet, cramming 6 billion people into Options (6) and (7) would produce political, social, and economic and instabilities that would be impossible for any government to manage.

Return to Table of Contents of this Appendix A ~


The sustainability of irrigated land productivity in the developing world (and even in the developed world) is being challenged on many fronts. (See Chapter 4 of Ref. (08S1)). This is important because irrigated croplands provide 30-40% of the world's cropland-based food supply on a weight-basis (00W2), and around 59% on a dollar-basis (97C1). The world's 2.7 million km2 of irrigated land produce about 74% more than the world's 40-50 million km2 of rangeland on a dollar-basis (97C1). Irrigation expansion contributed over 50% of the increase in global food production during 1965-85 (96G1). The world's irrigated land area grows at a net rate of 1.2%/ year - 33,000 km2/ year (48,000 created less 15,000 abandoned due to salt buildup) (00W2). This rate is down from 3%/ year during 1950 to the mid-70s, 2.0%/ year during 1970-82, and 1.3%/ year during 1982-94 (99P1). Productivity of the world's irrigated land does not grow 1.2%/ year however. Per-unit-area degradation due to increasing salinity, and abandonment due to freshwater-supply reallocation to urban uses both detract significantly from this rate. Per-capita irrigated area has declined 5% since 1978 (96P1).

Non-sustainability is largely the result of expediencies that increase current food supplies while risking, and reducing, future food supplies. The two principle expediencies are neglecting to deal effectively with salt buildup, and consuming freshwater supplies beyond their sustainable limits. Other expediencies are described below.

Virtually all irrigated lands, other than those in monsoon climates, need ways to avoid salt-buildup in soils (salinization). Declining productivity and abandonment are consequences of ignoring salt buildup. While data are lacking, irrigation experts believe that few of the world's irrigation systems provide for salt control (typically underground networks of drainage tiles) thereby threatening a sizeable portion of the world's irrigated croplands with decline and destruction - invariably permanent (74F1). Even the World Bank does not require that the irrigation systems it funds include salinity-prevention features (95J1). Secondary salinization, alkalization and water-logging influence as much as 50% of the world's existing irrigation systems (88S1) (FAO and UNESCO data). The threat is greater in developing nations, which lack the financial capital to invest in drainage systems required to prevent salinization. Because salinity effects take some decades to become apparent, and because such a large fraction of the world's irrigation systems is so new, rates of productivity-degradation and abandonment of irrigated lands are certain to grow well beyond current rates in coming decades.

An alternative to drainage tiles for preventing salt buildup due to rising water tables is alternate-year fallowing. But as human (population) pressures on the land increase, this strategy for sustainability becomes increasingly hard to defend from the interests of short-term expediency.

Water consumption by agriculture (almost entirely for irrigation) accounts for 82% of human-based water consumption. If reservoir evaporation losses are apportioned among all other consumption categories, agriculture accounts for 93% of water consumption by humans (96P2). Thus irrigation is the primary reason why many of the world's rivers no longer reach the oceans during at least parts of the year (99P1). It is also the primary reason why the number of lakes and the sizes of inland seas are shrinking so rapidly, and why the number of endangered lakes is now so large as to pose a threat to up to one billion people (01A1).

Partly because of this depletion of surface waters (and partly from advances in pump technology), irrigation water now comes increasingly from groundwater. As a result, groundwater tables are dropping globally, despite the fact that 97% of the earth's liquid freshwater is in aquifers (00S1). As a result of this draw-down, many coastal aquifers are suffering seawater intrusion. Only 2-3% ocean water makes an aquifer useless. As freshwater supplies shrink, and as urban demands for water expand, irrigation water is being increasingly reallocated to urban use. In the late 1990s, at least 400 million people lived in regions with severe water shortages. By 2050, this number is expected to be 4 billion (98S2). Thus large-scale reallocations of irrigation water to municipal- and industrial uses are virtually certain in coming decades. The rate of irrigated land abandonment due to water reallocation was apparently not counted in the above-mentioned 15,000-km2/ year loss to salinity. A review of the data compiled in Ref. (07S4) suggests a present rate of abandonment of irrigation systems due to water reallocation to urban use of roughly 7000 km2/ year.

Growing water scarcity is prompting irrigators to seek ways of conserving water, but all of these have their limitations. Use of wastewater is one strategy. But salinity rises by 300-400 parts per million while passing through the urban circuit, and it is not reduced by any of the usual sewage treatment processes (77A1). So more than once through the urban circuit causes significant problems with salinity. Drip-irrigation is another strategy. It does not entail salt accumulation in the root zone (93P1) and, relative to furrow- or sprinkler irrigation, cuts water use by 30-60% (96P1). The problem is the added capital intensity in developing nations where financial capital is already too scarce to even afford drainage tiles for avoiding salinization. Perhaps for this reason, global use of drip irrigation accounts for less than 1% of the world's irrigated area (97P1). Huge government-subsidies for irrigation water consumption virtually worldwide also work against the apparent (but not real) economics of drip irrigation.

Filling of dam backwaters with erosion sediments also threatens irrigation. The world's dam backwaters are filling with sediment at 1%/ year (87M1) and several times that in the world's more densely populated regions. Sedimentation rates are now 8 times higher than in the mid-1960s (UNEP release of 12/4/01) so the 1%/ year rate from the mid-1980s may now be too low. A US Geological Survey study notes that new dam construction might increase the (global) dam supply (storage capacity?) by 0.33%/ year over the next 30 years (98S1). This suggests that global dam-backwater storage per-capita should drop 2%/ year in coming decades - even as per-capita water consumption rises twice as fast as the world's population (98S2). The supply of suitable dam sites is also shrinking, greatly increasing the cost of new dams - costs that are already so high that developing nations must finance them largely by increasing their staggering external debt.

Irrigation systems, too, are heavily government-subsidized worldwide, so growing financial demands on (and indebtedness of) developing nations - where population pressures are greatest - represent yet another serious threat to irrigation. Government subsidies result in wasteful uses of both irrigation water and urban water supplies - creating even more serious threats to irrigation system sustainability.

The problems of salinity and freshwater supply are coupled. Increasing human pressures on the land, and diminishing water supplies force irrigators to try to increase production from each drop of water. But doing this increases salinity, resulting in an ever-steeper downward spiral of positive feedbacks.

The above-mentioned sustainability problems are summarized below.

All these threats mean that irrigation systems, their water supplies, and the large fraction (60%) of the world's food produced by irrigation are non-sustainable. Further, non-sustainability is certain to increase, particularly in developing nations where water supplies are tighter, financial capital needed to reduce salinity problems is scarcer, external debt increases by $1 trillion every 10-15 years, and where high and growing population pressures on the land worsen positive feedbacks.

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Wild fisheries are threatened by degrading marine- and freshwater environments, invasions by exotic species, over-fishing and fishing boat fleets far larger than that which marine fisheries can accommodate on a sustainable basis. Degradation categories include:

** Chemical-/Pollution-caused Degradation e.g., "red tides", algae blooms, bacteria, acid precipitation, toxic discharges and oil discharges. The worst pollution occurs in estuaries - environments that ought to be among the most biologically productive. Now many are "dead zones" largely due to surplus fertilizer run-offs that deplete oxygen. As much as 90% of all fin- and shellfish depend on estuaries for some portion of their life cycle or for wetlands-produced food (84T1). Coral reefs, normally extremely productive marine environments, are sensitive to pollution by virtue of their dependence on sunlight. Coral reefs provide food and breeding grounds for 10% of all fish caught for human consumption (95W1). Nearly a third of the world's fish live in coral reefs (96H1). 10% of the world's reefs have been degraded "beyond recognition"; 30% are in critical condition (97H1). If trends continue, this 30% will be lost completely in 1-2 decades, and another 30% will be lost within 2-4 decades (96H1). The causes are almost certainly anthropogenic. Most reefs are centuries old.

** exotic (introduced) species A primary cause of the globalization of aquatic species is careless charging/ discharging of ship ballasts (98W1). Another cause is deliberate introduction of a fish species motivated by desires to increase fishery production, but which frequently results in fishery destruction. Worldwide, 38% of (freshwater?) fish populations have been eliminated by exotics, compared to 17% by over-fishing (98U1).

** Physical habitat degradation. Heavily subsidized trawlers and factory trawlers (part of the increasing capital-intensiveness of the world's fishing industry) impact most of the world's continental shelves. Trawlers drag huge nets over continental shelves, leaving vast expanses of ocean floor devoid of fish habitat. One estimate puts the global sea-floor area swept by trawlers at 14.8 million km2/ year - about the same area as the world's croplands (98W2). Frequently, long before recovery can begin (about a decade) trawler nets make another pass. Governments are growing increasingly alarmed at the potential for large factory trawlers to devastate local fisheries and degrade habitats, even while they subsidize trawler construction. Over-fishing of fish species that protect coral reefs destroys such reefs -highly biologically productive habitat and breeding grounds for numerous other fish. Nets, anchors, dynamite, cyanide, ocean warming and other disturbances also degrade coral reefs. Dams and river-bottom sediment buildups are degrading riverine environments. Highly productive fishery breeding grounds such as coastal wetlands and mangrove swamps are being converted to other uses, e.g. aquaculture, at a rapid rate. Coastal mangroves have lost 50% of their original area to charcoal, pulp wood, salt-making, golf courses, marinas, resort development, and aquaculture ponds (95K1). Yet 80-90% of commercial seafood species inhabiting tropical oceans spend some part of their lives in coastal mangroves (94H1).

The other half of the fishery-decline picture comes from over-fishing. In the post-WWII period, the marine catch grew 6%/ year, vs. 4%/ year during 1950-88, 2%/ year in the 1970s and 1980s, and minus 0.8%/ year during 1988-92 (93B1) (98W1). The greatest growth came from high-volume-low-priced species low on the aquatic food chain. During the past decade the world price of seafood for any given specie (in constant $) has risen nearly 4%/ year (95B1). The decline of marine fisheries is also evidenced by the growing aggressiveness with which nations pursue marine fish. There are 100 ongoing disputes among nations around the world related to depleting fisheries. (UN data) (Wall Street Journal (11/20/97)) and a growing list of conflicts that, at the very least, border on armed conflicts (01S1). Many developing nations are not strong enough, economically or militarily, to defend their marine fishery resources from illegal exploitation by boats of larger, more powerful nations.

Increasing wastefulness in fishing practices causes some of these declines. The world's fishing fleet is changing from small (labor-intensive) boats to huge factory trawlers. That entails a change from discarding a relatively small fraction of the catch to discarding a far larger portion (about 40%) of the haul ("by-catch") back into the ocean (98P1). (Discarding these dead or dying fish is done because they are too small, the wrong species, damaged in capture, or exceed a quota.)

Declining fishery productivity is also happening concurrently with a massive, heavily subsidized buildup of fishing fleets. The world's fishing fleet doubled in number of large boats and in total capacity during 1970-90 (94W1) (FAO data). In 1998, this fleet had a fishing capacity twice that of the sustainable yield of the world's wild fisheries (Ref.2 of Ref. (98W1)).

Declining fishery productivity during massive buildups of fishing fleets still does not give a clear picture of how badly fisheries are degrading. For the past 45 years, as fish at the upper levels of the aquatic food chain are over-fished, fishers have been forced to fish at lower trophic levels. Ultimately this trend must result in fishing at such low tropic levels that the fish species are so small and diluted that it is no longer economical to fish. At the current rate of trophic-level descent, it will take 30-40 years to fish down to the trophic level of plankton (98P1). If today's fishing effort and efficiency were applied to zooplankton, the global catch would drop by over 99%, and dock-side fish prices would need to increase by a factor of over 100 to cover costs (81C1).

Even the descent to ever-lower trophic levels still does not give a clear picture of how badly fisheries are degrading. Of the world's 15 leading oceanic fisheries, 11 are in a state of decline (98M3), and 69% of the world's major fish species are in decline (98M3). In 1950, no marine fish stocks were known to be over-fished (98K1), yet by 1989, all ocean fisheries were being fished at or beyond capacity (96B1). World-wide, 60-70% of fish stocks require urgent intervention to control or reduce fishing to avoid further declines of fully exploited- and over-fished resources and to rebuild depleted fish stocks (FAO statement, 1998).

Degradation of fisheries would be slower if free-market conditions prevailed. As fish populations decline, capture costs per pound of catch should rise to economically prohibitive levels. This would allow for a steady state, albeit far less profitable than the optimal (maximum profit) steady-state defined by fishery biology. But huge government subsidies to the fishing industry make it possible to go after that last fish, even in fisheries that have long since ceased to be economically viable on a non-subsidized basis. Governments, worldwide, subsidized fishing fleets by amounts that the FAO estimates to be greater than the value of the annual catch. For every dollar earned from fishing (globally) in the late 1980s, governments, taxpayers and fishers spent $1.77 (98M3). Between 25-33% of global fishing revenues comes from subsidies (Ref. 45 of Ref. (98M3)). The FAO estimates that, globally, $124 billion/ year is spent catching $70 billion/ year worth of fish (Ref. 53 of Ref. (94W2)). Government subsidies apparently make up the $54 billion/ year difference.

Declining global wild fisheries hit developing nations especially hard. Nearly 50% of fish caught today are traded between nations (vs. 32% in 1980) (98M3). The US, Canada, Europe and Japan import 84% of world fishery imports by value, yet population-wise, they have less than 25% of the world's population (Ref. 96 of Ref. (94W1)). This reflects increasingly global, trade-oriented fishery policies that leave developing-nation consumers in lop-sided bidding wars with consumers in developed nations. Developed-nation purchases of fishing rights from financially strapped developing nations for pennies on the dollar's worth of catch make matters worse.

More detailed analyses of the above fisheries issues can be found in Chapter 5 of Ref. (08S1).

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Some degradation of wild fisheries has been compensated for by growth in aquaculture. However experts estimate that over-fishing in wild fisheries has reduced the sustainable marine catch by about 20 million tonnes/ year (94W1). So growth in aquaculture in recent decades has barely kept pace with the declining potential of marine fisheries. This trade-off gives a misleading and overly optimistic view of the global fisheries picture. Consider:

In all fairness, it should be pointed out that it is the more carnivorous farmed fish (the type consumed mainly by consumers in the developed world) are the main culprits in the sustainability problem. Non-carnivorous farmed fish species, especially those grown in rice paddies, represent a fairly sustainable and efficient branch of aquaculture and almost certainly add to the net global productivity and sustainability of the world's food outputs.

More detailed analyses of the above aquaculture issues can be found in Chapter 5 of Ref. (08S1).

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The number of people, worldwide, facing fuel-wood deficits is about 3 billion (2/3 of the population of developing nations, up from 1.5 billion in 1980) (91U1). Nearly 75% of the increase in wood demand during 1980-90 is attributed to local population growth (91U1). Increasing costs of firewood, even in the mid-1980s, force working-class families in developing nations to spent 20-40% of their incomes to buy wood or charcoal (88P1). Those still gathering their own fuel can spend several hundred woman-days/ year/ family as the deforested areas surrounding towns in developing nations expand (81F1). An even more serious problem occurs when people in the developing world use livestock dung for heating and cooking needs in lieu of firewood. The result is that croplands are deprived of organic matter and important nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium). Because imported chemical fertilizers are so expensive in many developing nations (about 60 times the price in the EU on a labor-units basis) farmers wind up mining soil nutrients, resulting in declining cropland productivities.

One might argue that these people should export labor to developing nations and use the income to buy fossil fuels in global markets. But this already is being done to a non-sustainable degree. The US runs a dangerous trade deficit of over $700 billion/ year by being involved in that sort of thing. Even this benefits only a small fraction of the population of developing nations (Section (A-3)).

Replacing local forests by plantations of fast-growing tree species greatly increase productivity. But such plantations are typically aimed at providing pulp and sawtimber for global markets, not far-cheaper fuel-wood for local markets in developing nations. Tree plantations probably worsen firewood shortages in developing nations since they transfer land away from being local firewood sources and toward satisfying needs of developed nations that can easily outbid subsistence-level, $2/ day developing-world people. Also, there are serious questions as to whether tropical soils can supply, sustainably, the high nutrient- and water flows needed by fast-growing tree species (96N1) (96T1) (98M2). About 90% of tropical soils are far less productive than temperate soils. There is also a local-employment problem associated with forest plantations. If the entire world's roughly 33 million km2 of forests (over a third of the world's supply of biologically productive land) were converted to pulp plantations, local employment would be provided for only 20 million people (Worldwatch, 11(2) (1998)).

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Trends in wood supplies in developing nations also gives compelling evidence of non-sustainability. About 37% of the world's 90 or so million km2 of reasonably biologically productive lands is forested. Much of this is also essential for avoiding massive flooding, landslides and erosion of down-slope urban areas and croplands. All these problems that have been growing significantly in recent years as forested hillsides get converted to marginal croplands and grazing lands. A 1989 study for the ITTO found that less than 0.1% of tropical wood harvesting was sustainable (98A2). Below are some data from Ref. (07S2).

Afghanistan - Forest cover reduced to under 0.1%
Asia - Forest regeneration:deforestation = 1:2
Burma (lower) - Forest cover was about 99% depleted during 1850-WWI.
Burma (Myanmar) - Coastal Forests are virtually eliminated.
Burma (Irrawaddy/ Sittang Valleys) - Forests virtually eliminated
Burma - All forests within 50 miles of Thai border gone by 12/90
China - 2/3 of timber districts to be depleted in 10 years.
China - 70% of districts will have no mature timber by 2000.
China - All remaining production forests of harvestable age to be gone within a decade.
India - Forest cover = 16.9% (early 1970s); 14.1% (early 1980s)
India - 50-75% of middle mountain ranges in Nepal/ India have been deforested in past 4 decades
Indonesia - lost 490,000 km2 though logging and conversions to agricultural uses
Java (Kalamantan) (Indonesian Borneo) - Current trends indicate no forest in 13 years.
Lebanon - Forest cover dropped from 25% to 7% in a decade.
Malaysia (Sarawak) - Logging at twice the sustainable rate
Malaysia (Sarawak) - Forests will be logged out in 11 years.
Malaysia (Sabah) - Primary forest will be gone by 1988.
Malaysia (Sabah) - Logging occurs at four times the sustainable rate.
Nepal - Forest cover is expected to be gone in 25 years.
Philippines - Dipterocarps forest area fell from 160,000 to less than 10,000 km2 during 1960-90.
Philippines - Less than 20% of the rainforest of WWII remains.
Philippines - Logging could eliminate rain forests in less than 20 years.
Russia - Softwood harvests exceed what is sustainable.
Russia - Hardwood harvests are 125% of sustainable (250 million m3/ year).
Sri Lanka - Forest cover: 44% (1956); 20% (1980)
Sri Lanka - Forest cover: 100% (1900); 25% (1985)
Thailand (N) - Cutting rate was 5-7%/ year in mountains.
Thailand - Forest cover was 70% (mid-40s); 15% (1991)
Tibet - Forest cover was 50% in 1950; less than 8% in 1990
Viet Nam - Forest cover was 43% in 1943; less than 23% in 1986
USSR.(European) - Coniferous forests have been depleted
Africa - Forests shrunk to 33% of original extent by 1948
Benin - Forests all but disappeared
Burundi - expected to be treeless in 7 years
Cote d'Ivoire - Forest cover was 200,000 (1966); 10,000 km2 now
East Africa Highlands - Largely deforested except for most inaccessible mountain areas and government-protected areas
Ethiopia - Forest cover was 40% originally; 3.1% today
Ethiopia (Eastern Plateau) - Original forest cover was 75%; under 4% today
Ethiopia - Fuel-wood consumption exceeds sustainable supply by 150%
Ghana - 80% of forests have disappeared: Forests no longer supply even local demand
Kenya - Deforestation ring around Nairobi has a 180 miles radius.
Madagascar - 95% of original forest has been eliminated.
Niger - Fuel-wood consumption exceeds sustainable supply by 200%.
Nigeria - Over 90% of the original forest cover has been lost.
Senegal -To be treeless in 30 years
Sudan (northern) - 77% of tree-cover to be gone by 2000
Sudan - Fuel-wood consumption exceeds sustainable supply by 70%.
West Africa (9 countries) - Deforestation rate: 4-6%/ year.

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Grasslands and pasturelands form the largest single component of the Earth's 117 million km2 of vegetated lands, and of its roughly 90 million km2 of reasonably biologically productive land. Domestic livestock graze on about 56 million km2 (07S3). Little is not grazed. Photosynthetic rates on various categories of grasslands are known, as are the amounts of grass and grain needed to produce a pound of meat from grazing livestock. This permits calculations of the domestic-livestock carrying capacity of the world's grasslands and pasturelands. Two methods used to estimate livestock carrying capacity of the world's grasslands in Ref. (07S3) computed carrying capacities of 1100 and 900 million "animal-units" (cow-equivalents). The world's 1996-98 population of global grazing livestock population of 1840 million animal-units (00W1) (excluding the 12% or so of the world's grazing-type livestock that are grain-fed) indicate that the world's grasslands are overgrazed by a factor of around two. This translates into huge soil losses, vegetation degradation, introduction of exotic plant species, and riparian habitat destruction. All these widen the gap between grassland carrying capacities and grazing livestock populations.

The bulk of the world's grasslands are semi-arid, so their soils have low organic matter content and hence are highly erodible. The combination of over-grazing and lack of soil erosion resistance is devastating. Soil loss per unit area from the world's semi-arid grasslands are far higher than from even the world's croplands (82M1), even though properly grazed grasslands are far more erosion-resistant than croplands.

Much (often 90+%) of the productivity of semi-arid grasslands is concentrated in their riparian habitats. Even in the US, where human pressures on grasslands are less than the global average, these riparian habitats have been 80-90% destroyed by livestock (07S3), causing large reductions in grassland productivity.

Overgrazing on forested grasslands (roughly 10 million km2 globally) also degrades the forests. Overgrazing results in woody brush replacing the grass. The result of that is that grass fires in forested grasslands do little or no damage to trees. Woody brush fires burn both the brush and the trees (and any homes in the vicinity), and the subsequent growth of trees tends to be less fire-resistant (96B2). The net result of all this is greatly reduced timber productivity as well as greatly reduced grazing productivity (96B2).

Clearly, population pressures are pushing the world's grasslands beyond their declining sustainable productivity. The resultant global trend toward feeding grazing-type livestock increasing amounts of grain only makes the global food-production systems less efficient. Even more important, livestock feedlots and concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) make manure fertilizer less likely to be used to fertilize croplands and more likely to contaminate rivers and streams. Manure fertilizer is essential in counteracting the harmful side effects of chemical fertilizers and in maintaining soil organic matter contents. (See Chapter 1, Section A, Part A3 of Ref. (08S1))

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Human carrying capacities of land under shifting cultivation (typically tropical rainforest) are, at most, 10 people/ km2 under subsistence levels (84G1) (World Bank data). This implies a carrying capacity of the 3 million km2 of land under shifting cultivation of 30 million people. Compare this to the 1980 population of shifting cultivators of 250 million (80U1). If all tropical forestland with poor soil (90% of 17.6 million km2 of open- plus closed forest) were devoted to shifting cultivation, the carrying capacity of this land would be 158 million people. This is 63% of the 1980 population of shifting cultivators, and an even smaller percentage of today's population of shifting cultivators.

Instead of cropping a plot for three years and abandoning it for 20 years (the time needed by tropical soils used as cropland to regain productivity), shifting cultivators must return to fallowed plots after fallow times of only 3-10 years. The result is declining productivity with each cycle. Eventually the combination of falling productivity, population growth, the lack of undeveloped arable land, and large-scale conversions of tropical forests to grazing lands and to forest plantations forces shifting cultivators to migrate to steep, rocky, thin-soiled hillsides where sustainable agriculture is all but impossible and productivities are low. From there, shifting cultivators become part of the rural-to-urban mass migration that usually ends up in the slums ringing most urban areas in tropical climates. In that environment there are few survival options other than becoming a part of the "informal" economy where day-to-day survival is a significant challenge. As informal economies grow ever larger, large urban areas face increasing pressures on over-stressed infrastructure and social-, economic- and political instabilities (Section (A-3)).

For a more detained analysis of the issue of shifting cultivation, see Chapter 1, Section G of Ref. (08S1).

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Global supplies of potential (unused) arable lands are claimed to be comparable to croplands presently in use (96S1). This claim requires closer scrutiny. A more detailed analysis of the issue can be found in Chapter 1, Section D of Ref.(08S1). The FAO estimates that 930,000 km2 are available for agricultural expansion in developing nations (excluding China) during 1990-2010 (mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America) (Ref. 69 of (96G1)). But cropland is lost to degradation at a rate of about 100,000 km2/ year (0.7%/ year) (92P1) (50-70,000 lost to soil erosion, 20-40,000 to urbanization, and 20-30,000 to salination and waterlogging) (94K1). So the land available for agricultural expansion over two decades is scarcely adequate to cover, for one decade, the rate of cropland abandonment. The problems with the above-mentioned claim are that nearly all of this "potential" cropland (a) cannot be cropped sustainably, (b) is of low productivity and (c) is presently serving vital roles as urban lands, grazing lands, forest lands and wetlands. Global harvested area of annual crops grows by only 0.3%/ year (00W2) to 0.5%/ year (Table AF.2 in Ref. (00W1)), so cropland area per-capita has been shrinking. (The developing world's population growth rate is 1.3%/ year). This further supports the contention that the world's cropland area in use is close to, or in excess of, the land area capable of being cropped sustainably.

Consider just the regions of the globe where population pressures are least, and therefore where the bulk of the world's potential, but unused, arable lands are most likely to be found.

Canada is said to be using only half of its arable lands (84S1). But all of its unused cropable lands are low-grade, low-productivity lands that could not be cropped without high erosion rates - or are grazed or urbanized (78B1). Croplands on Canada's semi-arid plains have lost half of their organic matter over the past six or so decades (Refs. 5, 7 of Ref. (86D1)), reducing productivity and decreasing erosion resistance. Also, Canada has felt compelled to reduce cropland fallow periods (92U1) (Wall Street Journal (5/1/96)), increasing the rates of erosion and salinization (84S2). Why would Canada's plains farmers choose to endure all these problems if all they had to do is buy some undeveloped arable land and plow it?

Australia's soils are geologically old, poor, shallow, and its croplands have long-term, serious erosion and salinity problems. Salinity is increasing in the area that provides 40% of Australia's agricultural value. The area degraded by salinity could triple over the next five decades (Australia's "State of the Environment, 2001" (March, 2002)). Australia is one of the world's five or so top exporters of grain. Yet its grain exports support only about 50 million people - 8 month's growth of the world's population. Land degradation, population growth and prolonged drought (believed to be an effect of global warming) are likely to cause these exports to shrink significantly or vanish over the next generation.

Argentina could expand grain exports, but not beyond 5% of global food exports (02W2).

Russia would appear to be the ultimate in land-richness, but arable wealth is another matter. During 1954-62, out of sheer desperation, Russia embarked on a massive "Virgin Lands" program, converting 300,000 km2 of grazing land to semi-arid croplands. The results were predictable - windstorms wiped out all the increased productivity and then some. The program was declared a disaster and abandoned (96G1). If Russia has large tracts of idle but arable land, why did it not develop these, rather than resort to a desperate scheme with predictably disastrous results? And why are 13% of Russia's croplands on rocky hillsides (78B2)? Might a dose of free market economics have eliminated these problems? Russia's grain lands productivity in the mid-1980s was on a par with Canada's (90B2). Both have similar climates, and Canada has newer, less eroded soils.

The US is also believed to have lots of undeveloped cropland now masquerading as grazing lands and forestlands. But in 1972, when bad weather conditions prevailed, grain prices doubled over the following few years (98D1) and much of this idle, potential cropland was pressed into use. The results were huge increases in erosion. The Cropland Reserve Program, during the past decade or so, took most of this non-sustainable cropland back out of production (96G1). This withdrawal (about 47,000 square miles during 1982-1997) achieved huge reductions in net US soil loss. If large tracts of idle, but good, cropland are just waiting for a plow, why was it necessary to put extremely marginal lands to the plow and risk disaster? The US Great Plains (a semi-arid wheat-growing area) are suffering the same ills as their Canadian neighbors - loss of about half of their organic matter and salinization problems. What is so worrisome is that these US- and Canadian plains are the world's largest and second-largest sources of exportable wheat. A large fraction of the rest of the world depend on wheat imports from the US and Canada. As these lands degrade, and as China's net grain exports change to net grain imports, and as more food crops are used to produce biofuels to replace oil, some major problems are likely to erupt worldwide.

Globally, 4.6 of the world's 12.3 million km2 of rain-fed croplands are classified as dry lands (97C1). Most, if not all, of these should probably be used as grazing lands to avoid high wind-erosion rates and the risk of dust bowls. If the world is awash in potential croplands waiting for the plow, why has so much low-productivity, economically marginal land been pressed into service as croplands? And why would so much financial capital, effort, and government subsidies be invested in irrigation?

In Zimbabwe (90B1), the Philippines (00N1) and probably throughout developing nations, farmers producing for local markets have been marginalized into cropping steep, erodible hillsides of low-grade land with no hopes of producing sustainably. The results have been predictable - bloodshed and political unrest. If there were large tracts of unused but good-quality potential cropland in these developing nations, why were all these environmentally marginalized farmers unable to find them? In the Philippines, hillside agriculture accounted for 10% of all agricultural lands in 1960, but 30% in 1987 (94A1).

In Bangladesh, landlessness among rural households rose from 35% in 1960 to 53% in the early 1990s (97U1). This is not what one would expect if there were cropland-grade arable lands sitting idle.

The 3-4 major genocides in Rwanda in the past few decades can probably be explained by its cropland supply situation. Fifty percent of Rwanda's farming took place on hillsides by the mid-1980s (Ref. 16 of (97R1)). By the mid-1990s, Rwanda had less than 0.03 ha/ person of grain land, mostly on steep slopes (95D1). This is about a third of that in Bangladesh. This is totally inadequate, especially considering Africa's typically poor soils. The latest (1994) of several genocides in Rwanda claimed over 900,000 people -- 14% of Rwanda's population. The overwhelming majority of them were Tutsis, but in northwestern Rwanda at least 5% of the residents were slaughtered even though there were no Tutsis. Rwanda contained 2040 people per square mile, twice the population density of the Netherlands (a nation that has far better soils, far more fertilizer and far greater ability to import food). The average Rwandan farmer worked 0.07 acre of land with agricultural practices not far removed from those of the Stone Age. Much of this cropland is highly erodible, rocky hillsides. Rwandans can not afford chemical fertilizer. The price there is six times greater than in the EU and 60 times greater on an hours-of-labor per tonne of chemical fertilizer basis. By 1990, 40% of Rwanda's population was living on less than 1600 calories per day - famine level. A team of Belgian economists concluded that the outbreak of fighting "provided a unique opportunity to settle scores or reshuffle land properties, even among Hutus". It is not rare to hear Rwandans argue that the war was necessary to wipe out an excess population and bring human numbers in line with available land resources (04D1). Conflicts between cropland farmers and livestock grazing farmers are common throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa.

The world's croplands are dealing simultaneously with:

If, somehow, the developing world could summon the political will and financial capital needed to address all the non-sustainabilities listed above, in addition to all the needs for infrastructure growth that population growth requires, living standards of the developing world might be stable -- briefly. But this appears to be hopeless.

If, in addition, the wherewithal could be summoned to increase cropland productivities sufficiently to meet the requirements of a 50% increase in population growth over the next five decades, living standards of the developing world could be stable longer. But the prospects for this are even dimmer.

If, in addition, the wherewithal could be summoned to double global cropland productivities so that the convergence point of globalization (06S1) might be closer to developed-world living standards than to developing world living standards, then developed world residents might maintain some semblance of their current living standards as globalization proceeds (06S1). But this has no conceivable basis.

Yet the media rush to give coverage to cornucopian writers (67K1) (81S1) (87W1) (01L1) who remain oblivious to all of these issues. Also, political parties make the cornucopian philosophy (81S1) the cornerstones of their environmental, population and trade platforms. Ultimately there is a price to be paid for all of this denial and self-delusion.

Return to Table of Contents of this Appendix A ~

Section (A - 12) ~ CROPLAND SOILS ~

Historical Trends: Cropland soils appear to have had a major role in determining how long past civilizations survived as progressive entities in one place before they collapsed (55C1) (Also see the introductory chapter, Section D, of Ref. (08S1).) Today, cropland topsoils are eroding far faster than the rate of topsoil creation, mainly in those developing nations where population pressures are greatest (07S1). As human population pressures expand non-irrigated croplands into semi-arid grasslands, rates of wind erosion and risks of dust bowls increase. Growing salinity and waterlogging are degrading productivity of the bulk of the world's irrigated croplands. The combination of urbanization, erosion, salinity and waterlogging are causing outright cropland abandonment at a rate of 0.7%/ year (92P1).

Cultural Differences: In Europe, a culture well-versed in human history keeps cropland erosion under control. Large applications of organic fertilizers counteract the harmful side-effects of high rates of chemical fertilizer applications. Land-use laws keep urbanization of croplands to a minimum, and semi-arid regions are rare. In the US, the highly successful federal Conservation Reserve Program for leasing highly erodible croplands and using them for other purposes has significantly reduced US soil erosion. Expanding use of "Conservation tillage" also serves to reduce US soil erosion. There is no hope of a European type of culture developing in the developing world in the foreseeable future. Population growth rates in the developing world make strict land-use laws and "Conservation-Reserve" programs politically and economically impossible. Also the developing world is full of semi-arid- and arid lands, which are highly susceptible to degradation and abandonment, while population pressures make these lands increasingly irresistible.

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Section (A - 13) ~ SHRINKING COVER-UPS ~ [A13a]~ Inorganic Fertilizers ~ [A13b]~ Genetic Improvements ~ [A13c]~ Irrigation ~ [A13d]~ Expanded use of Pesticides ~ [A13e]~ Yet-to-be Developed/ Discovered Processes ~ [A13f]~ New Directions for Human Ingenuity ~ [A13g]~ Other Analyses of Global Carrying Capacity - "Footprint" Analyses ~ [A13h]~ Other Analyses of Global Carrying Capacity - Net Primary Production Analyses ~

Population growth has always put pressure on natural resources. These pressures motivate innovative ways of resource conservation and substitution, especially in adversity. The evolution of large-scale food/ wood/ freshwater supply systems is no exception (81B1). Table (A-2) provides a summary. The doubling of global food productivity since 1961 is due almost entirely to the innovations shown in the bottom three rows of this table.

Table (A-2) ~ The evolution of large-scale food/ wood production over the centuries ~


Key Resource Utilization

Growth Constraints /






Sustainability Problems







Game animal supplies /
Game animal extinction

Slash/ Burn/ Cultivate Agriculture






Limited sustainably cropped land /
Soil degradation as fallow periods shorten;
soil erosion

Small-scale Irrigation






None - Replaced by large-scale irrigation /
Salination, sediment-build-up

Organic Fertilizer use






Severe and increasing supply limitations /

Large-scale Irrigation






Limited surface- and ground waters /
Salinization, water-logging

Inorganic Fertilizer use






Saturation effects/
Long-term soil chemistry degradation

Green Revolution






Theoretical limits to ratio of seed-to-plant mass / Shrinking gene pools

These innovations have counteracted the fundamental degradation (described above) of all major global systems for food/ wood/ freshwater production - croplands, forests, grasslands, irrigated lands, fisheries and surface/ ground water. Two question thus arise:

  1. Can this counteraction continue indefinitely, and
  2. If not, does another process await development or discovery?

The answer to Question (1) is "No". All these innovations have growth constraints, and/or sustainability problems that diminish productivity over time. The last three innovations in Table (A-2) appear to be near, at, or beyond, the point of zero marginal productivity. The answer to Question (2) is "Probably not", essentially because the "Key Resources" listed in Table (A-2) cover all plant needs. Further support for these answers is given below.

[A13a] ~ Inorganic Fertilizers ~
By way of context, Smil estimated that one-third of the present human population of the earth would not exist were it not for the food derived from synthetic nitrogenous fertilizer a product of the Haber-Bosch process for nitrogen fixation developed in the early 20th century (91S1). Some authors have noted that synthetic nitrogenous fertilizers were not put into large-scale use until around the middle of the 20th century (after WWII). The same can be said about the large-scale use of genetically modified crops (which are highly dependent on chemical fertilizers) and the construction of large-scale irrigation systems (the economics of which are greatly enhanced by the use of chemical fertilizers). It is not clear whether Smil considered this in his figure of a 50% increase in global population being dependent on synthetic nitrogenous fertilizer. The population of the world has increased by more than 100% since the middle of the 20th century.

A well-established law of plant growth (Justus von Liebig's "Law of the Minimum" (76J1)) require the marginal productivity of fertilizer to decrease with increasing dose. This marginal productivity of chemical fertilizers is now significantly lower than it was a few decades ago (91B1) (94B4). Globally, per-capita consumption of fertilizer increased five-fold during 1950-1988, but dropped 23% during 1988-1998 (98P2). Much of this drop was due to elimination of subsidies in India and China and the former USSR (94B2). If the marginal productivity of inorganic fertilizers had been able to cover their marginal costs, it seems unlikely that elimination of government subsidies would have resulted in reduced consumption, or that subsidies would have been deemed necessary in the first place.

Also, some unanticipated costs of inorganic fertilizers are being recognized. Excess fertilizer runoffs cause eutrophication in waterways and dead zones in estuaries that damage or destroy fisheries (00D1). Inorganic fertilizers also produce high concentrations of nitrates in surface- and ground water supplies that harm human health (cancer and other illnesses) (99U3). Europe, with its high rates of application of both chemical fertilizers and organic fertilizers, is pushing hard against the legal (50 ppm) limit of nitrates in surface- and ground water. Also, long-term applications of inorganic fertilizers have been found to degrade fertile temperate soils. Researchers found that soils age the equivalent of 5000 years after 30 years of normal inorganic fertilizer application. Soils lose much of their ability to hold calcium, magnesium and potassium because of increased acidity. Acidity occurs when excess nitrogen becomes nitric acid. As a result, rich temperate soils are becoming more like sandy, less productive tropical soils (99U3).

Results similar to those found in Ref. (99U3) (See above) have been found in far more extensive studies (07K1). It is often perceived that chemical nitrogen fertilizers sequester soil organic carbon by increasing the input of crop residues. This perception is shown to be false, and the opposite is found to be true. After 40 years of synthetic (chemical) fertilization in which inputs of fertilizer nitrogen exceed grain (crop) nitrogen removal by 60 to 190%, a net decline occurred in soil organic carbon despite large amounts of residual organic carbon being incorporated into the soil (07K1). These findings implicate chemical (fertilizer) nitrogen in promoting the decomposition of crop residues and soil organic matter. The results are consistent with data from numerous cropping experiments involving synthetic nitrogen fertilization in the US Corn Belt and elsewhere (07K1).

Despite the use of forage legumes, many Midwestern US soils had suffered serious declines in both nitrogen content and soil organic matter by 1950, except in cases involving regular applications of manure. There are good reasons for being concerned that these declines could adversely affect both agricultural productivity and sustainability of cropland productivity because soil organic matter plays a key role in maintaining soil aggregation and aeration, hydraulic conductivity, water availability, cation-exchange, buffer capacity, and the supply of mineralizable nutrients (07K1). Numerous 15N-tracer studies have found that the nitrogen found in grain (crops) originates largely from soil nitrogen (the nitrogen stored in soil organic matter) rather than from the nitrogen supplied by chemical fertilizers (07K1). This means that the positive effects of chemical nitrogen fertilizers must ultimately be totally counteracted by the effects of chemical nitrogen fertilizers in reducing soil organic matter. (See Chapter 1, Section B, Part [B5] of Ref. (08S1)) for more details on the role and the importance of soil organic matter.)

Fertilizer consumption per unit area of cropland in 1997 in developed countries was about 40% more than in developing countries (00W1). One might infer from this that the developing world could increase its inorganic fertilizer consumption by at least 40% before marginal costs of inorganic fertilizers exceed their marginal productivities there. But this inference needs to be examined. Heavy usage of inorganic fertilizers in the developed world comes, in no small part, from the heavy European subsidies for inorganic fertilizer consumption. These subsidies would hardly make sense if the marginal productivities of inorganic fertilizers exceed their marginal costs. The major decreases in inorganic fertilizer consumption in areas like India, China and the former USSR after subsidies were eliminated would hardly make sense unless marginal productivities of inorganic fertilizers had already fallen below their marginal costs. Other, less obvious, subsidies need to be considered. In the developed world, marginal costs (see above) associated with effects of inorganic fertilizers on surface water, ground water and temperate soils have probably been only partially internalized, if at all.

Much of the consumption of inorganic fertilizer is closely tied to use on genetically improved crops. These were developed especially to make them amenable to higher doses of fertilizer. In the developing world such crops are limited to high base-status soil areas of tropical Asia and tropical America (18% of the tropics, and already intensively exploited (75S1)). So, even under optimal conditions, inorganic fertilizer consumption per unit area of cropland in developing nations must be inherently less than in the developed world.

For all of the above reasons, the remaining justifiable increase in inorganic fertilizer consumption in the developing world must be well below 40%. Whatever the remaining justifiable percentage increase in inorganic fertilizer consumption in the developing world is, the percentage increase in food/ wood production to be expected from this extra fertilizer must be far less. This simply reflects the law of diminishing marginal returns and Justus von Liebig's "Law of the Minimum".

Sub-Saharan Africa provides an insightful case study for any debate over the undeveloped potential of inorganic fertilizer. African soils are, by nature, poor in terms of both organic matter and nutrients. In the 1990s, Inorganic fertilizer consumption in China was 240 kg./ ha/ year, 110 in India, but about 8 in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some Sub-Saharan African soils have nutrient losses exceeding 60 kg./ha/ year of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium (02F1). So the region would appear to be a prime candidate for increasing inorganic fertilizer consumption. Inorganic fertilizer prices in Sub-Saharan Africa are six times greater than in Asia, Europe and North America. On the basis of hours of labor to purchase a tonne of fertilizer, that factor of six increased to roughly 60. Infrastructure is the cause of much of the problem. Much of Africa has less than 10% of the road density of India or China (02F1). These infrastructure problems result from a shortage of financial capital that Chapter 5 of "The Controversy over US support . . ." traces to population growth rates (2.5%/ year in Africa). Sub-Saharan African farm soils are poor in organic matter, but farmers cannot raise livestock (manure source) because of population pressures on the land. Also, instead of putting manure and crop residue in soils, people burn them for fuel - yet another consequence of population pressures (02F1).

Shortage of soil organic matter reduces drought resistance and increases inorganic fertilizer runoff. For this and other reasons, low organic matter worsens the economics of inorganic (inorganic) fertilizer consumption (02F1). Shortages of organic matter and nutrients also greatly reduce the efficiency of water use, making the economics of irrigation marginal (02F1). So in theory, there is still much untapped potential for inorganic fertilizers in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the reason it remains untapped is high population growth rates that require huge amounts of financial capital to pay for the infrastructure growth needed to accommodate that population growth. According to Norman E. Borlaug, Africa's grain productivity could be doubled or tripled in three years (02K1) - probably through increased consumption of chemical fertilizers and increased use of genetically improved crops that increased fertilizer consumption allows. Africa's present food deficit, plus its expected population-doubling over the next 3-4 decades, demands at least a tripling. One third of the 590 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa are chronically undernourished. Foreign food donations cover only 20% of food deficits (02K1). Some cornucopians may choose to use Borlaug's statement to conclude that sub-Saharan Africa is not over-populated. Before they do that however, they need to determine just why the rates of chemical fertilizer applications in sub-Saharan Africa are so low. Once they do that they will probably revise their conclusion to the contention that population growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa are too high, but sub-Saharan Africa may or may not be over-populated. In that contention they are correct.

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[A13b] ~ Genetic Improvements ~
Plant breeders have not been able to fundamentally alter the basic process of photosynthesis itself, i.e. to produce more plant mass without added water, fertilizer, etc. (97B1). Instead, the "Green Revolution" made its contribution to food production by increasing the fraction of plant photosynthate devoted to the development of seeds (i.e. grain). This fraction was originally around 0.2. The green revolution increased this fraction for wheat, rice and corn to over 0.5. Scientists see a physiological upper limit to this fraction of around 0.6 (Ref. 68 of (97B1)) (93E1) or less (99M1). This suggests that further major improvements to global food supplies via genetic improvements are unlikely. The past 20 years of research has not produced a single high-yield variety of wheat, rice or corn (97B1). In fact, the overall effort aimed at developing high-yield varieties of grains has virtually ground to a halt relative to what it was 20 years ago (07W1).

Weighing against this small potential for improvement are the negative side effects associated with genetic improvements. These cause the number of varieties of food grains in common use to shrink, increasing vulnerability to insects and blights. The UNFAO estimates that, since 1900, 75% of the genetic diversity of domestic agricultural crops has been lost (98H1). Without constant infusions of new genes from the wild, geneticists cannot continue to improve domestic crops. Cultivars need to be reinvigorated about every decade in order to protect them against diseases and insects that keep adapting to the changing genetic make-up of crops (98H1). This may be one reason why, despite major increases in pesticide-use in recent decades (both in tonnage and in toxicity per ton), losses to pests have increased. Other reasons: an ever-increasing rate of introduction of exotic pest species as (a result of globalization of the world's economies), monocropping and other ill-advised agricultural practices that largely reflect growing population pressures upon the land. The overall trend in genetics research now appears to be away from high-yield species. The focus is shifting to damage control - developing new plant species with improved pest-resistances to replace previously developed species that are losing their resistance to pests that are evolving through natural selection.

Some might see undeveloped potential in the fact that not all grain crops grown in developing nations are genetically improved. Across all developing countries, modern rice varieties were being grown on 74% of the planted area in 1991, modern wheat on 74% in 1994, and modern maize on 60% in 1992 ((98M4), p.220). However, the spread of the Green Revolution is limited to high base-status soil areas of tropical Asia and tropical America. High base-status soils (18% of the tropics) are already intensively exploited (75S1). Some conclude, therefore, that high-yielding, fertilizer-responsive crop varieties are planted on nearly all suitable land (91B1).

Thus the question of whether the "Green Revolution" has yet to peak, has peaked, or has become counter-productive at its margins remains open. But it seems clear that the era of rapid food productivity growth via genetic improvements is over.

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[A13c] ~ Irrigation ~
Problems with irrigation are described in Section (A-4). The age of rapid growth of large-scale irrigation projects is clearly drawing to a close, and for numerous good and largely inescapable reasons. At the same time, the productivity loss rate due to salination, land abandonment due to salination, aquifer depletion, dam-backwater sedimentation and reallocation of water to urban uses is increasing - also for good and largely inescapable reasons. So it seems clear that, even now, irrigation no longer continues to be an engine for per-capita food supply growth. Also, new irrigation systems and dams are easy to count, but irrigation-system abandonment, dam backwater siltation and other problems are harder to gauge. This tends to contribute an erroneous, positive spin to irrigation data that needs to be recognized, if not eliminated.

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[A13d] ~ Expanded use of pesticides ~
In theory, one might postulate that the degradation in the world's cropland soils and the declining inventories of cropland soils could be compensated for by increasing the tonnage and potency of pesticides, thereby providing some semblance of sustainability to the world's food production systems. Unfortunately the available data indicate that this is not possible. It also seems unlikely that it will ever be possible. Some details of this reality are given below.

The share of harvest lost to pests remains largely the same as in 1950, despite much greater rates of application of pesticides (tonnes per unit area of land) and much more toxic pesticides (toxicity per tonne) (98Y1).

During 1945-89 in the US, insecticide applications increased 10-fold, but pre-harvest crop losses to insects nearly doubled (from 7% to 13% of the harvest in 1989) (96G2). This loss is probably in addition to the global post-harvest loss of over 20% of harvested food because of spoilage, spillage, and losses to rodents and insects (96G2). Mono-cropping, reductions in both strip-cropping and crop-rotation practices explains part of the higher rate of losses to pests (96G2). The decreasing genetic diversity of crops (a result of the "Green Revolution)" also aids pests and necessitates increased usage of pesticides. Ever-increasing rates of introduction of exotic pest species (a product of globalization) also tends to counteract the effects of increased rates of pesticide application and toxicity. Also, the pesticides that are developed tend to be "non-specific" meaning that they often kill non-target organisms, including the natural enemies of targeted pests. Because of the disruption of natural enemies of pests, there have been resurgences of existing pests and outbreaks of new ones (03B4).

The overall focus in plant genetics research appears to have moved away from developing new, high productivity "miracle" (genetically enhanced) strains of cereal grains. The new focus appears to be that of developing new plant species with improved pest-resistances to replace previously developed plant species that are losing their resistance to genetically enhanced pests that keep evolving through natural selection. So far, genetically enhanced pests are winning or holding their own in the race with genetically enhanced plants. It is not clear that this will ever change, especially with all the help they keep getting from the ill-advised agricultural practices, the ever-increasing rates of importation of exotic pest species, and the non-specificity of pesticides described above. Almost all economically significant pests are now resistant to at least one chemical pesticide (03B4).

The trend toward monoculture does not just promote crop losses to pests. It also causes yields to decrease with time regardless of how much fertilizer is applied. A steady annual presence of a particular root system favors a few organisms - bacteria, fungi, nematodes - that are potagenic to plant roots. Changing to a different crop alters the circumstances, and all but the most unspecialized pathogens are unable to thrive in the absence of their usual host (90A1).

If all of the above weren't frightening enough, it must be pointed out that as the potency (toxicity per ton) of pesticides increase, they also become more toxic to humans as well. Also, humans have a distinct disadvantage relative to smaller pests. Smaller pests can be genetically enhanced via natural selection in something on the order of a decade (about the same time as that required to develop an improved pesticide or a new pest-resistant plant specie). Humans, on the other hand require a vastly longer time to be genetically enhanced via natural selection. Much research has been done on the effects of residual pesticides on human health. As a result, government agencies have placed restrictions on the amount of residual pesticides that various food products can contain. But there are other ways that pesticide residues can make their way into human blood streams and livers. One other way is for agricultural workers and gardeners to come into direct physical contact with pesticides residing on plant surfaces. One effect on agricultural workers and gardeners is described below.

A study followed the health of 143,000 people since 1982 tried to pick out the factors that lead to diseases. People regularly exposed to pesticides were found to have a 70% higher incidence of Parkinson's disease. Gardeners who used such chemicals were as much at risk as farm workers. The findings support the idea that exposure to pesticides is a risk factor for Parkinson's disease (a brain disease that afflicts about 150,000 Britons, with nearly 10,000 new cases a year). Scientists have suspected a link between pesticides and Parkinson's since 1983 when Californian drug addicts were diagnosed with the disease after taking impure drugs. Since then, epidemiological studies have hinted at links, but few studies have been large enough to extract meaningful data. The latest research is big enough to get around that problem but it raises new questions, especially as to which pesticide(s) might be causing this effect. In Britain 31,000 tons of pesticides are applied to gardens and farms each year. Many pesticides are designed to be toxic to pests' nervous systems, so a link between pesticides and Parkinson's disease in humans should not be surprising ("US: Study Reveals Pesticides Link to Parkinson's," The Times (6/25/06)). As application rates of pesticides continue to increase, and as pesticide potencies continue to increase, the effects of pesticides on human health can hardly do anything but increase also.

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[A13e] ~ Yet-to-be-Developed/ Discovered Processes ~
Plants need water, nutrients, genes and light for survival - little else. The water issue is within the irrigation issue. The nutrients issue is within the fertilizer issue. The genes issue is within the "green revolution" issue. All these have been analyzed. Only light remains as a potential, not-yet-addressed source of food/ wood-productivity improvements. Actually this issue has been thought about - in terms of vast mirrors in outer space, and in terms of hydroponics where fluorescent light bulbs serve as surrogate sunlight. Hydroponics is capable of producing the more expensive foods (some fruits and vegetables, but not grains - 80% of human food supplies) for the wealthiest of developed-nation consumers. But the thought of substantively increasing light supplies to an inventory of plants comparable to those that now grow on some 15 million km2 of the world's croplands seems far-fetched at best. And the notion that food produced by highly capital-intensive hydroponics could feed people living on $2/ day in capital-starved economies seems unlikely. Any argument that contends that a yet-to-be-developed technology could sustainably increase food supplies should begin by defining the plant-need that the new technology is likely to serve. Since no un-addressed plant needs remain, it seems reasonable to assume that no more major technologies await development.

U.S. Department of Agriculture plant scientist Thomas R. Sinclair observes that advances in plant physiology now let scientists quantify crop-yield potentials quite precisely. The physiological limits of such metabolic processes as transpiration, respiration, and photosynthesis are well known. He notes "except for a few options which allow small increases in yield ceilings, the physiological limit to crop yields may well have been reached under experimental conditions." In these situations, national or local, where farmers are using the highest-yielding varieties that plant breeders can provide, and the agronomic inputs and practices needed to realize fully their genetic potential, there are few options left for dramatically raising land productivity (94S1).

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[A13f] ~ New Directions for Human Ingenuity? ~
Population increases, it is often argued, produce more human minds that are thus able to more rapidly devise ways of improving the human condition (67K1) (81S1). Proponents of this view implicitly use the effects of expanded inorganic fertilizer use, genetic improvements, and irrigation-system growth over the past four decades to make their point and pretend that they know nothing of fundamental limitations to all three of these developments. The problem with such contentions lies in the fact that human ingenuity, when applied to food/ wood/ freshwater production, increasingly focuses on non-sustainable expedients, zero-sum games, or negative-sum games. They produce current benefits by degrading key components of food/ wood/ freshwater supply systems. Or they devise asset-transfers from developing to developed nations under circumstances far removed from those of a free market.

For example, factory trawlers increase fish production for the near-term, but massively increase by-catch and degrade vast areas of fish habitat. These effects insure the demise in the fundamental productivity of the fisheries they operate in. The use of explosives and cyanide to harvest fish from coral reefs produce the same type of effects. Heavily subsidized developed-world fishing companies purchase fishing rights from financially strapped developing nations. Some results are more extreme levels of over-fishing, and transfers of fish from developing-world marketplaces to developed world markets.

Some may suggest that genetic modification of plants represents an example of human Ingenuity that could greatly increase the global productivity of food sufficient to satisfy the needs of the additional three billion new inhabitants of the Earth expected during the next 4-5 decades. Unfortunately this is not so. Today's plant geneticists are busy developing new plant species that will counteract all those genetically improved pests that keep evolving via natural selection. It is still far from clear who will win -the pests or the geneticists. The development over the past decade of a new bred of rice ("Nericas") well suited to the climate and soil conditions of West Africa might be taken by some as a development that breaks through the fundamental limit of the Green Revolution alluded to above. (See Chapter 1 Section A Part A4b of Ref. (08S1).) Again, this is not the case. Part of the improvement comes from improved pest resistance - a benefit that will disappear as soon as the next round of genetically improved pests appears on the scene. Also, the improvement will only accommodate West Africa's population growth for about 5 years - even discounting the considerable difficulties governments are having making farmers aware of the development. After that, another decade will be required to develop yet another breed of rice for West Africa. West Africa's plant geneticists appear to be losing their battle with West Africa's Total Fertility Rates by a wide margin.

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[A13g] ~ Other Analyses of Global Carrying Capacity - "Footprint" Analyses ~
The ecological "footprint" - the average amount of productive land and shallow sea appropriated by each person for food, water, housing, energy, transportation, commerce and waste absorption-is about one hectare (2.47 acres) in developing nations, and 9.6 hectares (24 acres) in the US (02W1). For every person in the world to reach present US levels of consumption with existing technology would require five planet Earths (02W1). So if globalization caused the standards of living of every nation to converge, and the Earth's "footprint" limit were obeyed, that living standard would be 20% of the current US standard of living, or 1.9 times the current standard of living of the developing world. The peak human population, anticipated in mid-21st century (9 billion (99U2) (01U3)), would take 1.9 down to 1.27. The lack of sustainability in the management of the world's key food/ wood/ freshwater supply systems would cause 1.27 to fall indefinitely. "Footprint" analyses tell us, therefore, that the most optimistic convergence point of globalization must be something on the order of the current standard of living of the developing world. Neglected are the potential marginal productivity enhancement schemes such as increased consumption of inorganic fertilizer, expansion of irrigated land, and genetic improvements. These and others are evaluated above.

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[A13h] ~ Other Analyses of Global Carrying Capacity - Net Primary Production Analyses ~
Net Primary Production (NPP) analyses start with known rates of photosynthesis (the bottom of the food chain that is the source of all food and natural wood consumed by Man) and compute what fraction of terrestrial NPP is consumed directly or co-opted because of human activity. The word "Net" means that the respiration of primary producers-mostly plants-is subtracted from the total amount of energy (mostly solar) that is fixed biologically to compute NPP. The most comprehensive, global-scale analysis of this type was done by Vitousek et al (86V1). They compute that nearly 40% of the world's potential NPP is used directly, co-opted or foregone because of human activity, including 2% of aquatic primary production. Correcting for population growth since 1986 would give an updated global fraction of 48%. A later (1995) study by the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management estimated that humans co-opt 8% of aquatic primary productivity - 2% of open ocean primary productivity and 25-34% of other aquatic systems (98M3).

The implication of all this is that the world's human carrying capacity is limited to that that would result in the fraction of NPP co-opted becoming 100% (Vitousek et al's "intermediate" estimate) assuming infinite supplies of fossil fuels, freshwater, waste-disposal sites, etc.. The implication of a 48% co-option of NPP is that human populations could roughly double. This seems inconsistent with the more comprehensive "footprint" analyses that imply that humans already consume somewhat more than 100% of the productivities of the world's photosynthesis-based systems. This inconsistency can be explained by some inconsistencies and an error in Vitousek et al's "intermediate" analysis of co-opted NPP. These inconsistencies and the error are corrected in Appendix A of Ref. (06S1). The revised global accessible NPP co-opted by humans is 89-96%. The revision takes cognizance of the fact that some NPP is so diffuse that it is effectively inaccessible to human co-option. This largely eliminates the inconsistency between NPP and "footprint" analyses.

Both "footprint" and NPP analyses lead to the same basic conclusion as that reached in this appendix - that, under present resource management practices, no significant options exist for sustainably increasing global food/ wood outputs.

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Section (A - 14) ~ APPENDIX A ~ REFERENCES ~
1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04,

55C1 Vernon Gill Carter, Tom Dale, Topsoil and Civilization, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman Oklahoma (1955) 292 pp.
67K1 S. Kuznets, "Population and Economic Growth", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 111 (1967) pp. 170-193.
74F1 Martin M. Fogel, "Comments on the Symposium from a Hydrologic Perspective", in Irrigation's Impact on Society, T. E. Downing and M. Gibson, editors, University of Arizona Press (1974) pp. 169-171.
75S1 P. A. Sanchez, S.W. Buol, "Soils of the Tropics and the World Food Crisis", Science 188 (1975) pp. 598-603.
76J1 Jules Janick, Carl H. Noller, Charles L. Rhykerd, "The Cycle of Plant- and Animal Nutrition", Scientific American 235 (September 1976) pp. 75-86.
77A1 Avil Agarwal, "The Rising Cost of Making Deserts Bloom", New Scientist (10/13/77) pp. 96-97.
78B1 Lester R. Brown, "The World-wide Loss of Croplands", Worldwatch Paper 24, (October 1978) 49 pp.

~ 1980-1984 ~
Nevin S. Scrimshaw, Lance Taylor, "Food", Scientific American (September 1980) pp. 78-88.
80U1 (Unknown), "The World's Tropical Forests: A Policy, Strategy and Program for the U. S.", (Report to the President by a U.S. Inter-agency Task Force on Tropical Forests) (1980) 53 pp. USGPO, Washington DC 20402 (Department of State Publication 9117).
81B1 E. Boserup, "Population and Technology Changes: A Study of Long-Term Trends", Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1981).
81C1 Council on Environmental Quality, Department of State, The Global 2000 Report to the President, Gerald O. Barney, Editor, 2 (1981).
81F1 Walter Friedenberg, "World Wood Shortage has become a Burning Issue", Pittsburgh Press, 7/11/81.
81S1 Julian Simons, The Ultimate Resource, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ (1981).
82M1 Michel Meybeck, "C, N, and P Transport by the World's Rivers", American Journal of Science, 282 (1982) pp. 401-450.
83N1 James D. Nations, Daniel I. Komer, "Rainforests and the Hamburger Society", Environment, 25(3) (1983) pp. 12-19.
84G1 Nicholas Guppy, "Tropical Deforestation: A Global View", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1984, 62, pp. 928-965 (World Bank data).
84S1 Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Soils at Risk, Senate of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A0A4 (1984) 129 pp.
84T1 Ralph W.Tinder, Jr. "Wetlands of the United States: Current Status and Recent Trends", U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service (March 1984) 59 pp.

~ 1985-1989 ~
J. Dumanski, D. R. Coote, G.Luciak, C. Lok, "Soil Conservation in Canada", Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 41 (1986) pp. 204-210.
86V1 Peter M. Vitousek, Paul R. Ehrlich, Ann H. Ehrlich, Pamela A. Matson, "Human Appropriation of the Products of Photosynthesis", BioScience, 36(6) (1986) pp. 368-373.
87M1 K. Mahmood, "Reservoir Sedimentation: Impact, Extent and Mitigation", World Bank, Washington DC, 1987.
87W1 Ben Wattenberg, "The Birth Dearth", Pharos Books (1987).
88B1 Lester R. Brown, "The Changing World Food Prospect: The Nineties and beyond", Worldwatch Paper 85 (October 1988) 60 pp.
88P1 Sandra Postel, Lori Heise, "Reforesting The Earth", World Watch Paper 83, (April 1988).

~1990-1994 ~
Philip H. Abelson, "Opportunities in Agricultural Research", Science, 248 (1990) p. 941.
90B1 Holly Brough, "Zimbabwe Sows Seeds of Land Equality", Worldwatch 3(3) (1990) pp. 37-38
90B2 Lester R. Brown, John E. Young, "Feeding the World in the '90s", in Linda Starke, Editor, State of The World 1990, W.W. Norton Co., New York (1990) pp. 59-78.
90P1 Sandra Postel, "Saving Water for Agriculture", Linda Starke, editor, State of the World 1990, W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1990) pp. 39-58.
91B1 Lester R. Brown, "Fertilizer Engine Losing Steam", Worldwatch, 4 (1991) pp. 32-33.
91J1 Lynn Jacobs, Waste of the West: Public Lands Grazing, P.O. Box 5784, Tucson, AZ 85703 602 pp. (1991)
91S1 Vaclav Smil, "Population growth and nitrogen: an exploration of a critical existential link." Population and Development Review 17: (1991) pp. 569-601.
91U1 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) "Population, Resources and the Environment", London, UNFPA (1991).
92P1 Pimentel, D., Stachow, U., Takacs, D. A., Brubaker, H.W., Dumas, A. R., Meaney, J. J., O'Neil, J., Onsi, D. E. and Corzilius, D. B. "Conserving biological diversity in agricultural/ forestry systems", Bioscience 42 (1992) pp. 354-362.
92U1 John Urquhart, "Canada to Seed Record Wheat Acreage: Strong Exports, Higher Prices are Cited", Wall Street Journal (3/23/92).
93B1 Lester R. Brown, "A New Era Unfolds", in Linda Starke, Editor, State of the World 1993, W. W. Norton and Co., New York (1993) pp. 3-21.
93E1 L.T. Evans, Crop Evolution, Adaptation and Yield, Cambridge University Press (1993).
93P1 Sandra Postel, "Facing Water Scarcity", in Linda Starke, editor, State of the World 1993, W. W. Norton and Co., New York (1993) pp. 22-41.
93U1 Audubon, (March/ April 1993) pp. 54-63. National Audubon Society.

94A1 Per Pinstrup Anderson and Rajul Pandya-Lorch, "Alleviating Poverty, Intensifying Agriculture and Effectively Managing Natural Resources", Food, Agriculture and the Environment Discussion Paper 1, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC (1994).
94B1 John Bongaarts, "Can the Growing Human Population Feed Itself?" Scientific American, 270(3) (March 1994) pp. 36-42.
94B2 Lester R. Brown, Hal Kane, "Full House: Reassessing The Earth's Population Carrying Capacity", W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1994) 262 pp.
94D2 Democratic Staff Report, "Taking from the Taxpayer: Public Subsidies for Natural Resource Development", Committee on Oversight and Investigation, Committee on Natural Resources, US House of Representatives, 103rd. Congress, 2nd Session, 8/94, Washington DC.
94H1 Joan Hamilton, Sierra (November-December 1994) pp. 36-37.
94K1 Henry W. Kindall, David Pimentel, "Constraints on the Expansion of the Global Food Supply", Ambio 23(3), (May 1994).
94L1 Leisinger, K. M. and Schmitt, K., "All our people -Population Policy with a Human Face", Washington DC, Island Press (1994) 280 pp.
94S1 Thomas R. Sinclair, "Limits to Crop Yield?" in American Society of Agronomy, Crop Science Society of America, and Soil Science Society of America, "Physiology and Determination of Crop Yield", Madison, Wisconsin (1994)) (See Lester R. Brown, Gary Gardner, Brian Halweil, "Beyond Malthus: Sixteen Dimensions of the Population Problem", Worldwatch Paper 143, (September 1998) p. 72.).
94W1 Peter Weber, Net Loss: Fish, Jobs and the Marine Environment, World Watch Paper 120 (July 1994) 76 pp.
94W2 Peter Weber, "Safeguarding Oceans", in Linda Starke, editor, State of the World 1994, W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1994) pp. 40-60.

~ 1995-1999 ~
Lester R. Brown, "Nature's Limits", in Linda Starke, Editor, State of the World 1995, W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1995) pp. 3-20 [based on FAO data in Fishery Statistics: Trade and Commerce (various years)]
95D1 Derek Denniston, Worldwatch Paper #123, (1995).
95J1 Wm. I. Jones, "The World Bank and Irrigation", World Bank, Washington DC, (1995).
95K1 G. Kelleher et al, "A Global Representative System of Marine Protected Areas, Vol.1", a joint publication of the World Bank, The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Washington DC (1995).
95W1 Washington Post, "Unexplored Coral Reefs Already Facing Ruin", Pittsburgh. Tribune Review (6/2/95).

96B1 Lester R. Brown, "The Acceleration of History", in Linda Starke, editor, State of the World 1996, W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1996) pp. 3-20.
96B2 A. J. Belsky, D.M.Blumenthal, "Effects of livestock grazing on Stand Dynamics and Soils in Upland Forests of the Interior West", Conservation Biology, 11 (1996) pp. 315-327.
96G1 Gary Gardner, "Shrinking Fields: Cropland Loss in a World of Eight Billion", World Watch Paper #131 (July 1996) 56 pp.
96G2 Gary Gardner, "Preserving Agricultural Resources", in Linda Starke, editor, State of the World 1996, W. W. Norton and Co., New York (1996) pp. 78-94.
96H1 Don Hinrichsen, "Reef Revival", Amicus Journal, 18(2) (1996) pp. 22-25.
96N1 E. K. Sadanandan Nambiar, "Sustained Productivity of Forests in a Continuing Challenge to Soil Science", Soil Science Society of America Journal, 60 (1996) pp. 1629-1642.
96P1 Sandra Postel, "Forging a Sustainable Water Strategy", in Linda Starke, Editor, State of the World 1996, W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1996) pp. 40-59.
96P2 Sandra L. Postel, Gretchen C. Daily, Paul R. Ehrlich, "Human Appropriation of Renewable Fresh Water", Science, 271 (1996) pp. 785-788.
96S1 Charles H. Southwick, "Global Ecology in Human Perspective", Oxford U. Press, New York (1996).
96T1 A. E. Tiarks, J. D. Haywood, "Site Preparation and Fertilization Effects on Growth of Slash Pine for Two Rotations", Soil Science Society of America Journal, 60 (1996) pp. 1654-1663.

97B1 Lester R. Brown, "The Agricultural Link: How Environmental Deterioration Could Disrupt Economic Progress", Worldwatch Paper 136 (1997) 73 pp.
97C1 Pierre Crosson, "Will Erosion Threaten Agricultural Productivity?", Environment 39(8) (1997) pp. 4-9 and 29-31.
97H1 Don Hinrichsen, "Coral Reefs in Crisis", People and the Planet, 6(2) (1997) http://www.oneworld.org/patp/index.html.
97P1 Sandra Postel, "Last Oasis: Facing Water Scarcity", Cadillac Desert PBS Series http://www.pbs.org/kteh/cadillacdesert/home.html http://www.worldwatch.org/pubs/ea/lo.html
97R1 Michael Renner, "Transforming Security", in Linda Starke, Editor, State of the World 1997, W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1997) pp.115-131.
97U1 United Nations, "Government Views on the Relationship between Population and Environment", United Nations, New York, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1997).

98A2 Janet N. Abramovitz, "Taking a stand: Cultivating a New Relationship with the World's Forests", Worldwatch Paper 140 (April 1998) 84 pp.
98B1 Rodolfo A. Bulatao, "The Value of Family-Planning Programs in Developing Countries", RAND MR-978-WFHF/RF/UNFPA (1998) 79 pp.
98B2 Lester R. Brown, "The Future of Growth", in Linda Starke, editor, State of the World 1998, W.W. Norton and Co., New York, (1998) pp. 3-20.
98B3 Bread for the World Institute Report of 11/19/98.
98D1 Tim Dyson, "World Food Trends and Prospects to 2025", National Academy of Sciences Colloquium, "Plants and population: is there time?", UC Irvine, (12/5-6/98) http://www.lsc.psu.edu/nas/Speakers/Dyson%20manuscript.html.
98H1 Don Hinrichsen, (Contributing Editor), "Feeding a Future World", People and the Planet, 7(1) (1998) http://www.oneworld.org/patp/index.html.
98H2 Don Hinrichsen, "Winning the Food Race", Population Reports, Series M, No.13, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, Population Information Program (November 1997) 24 pp.
98K1 Danielle Knight, "Marine Fisheries in Global Crisis", InterPress Third World News Agency report of a Science Magazine article (2/6/98).
98M1 Ann Platt McGinn, "Promoting Sustainable Fisheries", in Linda Starke, editor, State of the World, 1998, W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1998) pp. 59-78.
98M1 Ahmar Mustikhan, "US Factory Fishing Company in Pakistan U.S. Company Could Wipe Out Pakistani Fishing Grounds", (12/3/98) ENS.
98M2 Ashley T. Mattoon, "Paper Forests, WorldWatch 11(2) (1998) pp. 20-25.
98M3 Ann Platt McGinn, "Promoting Sustainable Fisheries", in Linda Starke, Editor, State of the World, 1998, W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1998) pp. 59-78.
98M4 M. L. Morris and P.W. Heisey, "Achieving Desirable levels of Crop Diversity in Farmer's Fields: Factors Affecting the Production and use of Commercial Seeds", pp. 217-38 in Farmers, Gene Banks and Crop Breeding: Economic Analysis of Diversity in Wheat, Maize and Rice, M.Smale, Editor, Kluweer Academic publishers, Boston (1998).
98M5 Anne Platt McGinn, "Rocking the Boat: Conserving Fisheries and Protecting Jobs", Worldwatch Paper 142 (June 1998) 92 pp.
98N1 Rosamond L. Naylor, Rebecca J. Goldburg et al, "Nature's Subsidies to Shrimp and Salmon Farming", Science 282 (10/30/98) pp. 883-884.
98P1 Daniel Pauly et al, "Fishing Down Marine Food Webs", Science 279 (2/6/98) pp. 860-863.
98P2 David Pimentel, INTERNET:dp18@cornell.edu (9/1/98).
98S1 William K. Stevens, "Water: Pushing the Limits of an Irreplaceable Resource", New York Times, 12/8/98.
98S2 Paul Simon, "Are We Running Dry?", Parade Magazine Sunday (August 23, 1998).
98U1 (Unknown), "Invasive Specie Threatens Great Lakes", Watershed Currents- 2(12) (8/5/98) Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (iatp@iatp.org).
98U2 UNFAO, "The State of Food and Agriculture 1998" (11/26/98).
98W1 Peter K. Weber, "Global Fishery Trends and their Implications for Fishing Communities", presented to World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers (1998).
98W2 L.Watling and E. A. Norse, "Disturbance of the Seabed by Mobile Fishing Gear: A Comparison to Forest Clearcutting", Conservation Biology 12 (1998) pp.1180-1197.
98Y1 Yudelman, M., Ratta, A. and Nygaard, D., "Pest management and food production: looking to the future", Food, Agriculture and the Environment Discussion Paper No. 25. Washington DC, IFPRI (1998).

99A1 Janet N. Abramovitz, Ashley T. Mattoon, "Reorienting the Forest Products Economy", in Linda Starke, editor, State of the World 1999, W.W. Norton and Co., New York (1999) pp. 60-77.
99D1 Cynthia Dailard, "Abortion in Context: United States and Worldwide", The Alan Guttmacher Institute, (May 1999) 12 pp.
99M1 Charles C. Mann, "Crop Scientists Seek a New Revolution", Science (1/15/99).
99P1 Sandra Postel, "Pillar of Sand: Can the Irrigation Miracle Last?", W.W. Norton and Co., New York, (1999) 312 pp.
99R1 Red Cross World Disaster Report of 6/23/99 (See New York Times of 6/24/99).
99U1 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), "The State of World Population, 1999" (1999) (http://www.unfpa.org).
99U2 U. S. Bureau of the Census, "International Brief, World Population at a Glance: 1998 and Beyond", Washington DC, U.S. Government Printing Office (1999).
99U3 (Unknown), "Fertilizers Over-applied" and "Nitrogen Impacting Iowa's Drinking Water", Watershed Currents, 3(2) (3/18/99).
99W1 Patricia Wolff, "The Taxpayer's Guide to Subsidized Ranching in the Southwest", Center for Biological Diversity and New West Research (September 1999) 23 pp.

~ 2000-2004 ~
00D1 Doug Daigle, "Mississippi River Groups call Farm Bureau's Hypoxia Policy Distorting and Inappropriate", Mississippi River Basin Alliance, 504-588-9008 (8/9/00).
00F1 FAO, "Statistical Databases", Online at http://apps.fao.org/ (2000).
00N1 Brian Nichiporuk, "The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors", RAND MR-1088-WFHF/RF/DLPF/A (2000) 52 pp.
00N2 Rosamond L. Naylor, Rebecca J. Goldburg et al, "Effect of Aquaculture on World Fish Supplies", Nature 405 (6/29/00) pp. 1017-1024 (91 refs.).
00S1 J. Joseph Speidel, "Environment and Health: 1. Population, Consumption and Human Health", Canadian Medical Association Journal, 163(5) (9/5/00) pp. 551-556.
00S2 Payal Sampat, "Groundwater Shock", WorldWatch (January/February 2000).
00W1 World Resources Institute, World Resources 2000-2001, World Resources Institute, 10 G St. NE, Washington DC 20002 (2000) 389 pp.
00W2 Stanley Wood, Kate Sebastian, Sara J. Scherr, PILOT Analysis of Global Ecosystems: Agroecosystems, International Food Policy Research Institute and World Resources Institute, Washington DC (2000) 94 pp.

01A1 Associated Press article on the International Conference on Conservation and Management of Lakes meeting in Japan (11/12/01).
01L1 Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist, Cambridge University Press (2001) 496 pp.
01M1Alex F. McCalla and Cesar L. Revoredo, "Prospects for Global Food Security: A Critical Appraisal of Past Projections and Predictions", International Food Policy Research Institute, 2033 K St. NW, Washington DC 20006-1002 (October 2001) (80 pp), (http:www.ifpri.org/2020/dp/2020dp35.pdf) (1.664 MB).
01N1 Larry Nowels, "Population Assistance and Family Planning Programs: Issues for Congress", Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB96026 (2/21/01) 10 pp.
01S1 Bruce Sundquist, The Earth's Carrying Capacity - Some Literature Reviews, http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/index.html (January, 2001).
01U3 United Nations, "World Population Prospects: the 2000 Revision", Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York: United Nations (2001).

02F1 Heidi Fritschel, "Nurturing the Soil in Sub-Saharan Africa", IFPRI, 2020 News and Views (July, 2002).
02K1 Scott Kilman, Roger Thurow, "Africa Could Grow Enough to Feed Itself; Should It?" Wall Street Journal (12/3/02).
02M1Thomas W. Merrick, "Population and Poverty: New Views on an Old Controversy", Inter-national Family Planning Perspectives, 28(1) (2002) 10 pp. (www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/2804102.pdf
02P1 Michael M. Phillips, "O'Neil Takes a Firm Stance on Trade Gap in G-7 Meetings", Wall Street Journal (4/2/02).
02S1 Pedro A. Sanchez, Science, 295 (2002) pp. 2019-2020.
02U1 US Census Bureau, International Data Base of 10/10/02, http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/popproj.html
02W1 Edward O. Wilson, The Future of Life, Alfred A. Knopf (2002).
02W2 Peter Wonacott, "China's Secret Weapon: Smart, Cheap Labor for High-Tech Goods", Wall Street Journal (3/14/02).

03B4 Jelle Bruinsma, "Selected Issues in Agricultural Technology", Chapter 11, pp. 297-330 in Jelle Bruinsma, editor, World Agriculture: Towards 2015/ 2030, UNFAO (2003) Earthscan Publications, London, 432 pages.

04D1 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, Viking (2004) 576 pp.

06S1 Bruce Sundquist, Globalization: The Convergence Issue, http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/gci.html, Edition 15 (December 2006).

07K1 S. A. Khan, R. L. Mulvaney, T. R. Ellsworth and C. W. Boast, "The Myth of Nitrogen Fertilization for Soil Carbon Sequestration," Journal of Environmental Quality 36 (2007) pp. 1821-1832.
07S1 Bruce Sundquist, Topsoil Loss - Causes, Effects, and Implications: A Global Perspective, Edition 7 (July 2007) http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/se0.html
07S2 Bruce Sundquist, Forest Land Degradation: A Global Perspective, Edition 6 (July 2007) http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/df0.html
07S3 Bruce Sundquist, Grazing Lands Degradation: A Global Perspective, Edition 6 (July 2007) http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/og0.html
07S4 Bruce Sundquist, Irrigated Lands Degradation: A Global Perspective, Edition 5 (July 2007) http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/ir0.html
07S5 Bruce Sundquist, Fishery Degradation: A Global Perspective, Edition 8 (July 2007) http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/fi0.html
07W1 Malia Wollan, "Alternative-Fuel Hunt Gives Plant Biologists a Lift," Wall Street Journal (7/10/07) p. B1.

08S1 Bruce Sundquist, Sustainability of the World's Outputs of Food, Wood and Freshwater for Human Consumption, Edition 1 (March 2008) http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/su0.html
08S2 Bruce Sundquist, The Informal Economy of the Developing World: The Context, the Prognosis and a Broader Perspective, Edition 1 (March 2008) http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/ie.html
08S3 Bruce Sundquist, Could Family Planning Cure Terrorism? Edition 7 (March 2008) http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/terror.html

Return to Table of Contents of this Appendix A ~